

# AAP / AAP(NZ) 2011

## *Book of Abstracts*

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# 1 General Information

Contact details for conference organisers:

## **AAP Conference Convenor**

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## **Department of Philosophy Administrator**

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Department of Philosophy

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New Zealand

The Department of Philosophy Office is open from 8:30am to 5:00pm daily (Room G02)

The **conference notice board** is in the **Burns Foyer** (see map on back cover). All conference-related announcements will be posted there, and an authoritative programme will also be posted there.

## 1.1 Photocopying, printing, and web access

### Photocopying and printing facilities

**University Library Uniprintshop.** The Uniprintshop is the on-campus branch of Uniprint. It is located on the ground floor of Central Library.

Hours: Mon-Fri 8.30am-5.00pm

Extended hours during Semester One & Two teaching times only:

Mon-Thurs 5.00pm-7.00pm

Sat 2.00pm-5.00pm

Sun CLOSED

**Uniprint**, on the corner of Albany and Forth Streets, is open weekdays

8.30am – 4.30pm Reception: (03) 479 8043

Customer Services: (03) 479 3487.

**Department of Philosophy** Reception, 117 Union Street East, for small quantities only.

### Using the Library

While you will not be able to borrow books, you are welcome to access the various collections.

General library assistance can be obtained from the Philosophy liaison Charlotte Brown:

Office: Central Library (ask at the Lending and i desk)

Hours: Monday 10.00am – 1.00pm (or by appointment)

Email: [charlotte.brown@otago.ac.nz](mailto:charlotte.brown@otago.ac.nz)

Phone: (03) 479 8976

### Web access

Shortly after you registered you were assigned, as official guests of the University, usernames and passwords that allow you to access the University network. These were sent to your e-mail address. If you have not received your username and password then please contact David Howard to obtain it.

If you have difficulties connecting to the Network then this link will take you to a pictorial guide for both Macs and PCs:

<https://docushare.otago.ac.nz/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-43604>

(A printed copy of this document is included in your conference pack).

Please note that the student computers in the University Library are NOT able to be used with your username and password.

## 1.2 Getting around

### Buses

Bus fares are paid for by cash, or by the electronic ticketing system GoCard. Cards can be purchased from the bus driver for \$5 but then need to be topped up. If you expect to use a bus only occasionally then we suggest you pay in cash. Most of you will only need to travel one zone, which is \$1.90.

The timetable for all Dunedin routes can be viewed here:

<http://www.orc.govt.nz/Information-and-Services/Buses/>

### Taxis

We recommend **City Taxis** – (03) 4771-771

Other taxi companies include:

**Dunedin Taxis** – (03) 4777 777

**Otago Taxis** – (03) 477 3333

**United Taxis** Dunedin – (03) 455 5555

### Getting to and from the airport

As you may be aware, Dunedin airport is a long way from the city. There are no conventional bus services to and from Dunedin International Airport; instead it is served by a large fleet of shuttle vans provided by several operators, including most of the local taxi companies. Airport shuttle vans typically travel non-stop to or from the airport and meander about the city and suburbs picking up or dropping passengers at each address.

You are recommended to use an airport shuttle (\$20-30 one way). There is also a limo service from Classic Jags (ask for the University rate of \$66.44 per carload one way) which is considerably cheaper (and nicer) than an ordinary taxi.

Classic Jaguar Limosines 0800 346 370/ (03) 488 5961

Dunedin Airport Shuttle (03) 477 6611

Dunedin Taxis Airport Shuttle 0800 505 010/ (03) 477 6611

Kiwi Shuttles 0800 365 494/ 027 277 3852

O'Brien Shuttles 0800 778 810/ (03) 488 2658

Southern Taxis Shuttle 0800 829428

Supershuttle 0800 748 885

## 1.3 Food and drink

Morning and afternoon tea are provided in the **Link** area. Lunches and dinners are left to your own discretion. Suitable places to eat and drink are listed below. The campus map shows places to eat and drink in orange.

### Official conference pub

Eureka Cafe and Bar is the official conference pub.

You can find it on: 116 Albany Street, North Dunedin. It is open from 10.30am to 11.30pm, Monday through to Sunday.

Eureka also offers medium-priced lunches and dinners, and bar snacks.

### Lunch venues

**Otago Museum Cafe** – This is located just across the road from the link. You can find it on your campus map. They're open from 9am till 5pm, with the kitchen menu available from 11am – 2pm.

**Food Department** – A personal favourite with the compiler of this guide. Five minutes from Campus, this is located at: 20 Malcolm Street. Open Monday to Friday, 7.30am to 4.30pm. Food includes soups, salads, raps, pininis, etc.

**Staff Club** – This is located on campus, and can be found on your campus map. The food is traditional fare.

**Everyday Gourmet** – A little Dunedin treat! This breakfast and lunch venue can be found at: 446 George Street. About seven minutes walk from campus, it's open from 8am to 5.30pm week days, and from 9am – 3pm Saturdays. The food includes salads, bagels, quiche, and the best mochas and hot chocolates in town! (Seriously, you have to try one!)

**Formosa Delight** – This venue is a vegan and vegetarian dream. It serves delicious and healthy Tiwanese Cuisine, including bubble teas. Many of their ingredients are grown on their own local farm, or are sourced from the Otago Farmers Market. They can be found at 114 Albany Street. The vegan dumplings are a must have! This food can also be ordered to take away. Open Monday to Friday, 8am to 6pm.

Some food and a small convenience store can be found in the **link**, where morning and afternoon tea are served.

**The Good Earth Cafe** - This is located near campus, at 765 Cumberland Street. Cabinet food includes things such as bagels and frittata. They also serve food from the kitchen. Open 7am to 5pm Monday to Friday, 9am to 5pm Saturday, and evening dining on Friday and Saturday, from 6pm.

**Green Acorn** – This cafe offers salads, sandwiches, soups, muffins, coffee, fresh juice etc. It can be found at 72 Albany Street.

**The Flying Squid** – Quick, cheap and easy, this is the best fish and chips shop near campus. Open seven days a week from 12.30pm to 8.30pm.

**Poppa's Pizza** – This is a Dunedin institution. Poppa's sells yummy pizzas and subs. Its walls are covered with a few decades of student orientation posters. Ask them to point out the letter from the Queen. This pizzeria can be found at 74 Albany Street. It's open from 11am to 10pm, and is licensed and BYO.

