Annette Baier Prize Judging Criteria

The sole criterion for the Prize is philosophical merit. The judging panel will consider and score the entries on:

1.Overall impression of merit 

2. Originality 

3. Scholarship 

4. Clarity of expression

Eligibility

The prize is open to female professional philosophers who are actively engaged in an Australasian higher education and/or research institution. ‘Professional philosopher’ includes Research Higher Degree students. Entries must appear in print (or in final form if the publication is online only) in 2020 to be eligible. If the piece appears first online and then in hard copy in different years, it may be submitted in either of those years, but may only be submitted once. The prize is open to published papers or book chapters (i.e. chapters in edited anthologies, (not monographs)) in any area of philosophy. 

In addition

• Only single-authored entries are eligible
  
• If the author has Australasian and non-Australasian affiliations, the paper needs to be published under at least one Australasian affiliation (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore)

Please note the following change in procedure: Entries must be submitted as a PDF for blind review with all names, contact details, publication name and other identifying features redacted.

The closing date for entries is February 28 2021 at 6pm AEDT. Please note: late entries will not be accepted.

Full details on Policy & Procedure can be found HERE (Requires Member Login)

This prize requires the collection of personal information. The way this personal information is used and distributed is detailed in the AAP Privacy Policy which can be found HERE. The AAP Privacy Policy forms part of the terms and conditions of this prize. By submitting a nomination, an applicant agrees to the usage of personal information as defined in the AAP Privacy Policy. Those nominating a third party for the prize should pay special attention to their obligation in notifying the third party of the usage and disclosure of their information as defined in the AAP Privacy Policy.

All enquiries to: admin@aap.org.au

This Prize is sponsored by Taylor and Francis, publisher of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and the Australasian Philosophical Review.

2019 Winner

Louise Richardson-Self  University of Tasmania

sites.google.com/site/louiserichardsonself

ABC Radio interview.

In "Offending White Men" the author very skillfully and convincingly draws on recent scholarship on epistemic injustice to address an important issue in contemporary Australian politics and society, namely recent challenges to the Racial Discrimination Act by white complainants. The paper is an excellent example of engaged philosophy - philosophy that takes as its starting point a specific social problem and uses the resources of philosophical theory to analyse and respond to that problem.

Richardson-Self, L. 2018. 'Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice'. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 4(4). 

2019 Commendation

Holly Lawford-Smith  University of Melbourne

hollylawford-smith.org

Lawford-Smith, H. 2018. 'What's Wrong with Collective Punishment?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 3/CXVIII. 

2019 Shortlist

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Bronwyn Finnigan  Australian National University

sites.google.com/site/bronwynfinnigan

Finnigan, B. 2018. 'Is Consciousness Reflexively Self-Aware? A Buddhist Analysis'. Ratio, 31: 389-401

Holly Lawford-Smith  University of Melbourne

hollylawford-smith.org

Lawford-Smith, H. 2018. 'What's Wrong with Collective Punishment?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 3/CXVIII. 

Kristie Miller  The University of Sydney

kristiemiller.net

Miller, K. 2018. 'The New Growing Block Theory vs Presentism'. Inquiry, 61(3): 223-251.

Catherine Mills  Monash University

monash.edu/en/persons/catherine-mills

Mills, C. 2018. 'Seeing, Feeling, Doing: Mandatory ultrasound laws, empathy and abortion'. Journal of Practical Ethics. 6(2): 1-31.

Louise Richardson-Self  University of Tasmania

sites.google.com/site/louiserichardsonself

Richardson-Self, L. 2018. 'Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice'. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 4(4). 

^{2018 Annette Baier Prize Winner}

Jennifer Windt  Monash University

"Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self-and world-simulation in dreams"

Synthese 195.6 (2018): 2577-2625.