Other breakfast, lunch and coffee venues can be found scattered along George Street, South of the intersection with Albany Street.

### **Dinner venues (Medium priced)**

**Anarkali Indian Restaurant** – Delicious Indian cuisine. Anarkali is located at 365 George Street. They're open from 5pm. BYO.

**Chilli Planet Thai Restaurant** – Chilli Planet offers a great range of Thai dishes. They're located at 430 George Street. Open for lunch and dinner. BYO.

**Etrusco** – If you enjoy home-style Italian cuisine, and a gorgeous dining environment Etrusco is for you. It's fantastic value, with a five star ambience and a wine list to write home about. Etrusco is located at 8a Moray Place, just past the Octagon. Reservations advisable. Phone 03-4773737. BYO. Buon Appetito!

**The Flying Squid** – Quick, cheap and easy, this is the best fish and chips shop near campus. Open seven days a week from 12.30pm to 8.30pm.

**Poppa's Pizza** – This is a Dunedin institution. Poppa's sells yummy pizzas and subs. Its walls are covered with a few decades of student orientation posters. Ask them to point out the letter from the Queen. This pizzeria can be found at 74 Albany Street. It's open from 11am to 10pm, and is licensed and BYO.

**The Jitsu** – The Jitsu serves Japanese Cuisine (and not just sushi!) Its vegan and vegetarian friendly. Make sure you request the vegetarian miso soup. This is located just below the Octagon at 133 Stuart Street. Reservations not usually necessary, but if you want to make one call 03-4701155. BYO.

**Yuki Izakaya** – Japanese Tapas in a bar setting. Great if your after a light meal over a few drinks. This is also BYO!

**Nova** – Situated next to the Dunedin Public Art Gallery, Nova provides Modern Kiwi Cuisine. Fine dining for a bit less than the pricer places listed below.

### **Dinner venues (More pricey)**

*(A note on vegetarian dining.)* In the conference convenor's experience, the restaurants listed below tend to have one vegetarian option per menu; however, their chefs can produce more if asked in advance.

**Plato** – Seafood (and some meat and vegetarian options) in a converted seaman's hostel. A favourite with the local philosophers for obvious reasons. Is not far from city centre, but awkward to get to on foot, so take a taxi. 2 Birch St. (03) 477 4235

**Two chefs** – close to the Octagon, with a reputation for being the best new restaurant in the city centre. 121 Stuart St. (03) 477 7293

**Bacchus** – wine bar / restaurant, right in the Octagon, with smashing views and gorgeous local wines. 12 The Octagon. (03) 474 0824

**Scotia** – mod-Scottish cuisine (Yes, really! It's very nice). Best selection of single-malt whiskies by the glass in town. Handy from the center of town. 199 Upper Stuart Street. (03) 477 7704

**The palms** – 18 Queens Gardens. (03) 477 6534

### **Other pubs**

The Octagon (which can be reached by walking south down George St from the university) is the center of Dunedin's nightlife. There are many pubs, clubs, bars, and cafes on the Octagon itself, on the streets that radiate out from it, Stuart street, Princes street, and George street, and on Moray Place, the road that loops around the Octagon.

On the Octagon itself, we recommend **Baraka**, **Di Lusso**, and **Bacchus**.

On Lower Stuart St (downhill from the Octagon):

**Al Bar** – has Dunedin's second best selection of single malts plus a great range of European and local beers, and a nice tapas selection. 135 Stuart Street

**Carousel** – great cocktail venue, excellent wine list, roaring fire and stylist décor. 1<sup>st</sup> floor, 141 Stuart St (Go up the stairs)

On Moray Place:

**Pequeno** – Spanish themed wine bar hidden away down an alley way. Go down the alley at 24 Moray Place, past the Blue Oyster art galley, and cross the courtyard at the end. Order a Roija.

Further down Princes St:

**Tonic** – notable for its selection of Belgian beers. 138 Princes Street

**Toast** – well-established cocktail bar, knowledgeable bar staff. 59 Princes St

On George St:

**Mou** – perhaps New Zealand's smallest bar, is just 1.8m wide. Fortunately there is room for patrons to spill out into an adjoining alleyway. A favourite with some of the local graduate students. 357 George Street

## 1.4 Facilities

### Doctor and dentist

The **Dunedin Urgent Doctor and Accident Centre** is located at 95 Hanover St, close to the university. (03) 479-2900

**Steve Duncan Dentists** are located 5 minutes from the university, on the corner of Albany and George streets. (03) 474 0029

Outside of office hours: **After Hours Emergency Dentist**. (03) 477 7230

### Bank and post office

**National bank** and **BNZ** have branches close to campus on Albany Street near the intersection with Cumberland St.

**Westpac**, **ANZ**, and **ASB** have branches on George St (go south from the university).

There is a **postoffice** and **Kiwibank** branch on the corner of Albany and Great King streets.

### Bookshop

The Otago **University Bookshop** (UBS) is on Great King St near the intersection with Albany (next to the post office). It is a particularly good university bookshop, so check it out.

### Dry cleaning

**Preens dry cleaning** are at 299 Castle St (follow the southbound one-way for one block from its intersection with Albany St). (03) 477 2140

### Shopping

The section of George St between Albany St and the Octagon is Dunedin's main shopping district. Head south from the intersection of George St and Albany St.

### Supermarket

The nearest supermarket to the university is **New World Centre City** at 133 Great King Street. (03) 477 4677

There are also “dairies” (non-locals note that this is kiwi for “convenience store”) in the Link and on the corner of Albany and George streets.

## 2 Programme

### 2.1 Sunday 3 July

16-00	Registration (Burns Foyer)
18-00	AAP Presidential address: Moira Gatens (Burns 1)
20-00	Reception (Otago University Staff Club)

### 2.2 Monday 4 July

	Burns 1	Burns 2	Burns 3	Burns 4	Burns 5	Burns 6	Burns 7
09-00	AAP(NZ) Presidential address: Colin Cheyne (Burns 1)						
10-30	Morning Tea (Link)						
10-50 (55min)	<b>Dr Stuart Brock</b> (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism</i> (MET)	<b>Prof Jack MacIntosh</b> (University of Calgary) <i>Models and Method in the Early Modern Period: 4 case studies</i> (EM)	<b>Mr Onni Hirvonen</b> (Macquarie University) <i>Taylor and the Problem of Recognizing Cultural Groups</i> (POL)	<b>Prof Sue Dodds &amp; Dr Frederic Gilbert &amp; Eliza Goddard</b> (University of Tasmania) <i>Brain Intervention and Selfhood: Burden of Normality and Deep Brain Stimulation</i> (ETH-A)	<b>Dr Christian Barry</b> (ANU) <i>What's Wrong with Overdetermining Harm?</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Ms Kari Refsdal</b> (University of Oslo) <i>Kant on Rational Agency as Free Agency</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Mr Clas Weber</b> (ANU) <i>Centered Communication</i> (LANG)
11-50 (55min)	<b>Mr Takahiro Yamada</b> (Kyoto University) <i>The Relationship between Metaphysical (Anti-) Realism and Semantic (Anti-) Realism</i> (MET)	<b>Miss Kirsten Walsh</b> (University of Otago) <i>Structural Realism, the Law-Constitutive Approach and Newton's Epistemic Asymmetry</i> (EM)	<b>Ms Sandra Field</b> (Princeton University) <i>Spinoza and Radical Democracy</i> (POL)	<b>Ms Lynne Bowyer</b> (Bioethics Centre Otago University) <i>Re-conceptualizing autonomy</i> (ETH-A)	<b>Mr David Merry</b> (University of Auckland) <i>Why I don't tend to respond well to dispositional analyses of character traits</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Mr Matthew Hammerton</b> (The University of Sydney) <i>Is moral error theory a contingent or necessary truth?</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Mr ChiYen Liu</b> (National Chung Cheng University) <i>Conditionals as 3-valued sentences</i> (LANG)
12-50	Lunch						
14-10 (85min)	<b>Prof Françoise Baylis</b> (Dalhousie University) <i>A relational account of personal identity</i>	<b>Dr Russell Blackford</b> (University of Newcastle) <i>Back to Locke: Freedom of religion and the secular state</i> (EM)	<b>Dr Matheson Russell</b> (University of Auckland) <i>The pragmatics of political dissent: Rancière after Habermas and Arendt</i> (POL)	<b>Dr Christine Swanton</b> (Auckland) <i>Right action: two levels of vagueness</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Dr Colin Caret</b> (Arché Research Centre, the University of St Andrews) <i>Against the 'No Solution' Solution to the Paradoxes</i> (LM)	<b>Dr Matt Boyd</b> (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>Causal Analysis of Complex Developing Systems</i> (SCI)	<b>Dr Richard Paul Hamilton</b> (University of Notre Dame Australia) <i>In Defence of Hirsute Naturalism in Ethics</i> (ETH-N)
15-40	Afternoon Tea (Link)						
16-00 (85min)	<b>Prof Alan Hajek</b> (Australian National University) <i>Staying Regular?</i>	<b>Prof Peter Anstey</b> (University of Otago) <i>The origins of early modern experimental philosophy</i> (EM)	<b>Mr Michael Gilchrist</b> (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>Being something versus Being there</i> (LANG)	<b>Dr Campbell Brown</b> (University of Edinburgh) <i>Supervenience, Reduction, and Relations</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Prof Garrett Cullity</b> (The University of Adelaide) <i>Normative Derivation</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Mr Dan Weijers</b> (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>The Experience Machine is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!</i> (XPMP)	<b>Dr Philip Catton &amp; Joshua Black</b> (University of Canterbury) <i>C. S. Peirce on mathematical experiments: relations of logic, practice, insight</i> (LM)
17-30	Book launch and exhibition opening: Peter Anstey (Otago University Library)						

## 2.3 Tuesday 5 July

	Burns 1	Burns 2	Burns 3	Burns 4	Burns 5	Burns 6	Burns 7
09-00	Plenary: Amie Thomassion (Burns 1)						
10-30	Morning Tea (Link)						
10-50 (55min)	<b>Ms Steffi Lewis</b> (MCM LLC) <i>David Lewis' Teachers and Students</i>	<b>Dr Koji Tanaka</b> (University of Auckland) <i>On Self-Awareness and Self</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr Wang-Yen Lee</b> (University of Science, Malaysia) <i>Gruesome Hypotheses and the Swamping of Priors</i> (LM)	<b>Dr Peter Lewis</b> (University of Miami) <i>Wavefunction Possibilism</i> (SCI)	<b>Dr Alberto Vanzo</b> (University of Otago) <i>Rationalism and Empiricism in the Historiography of Early Modern Philosophy</i> (EM)	<b>Dr Catherine Legg</b> (University of Waikato) <i>Epistemic Particularism</i> (EP)	<b>Dr Ali Rizvi</b> (Brunei Darussalam) <i>The Independence/Dependence Paradox within John Rawls's Political Liberalism</i> (POL)
11-50 (55min)	<b>Ms Bronwyn Finnigan</b> (University of Auckland) <i>Rationality in Action</i> (MET)	<b>Mr Raamy Majeed</b> (University of Sydney) <i>A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies</i> (MIND)	<b>Mr Ryo Ito</b> (Kyoto University) <i>Russell's Substitutional Theory and Two Paradoxes</i> (LM)	<b>Ms Karen Crowther</b> (Centre for Time, Sydney) <i>Effective field theory, emergence and fundamental physics</i> (SCI)	<b>Mr Juan Manuel Gomez</b> (University of Otago) <i>Hume's Four Dissertations: Revisiting the essay on taste</i> (EM)	<b>Mr Steven Robertson</b> (University of Sydney) <i>Normative theory choice</i> (EP)	<b>Ms Joanne Lau</b> (Australian National University) <i>Voting in Bad Faith</i> (POL)
12-50	Lunch						
14-10 (85min)	<b>Dr Neil Sinhababu</b> (National University of Singapore) <i>Ethical Reductionism</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Dr Justine Kingsbury &amp; Dr Jonathan McKeown-Green</b> (University of Waikato / University of Auckland) <i>Conceptual decluttering</i> (XPMP)	<b>Dr John Howes</b> (Learning Guild (based in Melbourne)) <i>Plato's question: what is justice, and so what kind of good?</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Ms Inja Stracenski</b> (Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Germany) <i>What is Jewish Philosophy?</i>	<b>Prof Michael Morreau</b> (University of Maryland and CSMN, University of Oslo) <i>Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope</i> (SCI)	<b>Dr Douglas Campbell</b> (University of Canterbury) <i>Analaticity, Apriority, and Necessity: On Why the Three Modal Distinctions Come Apart Every Which Way</i> (MET)	<b>Assoc Prof Berit Brogaard</b> (University of Missouri - St Louis) <i>A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness</i> (MIND)
15-40	Afternoon Tea (Link)						
16-00 (55min)	<b>Prof Jc Beall</b> (University of Connecticut and University of Otago) <i>Illogical times</i> (LM)	<b>Prof John Bigelow</b> (Monash University) <i>Skepticism refuted</i> (EP)	<b>Dr Angela Mendelovici</b> (Australian National University / The University of Western Ontario) <i>A Simple Intentionalist View of Emotions</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr Francesca Minerva</b> (CAPPE, University of Melbourne) <i>Conscientious objection in the medical context: how can we solve conflicts of values between patients and doctors?</i> (ETH-A)	<b>Dr Kent Hurtig</b> (Uppsala and Stirling Universities) <i>Rationality and Normativity</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Dr Katrina Hutchison</b> (ANU) <i>Doing Philosophy and Making Progress</i> (XPMP)	<b>Dr Simon Wigley</b> (Philosophy, Bilkent University) <i>The Right, the Good and the Problem of Distinct Identities</i> (ETH-N)
17-00 (55min)	<b>Mr Michael Couch</b> (University of Canterbury) <i>Hume's Philosophy of Education</i>	<b>Mr Paul Daniels</b> (Monash University) <i>The Persistent Time Traveller: Insights about Persistence from Time Travel</i> (MET)	<b>Mr Jonathan Farrell</b> (ANU) <i>The meaning of 'what it is like' phrases as used to talk about phenomenal consciousness</i> (MIND)	<b>Mr Thomas McGuire</b> (University of Auckland) <i>Why children have the right to a spiritual education</i> (REL)	<b>Ms Hatha McDivitt</b> (ANU) <i>"Which Bunk Can Evolutionary Arguments Debunk?"</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Mr Kengo Miyazono</b> (The University of Tokyo) <i>Imaginative Resistance and Higher-Lower Inconsistency</i>	<b>Mr Samuel Ujewe</b> (Bioethics Centre, Otago) <i>The African Concept of Person: Ubuntu and its implications for Human Free Will</i>
19-30	Whisky tasting (to be organised by Heather Dyke)						