This paper is exceptionally clear and systematic. Building on an impressive body of prior work, Windt does a great job of walking the inexperienced reader through the steps of both established scholarly debates in analytic philosophy of mind, and a wealth of empirical data on dreaming. The manifold and subtle ways in which the paper manages to explore the testability of various well-known philosophical positions as empirical hypotheses greatly impressed the judges. The paper is also notable for arguing powerfully against a view of the relationship between mind, brain and body that is currently widely held by philosophers (‘cranial envatment’), and advancing an interesting positive thesis of its own: that the way we imagine our body to be shapes our phenomenal states, and thus while we’re dreaming our actual bodily sensations might give rise to dream images that unfold through their own logic and then inform further dream ‘perceptions’ in a rich feedback loop. One judge also noted potentially rich connections between this discussion and work by Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. 

^{2018 Annette Baier Prize Commendations}

Talia Morag  Deakin University
"The Tracking Dogma in the Philosophy of Emotion"
Argumenta 2, 2 (2017) 343-363

Helen Ngo Deakin University
"Simulating the Lived Experience of Racism and Islamophobia: On ‘Embodied Empathy’ and Political Tourism"
Australian Feminist Law Journal (2017) 43:1, 107-123, DOI: 10.1080/13200968.2017.1321090

2017 Annette Baier Prize Winner

Miriam Bankovsky La Trobe University

'Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence'

Journal of Applied Philosophy - March 2016

Bankovsky’s paper provides a highly original analysis of an idea that has been with us since the Ancient Greeks – that envy is irrational, and as such, does not provide justification for economic redistribution. Bankovsky challenges this orthodoxy by recovering the overlooked concept from John Rawls of ‘excusable envy’, which she argues shows that envy can be rational, and does provide grounds for economic redistribution. Bankovsky’s analysis is both detailed and ambitious; it has the potential to re-orient philosophical analysis of economic envy, from the language of individual shame to that of collective social justice. In this, she links conceptual argumentation with contemporary political concerns, in an article that the committee judged to be of a high standard of scholarship, clarity and overall merit. Her article is a commendable achievement.

2017 Short List

Tracy Llanera Macquarie University

'Rethinking nihilism: Rorty vs Taylor, Dreyfus and Kelly', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 42.9 (2016), 937-950.

Talia Morag Deakin University

'Emotions as judgments or as modes of “seeing-as”: The explanatory challenges toward a causal account for emotional episodes', Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 21-57

Miriam Bankovsky La Trobe University

'Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence', Journal of Applied Philosophy, (March 2016), DOI: 10.1111/japp.12194

Dalia Nassar University of Sydney

'Analogical reflection as a source for the science of life: Kant and the possibility of the biological sciences', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016), 57-66.

Anik Waldow University of Sydney

'Natural history and the formation of the human being: Kant on active forces', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 56 (2016), 67-76.

2016 Annette Baier Prize Winner

Monima Chadha Monash University

“Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience,” Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences: 14 (3), pp. 543–560.

This paper defends the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience from phenomenological and metaphysical challenges due to the doctrine of momentariness, the view that ‘seemingly rich conscious experiences are made fully available in a moment’. (544) It is a very thorough paper, responding to recent criticisms by Dan Zahavi and others, and elegantly weaving together history of philosophy in the Buddhist tradition, contemporary analytic philosophy, empirical neuroscience and the phenomenology of Husserl to craft an intricate united view. The piece is incredibly rich, and correspondingly complex, due to the worlds of knowledge navigated. It carefully treads the line between textual fidelity to particular traditions and conceptual engagement across traditions. The committee judged the paper to be of a high standard of scholarship, clarity, and overall merit, and found that one could keep reading this piece and finding more insights in it.  

2016 Short List

Joanne Faulkner  University of New South Wales

‘Our own Hurricane Katrina: Aboriginal disadvantage and Australian national identity’, National Identities, 2015, 17(2),117-135.

Bronwyn Finnigan  Australian National University

‘Phronesis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015, Vol. XCI No. 3, 674-697.

Dalia Nassar University of Sydney

‘Analogy, Natural History and the Philosophy of Nature', Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2015, 9, 240-257.

Monima Chadha  Monash University

‘Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience’, Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, 2015, 14 (3), 543-560

Anik Waldow University of Sydney

‘Activating the Mind: Descartes’ Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12252