## 2.4 Wednesday 6 July

	Burns 1	Burns 2	Burns 3	Burns 4	Burns 5	Burns 6	Burns 7
09-00	Keynote: Jeff McMahan (Burns 1)						
10-30	Morning Tea (Link)						
10-50 (55min)	<b>Prof Carsten Hansen</b> (Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo) <i>Correctness and Naturalness: On David Lewis' approach to Radical Interpretation</i> (LANG)	<b>Dr Gillian Crozier and William Harper</b> (Laurentian University) <i>"Feyerabend on Newton: A defense of Newton's empiricist method"</i> (EM)	<b>Dr Jennifer Greenwood</b> (University of Queensland) <i>Contingent Transcranialism and Deep Functional Cognitive Integration</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr Tracy Bowell</b> (University of Waikato) <i>Response-Dependence and Moral Practice: Not so Queer After All?</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Prof John Bishop &amp; Dr Ken Perszyk</b> (Universities of Auckland & Victoria, Wellington) <i>Divine Action Beyond the Personal omniGod</i> (REL)	<b>Dr Peter Wong</b> (University of Melbourne) <i>A Musical Vocabulary for Human Cultivation</i> (AC)	<b>Mr Dan Marshall</b> (HKU) <i>Intrinsicity and Necessarily Co-extensive Properties</i> (MET)
11-50 (55min)	<b>Dr David Ripley</b> (University of Melbourne) <i>Bilateralism and paradox</i> (LM)	<b>Dr Simon Duffy</b> (University of Sydney) <i>The 'vindication' of Leibniz's account of the differential. A response to Somers-Hall.</i> (EM)	<b>Dr Zoe Drayson</b> (Australian National University) <i>Consciousness and Explanation</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr Scott Forscher</b> (St. Cloud Technical and Community College) <i>The Formula of Universal Law is Heteronomous</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Assoc Prof Earl Stanley Fronda</b> (University of the Philippines) <i>The statement 'God exists' is not substantively true, but it is not false either</i> (REL)	<b>Dr Sor-hoon Tan</b> (National University of Singapore) <i>Does Xunzi's Ethics of Ritual Need a Metaphysics?</i> (AC)	<b>Dr Kristie Miller</b> (The University of Sydney) <i>Persons sans objects</i> (MET)
12-50	Lunch						
14-10 (85min)	<b>Assoc Prof Fred Kroon</b> (University of Auckland) <i>Characterising Characterisation</i> (MET)	<b>Dr David Lumsden</b> (University of Waikato) <i>Concepts and Pragmatics</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr Joseph Mintoff</b> (Newcastle) <i>On the Quantitative Doctrine of the Mean</i>	<b>Prof Brian Ellis</b> (La Trobe University) <i>Social Ideals and the new Metaphysics of Morals</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Dr David Etlin</b> (University of Groningen) <i>Vague Desire: the Sorites and the Money Pump</i> (LANG)	<b>Assoc Prof Greg Dawes</b> (University of Otago) <i>Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation</i> (EP)	<b>Dr Alastair Wilson</b> (Monash University) <i>Meta-ethics for (Quantum) Modal Realists</i> (MET)
15-40	Afternoon Tea (Link)						
16-00	AAP AGM						
Late	Karaoke evening (to be organised by Kirsten Walsh)						

## 2.5 Thursday 7 July

	Burns 1	Burns 2	Burns 3	Burns 4	Burns 5	Burns 6	Burns 7
<b>09-00</b>	Plenary: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Burns 1)						
<b>10-30</b>	Morning Tea (Link)						
<b>10-50 (55min)</b>	<b>Assoc Prof Rod Gire</b> (University of Auckland) <i>Invisibility and the Can't Do Principle</i> (LM)	<b>Prof Paul Patton</b> (University of New South Wales) <i>Political Liberalism and the basis of rights</i> (POL)	<b>Dr Nicholas Munn</b> (Monash University) <i>Normative Ethical Pluralism</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Dr Brent Madison</b> (Institute of Advanced Study, University of Warwick, UK) <i>Epistemic Justification and Its Value</i> (EP)	<b>Prof Dan Korman</b> (ANU / University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) <i>Debunking Arguments Against Commonsense Realism</i> (MET)	<b>Dr Marguerite La Caze</b> (University of Queensland) <i>An uneasy peace: facing the difficulty of forgiveness</i>	<b>Dr Clinton Golding</b> (University of Otago) <i>An analysis of philosophical progress illustrated by papers from Rawls, David Lewis, Kripke &amp; Singer</i> (XPMP)
<b>11-50 (55min)</b>	<b>Mr Kelvin McQueen</b> (Australian National University) <i>Reduction, A priori Entailment and the Additivity of Mass</i> (SCI)	<b>Mr Jonathan Herington</b> (The Australian National University) <i>The Moral Foundations of Conceptions of Security</i> (POL)	<b>Ms Vanessa Schouten</b> (Princeton University) <i>Problems with Post-Mortem Harm</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Mr Edward Elliott</b> (ANU) <i>Tonk, Boche, Aqua &amp; Flurg: Epistemic Analyticity and 'Defective Concepts'</i> (EP)	<b>Ms Lisa Leininger</b> (University of Maryland) <i>Ersatzer Presentism and the Passage of Time</i> (MET)	<b>Ms Conor Kiernan</b> (Monash) <i>What Does a Prostitute Sell?</i>	<b>Ms Kate Tappenden</b> (Waikato) <i>Embodied representations</i>
<b>12-50</b>	Lunch						
<b>14-10 (55min)</b>	<b>Mr Gabriel Rabin</b> (UCLA) <i>Grounding Grounding</i> (MET)	<b>Mr Dean Ogden</b> (Monash University) <i>Rethinking the Mind: Solving the problem of split brains</i> (MIND)	<b>Mr Andrew Donnelly</b> (University of Sydney) <i>Conscience as Moral Identity</i> (ETH-M)	<b>Ms Elizabeth Olsen</b> (University of Otago) <i>Is Logic Normative?</i> (LM)	<b>Ms Rosa Terlazzo</b> (ANU) <i>Autonomy: Its Promotion and Recognition</i> (ETH-N)	<b>Ms Alejandra Mancilla</b> (Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University) <i>An enforceable duty of humanity?</i> (POL)	<b>Miss Stacey Broom</b> (Bioethics Centre, University of Otago) <i>The Ambiguity of 'Obligation': The case of emerging enhancement technology</i> (ETH-A)
<b>15-10</b>	Afternoon Tea (Link)						
<b>15-30 (55min)</b>	<b>Dr Zach Weber</b> (University of Melbourne) <i>Bad Lines</i> (LM)	<b>Dr Hinne Hetteema</b> (Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland) <i>The Reduction of Chemistry to Physics: Absolute Reaction Rate Theory</i> (SCI)	<b>Dr Aneta Cubrinovska</b> (Canterbury University) <i>Time-branching account of tenses in counterfactuals</i> (LANG)	<b>Dr Holly Lawford-Smith</b> (Charles Sturt University) <i>Profiting from Poverty, and other stories</i> (ETH-A)	<b>Dr Patrick Greenough</b> (University of St Andrews / University of Sydney) <i>Externalism and Scepticism</i> (EP)	<b>Dr Weng Hong Tang</b> (The National University of Singapore) <i>Success Semantics and Partial Beliefs</i> (MIND)	<b>Dr John Lamont</b> (University of Notre Dame Australia) <i>Molnar's Thomism</i> (MET)
<b>16-30</b>	AAPNZ AGM						
<b>19-00</b>	Conference Dinner						

## 2.6 Friday 8 July

	Burns 1	Burns 2	Burns 3	Burns 4	Burns 5	Burns 6	Burns 7
09-00	Plenary: Daniel Nolan (Burns 1)						
10-30	Morning Tea (Link)						
10-50 (55min)		Assoc Prof Heather Dyke (University of Otago) <i>Playing by the Rules: Can a Doping Ban be Justified?</i> (ETH-A)	Dr Richard Wei Tzu Hou (Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University) <i>Epistemic Possibilities Epistemologised</i> (EP)	Prof Max Cresswell (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>Mathematical Entities in the Divided Line</i> (LM)	Dr Miri Albahari (University of Western Australia) <i>Aliefs and the Constitution of Belief</i> (MIND)		Dr John Maier (ANU) <i>The Argument from Moral Responsibility</i> (EP)
11-50 (55min)	Mr Oseni Taiwo Afisi (University of Canterbury) <i>Popper's Universalism and the Politics of Liberalism</i> (POL)	Mr Daniel Burkett (Victoria University of Wellington) <i>Conceiving of Time Travel Fictions - A 'Novel' Argument for the Possibility of Time Travel</i> (MET)	Ms Hannah Clark-Younger (University of Otago) <i>Are Imperative Arguments Arguments?</i> (LANG)	Mr Bruce Long (The University of Sydney) <i>An Informational Defence of Melia's Mathematical Nominalism</i> (LM)	Ms Olwyn Stewart (University of Auckland) <i>Meaning, Living Faith and Theistic Metaphysics</i> (REL)	Mr Adam Bugeja (Australian National University) <i>Moral testimony and motivation</i> (ETH-M)	Mr John Matthewson (RSSS, ANU and Victoria University) <i>α</i> (SCI)
12-50	Lunch						
14-10 (85min)		Assoc Prof Charles Pigden (Otago) <i>No-Ought-From-Is: Searle, Godwin and the Duke of Wellington</i> . (ETH-M)	Mr Tim Oakley (La Trobe University) <i>Scepticism (almost) without tears</i> (EP)	Dr Steve Clarke (University of Oxford) <i>Are Philosophers' Intuitions Evidence?</i> (XPMP)	Dr Neil Pickering (University of Otago) <i>Prototype resemblance alternatives to classical concepts of illness and disease</i> (SCI)	Dr Adrian Walsh (University of New England) <i>Economic Hurts and Millian Harms</i> (POL)	Dr Adriane Rini (Massey University) <i>Three Kinds of Proofs about Possibility</i> (LM) (55 minutes)
15-40	Afternoon Tea (Link)						
16-00 (55min)		Ms Alison Fernandes (Columbia University) <i>Realism and Response-Dependence: What their Compatibility Suggests for the Realism Debate</i> (MET)	Ms Stephanie Collins (Australian National University) <i>Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties</i> (POL)	Mr Macintosh Stewart (University of Sydney) <i>Contractualism, Animals, and Intrinsic Value</i> (ETH-N)	Mr Adrian Currie (ANU) <i>Sauropod Size &amp; the Unity of Science</i> (SCI)	Mr Samuel Gavin (University of Auckland) <i>Types of Significance</i> (LANG)	Mr Andrew Pinchin (Monash University) <i>Searching for External Reason Statements</i> (ETH-M)
17-00 (55min)		Dr Denis Robinson (University of Auckland) <i>Contemplating Animalism's Claim to be the Favourite of Common Sense</i> (EP)	Dr George Duke (Deakin University) <i>Thin Theories of Reference for Abstract Singular Terms</i> (LM)	Dr Wan-Chuan Fang (Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan) <i>Embodied Cognition and Searle's Intentions in Action</i> (MIND)	Dr Rekha Nath & Holly Lawford-Smith (University of Alabama/Charles Sturt University) <i>Doxastic Obligations for Members of Collectives</i> (ETH-N)	Dr Mary Butler (Otago University) <i>Good Care</i> (ETH-A)	Dr Damian Cox (Bond University) <i>The Paradox of Virtuous Judgment</i> (ETH-N)

## 2.7 Key to streams

Asian and Comparative Philosophy (AC)

Epistemology (EP)

Meta-ethics (ETH-M)

Philosophy of Language (LANG)

Metaphysics (MET)

Political Philosophy (POL)

Philosophy of Science (SCI)

Early modern (EM)

Applied Ethics (ETH-A)

Normative ethics (ETH-N)

Logic / Philosophy of Mathematics (LM)

Philosophy of Mind (MIND)

Philosophy of Religion (REL)

Experimental Philosophy / Meta-philosophy (XPMP)

## 3 Abstracts

### 3.1 AAP Presidential address: Moira Gatens

### 3.2 AAP(NZ) Presidential address: Colin Cheyne

*The Asymmetry of Formal Logic*

Monday 4 July 9-00 Burns 1

Formal logic is, in at least one important respect, asymmetric. The asymmetry is this: all substitution instances of a valid argument form are valid, but not all substitution instances of an invalid argument form are invalid. I discuss the implications of this asymmetry, as well as various misguided and unsuccessful attempts to avoid those implications.

### 3.3 Keynote address: Jeff McMahan

*What Rights May be Defended by Means of War?*

Wednesday 6 July 9-00 Burns 1

Wrongful aggressors often claim to love peace, and there is a sense in which that is true, for they would prefer to get what they want without having to fight a war. Many of the aims that motivate unjust wars could be achieved without violence: for example, control of another state's natural resources, such as oil, limited political control over the other state, the annexation of a bit of its territory, and so on. In such cases, *war* and *killing* become necessary for aggressors only if they meet with military resistance. Most people believe that in domestic society it is not permissible to kill a thief merely to defend one's property. So how can it be permissible to kill a large number of soldiers just to defend collective property such as territory and resources – particularly when most of those soldiers act under duress imposed by those they regard as legitimate authorities? I will consider whether defensive war can be morally justified in such cases of lesser aggression.

### 3.4 Plenary sessions

#### Daniel Nolan

*There's No Justice: Ontological Moral Fictionalism*

Friday 8 July 9-00 Burns 1

This paper develops a limited form of moral fictionalism: fictionalism about distinctive moral ontology, such as rights, duties, virtues, vices etc. which is not also fictionalism about who ought to do what, which outcomes are better than others, and so on. This ontological moral fictionalism has distinctive appeal, and is supported by distinctive arguments, as against rivals such as the view that we should eliminate apparent reference to distinctively moral ontology; that it can be paraphrased away; or that we should be realist or expressivist about the language of moral ontology.

#### Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

*Are Moral Judgments Unified?*

Thursday 7 July 9-00 Burns 1

Much traditional moral philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience assume that moral judgments are unified enough to enable scientific and philosophical theories that apply to all and only moral judgments. This assumption is undermined by a variety of recent empirical studies and philosophical arguments against the six main candidates for features that might unify moral judgments. If moral judgments are not sufficiently unified at any level, as I suggest, then we need to do moral psychology and philosophy in a more fine-grained way.

#### Amie Thomasson

*Carnap and the Prospects for Meta-Ontological Deflationism*

Tuesday 5 July 9-00 Burns 1

After more than fifty years, metaontology has come back in fashion. But in most of the recent discussion, the original Carnapian deflationist position has been missed. How could a Carnapian form of deflationism—probably the most prominent historical form of ontological deflationism—have been missed? And what difference would rediscovering it make to contemporary discussions in metaontology? Those are the questions I aim to answer. I'll argue, first, that Carnap's original position was wrongly dismissed by association with verificationism and anti-realism. It was then put aside and forgotten given the common assumption that Quine had won the Carnap-Quine debate and made the world safe for serious metaphysics. Later attempts to revive a deflationary position only made matters worse: Putnam's deflationism linked the view to anti-realism, and Hirsch linked deflationism to quantifier variance. Ever since, metaontological disputes have largely focused on quantifier variance. Each of these moves, I'll argue, went wrong. Taken together, they have caused the original and most promising deflationary position to be largely overlooked. I'll close by sketching a contemporary neo-Carnapian form of deflationism, arguing that it is largely untouched by recent defenses of serious ontology, and that its prospects are rather promising.

## 3.5 General sessions

### Afisi–Butler

**Mr Oseni Taiwo Afisi** (oseni.afisi@pg.canterbury.ac.nz)

*Popper's Universalism and the Politics of Liberalism*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 1

One demerit of Popper's philosophy as a whole is its importation of universalism across from philosophy of science to political philosophy. Granted, science is not meant to reflect cultural differences. But the political ideals for societies certainly do. Differences of ambient culture can make a difference to political ideals even if they cannot be determinative of good science. Popper's insistence that social engineering must proceed piecemeal seems sensible at most where cultures are already deeply civilized. In disrupted and corrupted circumstances (like those in my part of Africa), insistence on merely piecemeal social engineering is hard to defend. But there are special qualities of ambient culture where I come from, that I believe underwrite confidence that faster, sweeping political change, if tried, could work. Popper's liberalism is individualistic. Not every culture is individualistic, however. I grant that the socio-political institutions in Africa have to become open in such a way that Popper advocates in his Open Society. I grant that present-day Africa suffers massive corruption very much because it possesses a system of central planning and a weakness for utopian political rhetoric and dreams. While I believe that in order for Africa to climb beyond this Africa must embrace a free-market structure, I argue that the values of social cohesion and brotherhood by which Africa is sharply defined would play a part to prevent societies there from becoming highly individualistic. On the contrary, communitarianism has deep cultural roots in Africa. I consequently argue that some worries against neo-liberalism are misplaced in the case of Africa. All this motivates a nuanced assessment of both Popper and his neo-liberal acolytes, in which by rejecting Popper's universalism as well as Popper's strident insistence on piecemeal engineering, I improve the evaluation that seems called for of some of Popper's other views.

**Dr Miri Albahari** (miri.albahari@gmail.com)

*Aliefs and the Constitution of Belief*

Friday 8 July 10-50 Burns 5

How do we explain my initial hesitation to step out onto the glass platform on Toronto Skytower? Is it the same sort of phenomenon as a phobia of heights? I rationally believe that the platform is safe but my racing heart makes me hesitate. Some accounts will say that I have contradictory beliefs (or that I imagine it unsafe etc). TS Gendler argues that while I believe that the platform is safe, I most likely 'alieve' – not believe or imagine - that it is dangerous. To have an alief is roughly "to have an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way". Such phenomena as phobias, superstitions and residual racism are explained by Gendler as widely involving 'belief-discordant aliefs', and these cases inform her position that aliefs are in a different mental category to beliefs. I argue that while Gendler's account has merit, it is not always helpful to regard aliefs and beliefs as being in

different mental or explanatory categories. That is because perceptual beliefs are partly constituted by aliefs. The upshot is that Gendler's taxonomy rides roughshod over a range of cases by classifying too many of them as belief-discordant aliefs.

**Prof Peter Anstey** (peter.anstey@otago.ac.nz)

*The origins of early modern experimental philosophy*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 2

From the 1660s almost all natural philosophers in Britain became adherents of the experimental philosophy. The experimental philosophy was opposed to speculative philosophy. This paper traces the process by which the experimental philosophy emerged in Europe in the early seventeenth century.

**Dr Christian Barry** (christian.barry@anu.edu.au)

*What's Wrong with Overdetermining Harm?*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 5

People throughout the world suffer severe harms—shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs and requirements of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. If a much smaller number of people engaged in these types of conduct, the harms in question would not occur. However, the conduct of any particular person (and in some cases even the conduct of quite large numbers of people) seems to make no apparent difference to the occurrence of these harms. When the conduct of some agent does not make any apparent difference to the occurrence of harm, but this conduct is of a type that brings about harm in because many people engage in it, let us say that this agent is an overdeterminer of that harm. This paper investigates whether there moral reasons against becoming an overdeterminer of harm, and what the nature of these reasons is.

**Prof Françoise Baylis**

*A relational account of personal identity*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 1

**Prof Jc Beall** (jc.beall@uconn.edu)

*Illogical times*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 1

Various phenomena (e.g., 'illogical' fictions, counter-logical conditionals, and especially truth-theoretic paradoxes) have been thought to motivate so-called non-normal (or, as I shall say, illogical) worlds -- worlds where the illogical happens, where the actual laws of logic fail (e.g., where Modus Ponens fails or the like). In this talk, I advance the corresponding temporal thesis: that there are illogical times -- actual times where the (actual) laws of logic fail.

**Prof John Bigelow** (john.bigelow@monash.edu)

*Skepticism refuted*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 2

Metaphysics used to be conceived as an attempt to establish important truths by deductive reasoning from self-evident truths: and in the twentieth century many preached the death of metaphysics, thus conceived. Lewis, Armstrong and others have attempted to revive metaphysics, but with a different methodology, namely the "Ibex" (inference to the best explanation). I will discuss two case studies that show how difficult it is to conduct a successful Ibex, one involving Darwin, one involving Shakespeare.

**Prof John Bishop & Dr Ken**

**Perszyk** (jc.bishop@auckland.ac.nz)

*Divine Action Beyond the Personal omniGod*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 5

What notion of divine action is possible if the dominant philosophical conception of God as an immaterial supernatural personal agent is rejected? This question is considered with particular focus on a non-personal conception of God as the Goal of the Universe's existence (and as Source only in so far as He is also the Goal).

**Dr Russell Blackford** (russellblackford@bigpond.com)

*Back to Locke: Freedom of religion and the secular state*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 2

For Locke, religious persecution was the problem - and a secular state apparatus was the solution. Locke argued that there were independent reasons for the state to confine its attention to "civil interests" or interests in "the things of this world". If it did so, it would not be motivated to impose a favoured religion or to persecute disfavoured ones. Taken to its logical conclusion, this approach has implications that Locke would have found unpalatable. We, however, need not hesitate to accept them.

**Dr Tracy Bowell** (taboo@waikato.ac.nz)

*Response-Dependence and Moral Practice: Not so Queer After All?*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 4

Famously, Mackie denies the possibility of objective values on the basis of their being ontically queer: If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 38) In this paper I re-visit a response-dependence account of moral practices, arguing that moral posits can and should be construed as response-dependent. I argue that if that account is properly understood as an account of moral practice, then it offers a plausible via media between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of morality. While this analysis may sacrifice what some may consider to be full-blown ontic respectability, it is far more in keeping with the reality that is moral talk and thought and sheds light on the ways in which we authorise our moral practices.

**Ms Lynne Bowyer** (bowly472@student.otago.ac.nz)

*Re-conceptualizing autonomy*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 4

In traditional liberal theory the concept of autonomy is taken to be equal to independence or self-sufficiency. An autonomous being is said to be a Lockean 'free agent', unfettered by binding forms of relatedness to others, pursuing its own self-interests. John Christman, a contemporary liberal thinker, also endorses this stance, despite gestures towards a more relational concept of autonomy. In this paper I argue that the liberal framework is misguided in its approach to autonomy because of its fundamental misunderstanding of the human condition. The concept of autonomy in both traditional and contemporary liberal theorizing is based on an individualistic, property based model, a model which conceals our embodied existence and our social embeddedness. For the concept of autonomy to have any legitimacy, it must resonate with our human condition and how we do things in the world. I will put forward a re-conceptualization of autonomy that has implications for our current social and political institutions.

**Dr Matt Boyd** (mattphilos@hotmail.co.nz)

*Causal Analysis of Complex Developing Systems*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 6

Determinists about the development of traits place undue explanatory weight on single (often genetic) factors, whilst developmental systems theory insists that we take all causal factors in developing systems equally seriously. I examine Woodward's notions of causal specificity, proportionality and stability, and by adding a fourth dimension, enablement, I build a concept space for analyzing the developmental causation of traits. I then use this tool to build causal explanatory models that include multiple privileged causes, whilst omitting non-privileged causes. This approach reconciles the empirical importance of some causes of development, with systems approaches that underscore the complexity of development.

**Dr Stuart Brock** (Stuart.Brock@vuw.ac.nz)

*The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 1

Fictionalism is a popular approach to metaphysics. Very roughly, a fictionalist says that discourse of a certain kind is to be understood by analogy with talk within fiction. Just as telling a story involves an element of make-believe and pretence, so too does much of our metaphysical discourse. But one common objection raised against fictionalism is that it isn't true to our experience of metaphysical debate. When we make claims and embrace theories committed to a realm of controversial entities, it just doesn't seem like we're engaging in any kind of pretence. My aim in this paper is to evaluate this objection. My assessment is that the complaint is easily answered, and understanding why the objection fails leads to a better appreciation of how a fictionalist can respond to a number of other related objections.

**Assoc Prof Berit Brogaard** (brogaardb@umsl.edu)

*A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 7

""Despite the plethora of literature on the neural correlates of consciousness, few researchers have addressed the question of what a neural correlate of consciousness is. This is somewhat surprising, as the precise answer to that question easily could be vital to how we answer other questions of crucial importance to philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. The answer to the question of what a neural correlate is is far from simple. The difficulties in establishing what we mean by 'neural correlate' arise in part from the fact that most empirical investigations of consciousness involve studies of the brains of atypical subjects, often subjects with physical or virtual brain lesions. A typical study aimed at identifying a neural correlate of consciousness of a particular feature examines the phenomenal experiences of subjects who lack normal function in a brain region that is hypothesized to be a neural correlate of consciousness of that feature. If the lesion prevents consciousness of that feature in the brains of the neuro-atypical individuals, it is then concluded that the brain region with the lesion is a neural correlate of consciousness of that feature in neuro-typical individuals. This reasoning, however, is unsound. It is unsound, not because an inference about neuro-typical individuals is made on the basis of studies of neuro-atypical individuals, but rather because the brain regions studied aren't the final destination for the information processed there. The structure of the talk is as follows. First I consider and reject some potential definitions of 'neural correlate'. I then provide a new functional definition that seems to be in line with the standard use of the expression in the neuroscience literature. I then cash out the details of the argument against making conclusions about neural correlates of consciousness based on simple imaging studies of brain lesions. In the penultimate section I look at a particular area of study, viz. blindsight, in which it has been commonplace to draw conclusions about neural correlates on the basis of a demonstration of a lack of consciousness in the absence of a functional primary visual cortex. I suggest a more fruitful way to study the neural correlates of consciousness. Finally, I argue that how we define 'neural correlate' may have a major impact on how we answer common questions in the philosophy of mind.""

**Miss Stacey Broom** (brost992@student.otago.ac.nz)

*The Ambiguity of 'Obligation': The case of emerging enhancement technology*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 7

"The term 'obligation' is being used so broadly and vaguely in contemporary ethics that we must begin by indicating the restricted sense in which we intend to use it", this line was the opening of the 1952 work by Herbert W. Schneider 'Obligations and the Pursuit of Happiness' (p. 3). Unfortunately, however, in modern-day ethics philosophers and bioethicists continue to be vague, and at times even slippery, in their use of the term 'obligation'. In this paper I will provide an analysis of the inherently ambiguous concept of 'obligation' with a focus on the question, does it make sense to argue that human enhancement is a moral obligation? Using emerging human enhancement technology as a context I will show that the ways in which philosophers and bioethicists use the term 'obligation' may have ramifications for how human enhancement technology is

approached and perceived both at the societal level and politically.

**Dr Campbell Brown** (campbell.brown@ed.ac.uk)

*Supervenience, Reduction, and Relations*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 4

Reductionist views hold that one aspect of the way things are is included in (is 'reducible' to) another. For example, metaethical naturalism holds that the ethical way things are is included in the natural. Some arguments for reductionism begin with a premise of supervenience. To say, e.g., that the ethical supervenes on the natural is to say that if things differ ethically, then they must also differ naturally. It has been argued that such supervenience, along with some auxiliary assumptions, implies metaethical naturalism. However, these arguments tend to apply only to properties, not relations. The goal of this paper is to consider including relations too. In the case of properties, the following is true: if a set of properties is closed under Boolean operations, then any property that (strongly) supervenes on this set is coextensive with an element of it. But the same does not hold for relations; a relation may supervene on a set of relations which is closed under Boolean operations without being coextensive with any element of that set. The paper considers what further conditions might be required, in addition to Boolean closure, to ensure that supervenience implies coextensiveness.

**Mr Adam Bugeja** (adam.bugeja@anu.edu.au)

*Moral testimony and motivation*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 6

When a person asserts a moral claim with the intention that her audience will believe it on trust, she is giving moral testimony. Described cases in which an agent forms a moral belief on the basis of testimony strike many people as intuitively puzzling or unsatisfactory. Two explanations for this response are prominent in the literature. First, it is suggested that believing moral testimony strikes us as epistemically inappropriate because we have no way of identifying moral experts. Second, it is held that moral beliefs acquired through testimony are deficient as a basis for moral action. I argue for a different explanation. Belief in moral testimony puzzles us because intuitively plausible psychological principles tell us that it should not be possible. According to motivational internalism, to believe a moral claim one must have some motivation to act upon it. If we are to believe moral testimony we must be motivated by moral testimony. Yet the intuitive Humean doctrine that cognitive states are motivationally inert seems to rule out the possibility that merely comprehending a moral assertion may cause us to be motivated by it.

**Mr Daniel Burkett** (danburkett@gmail.com)

*Conceiving of Time Travel Fictions - A 'Novel' Argument for the Possibility of Time Travel*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 2

Ordinarily, philosophers arguing for the possibility of time travel restrict themselves to merely defending time travel against allegations of inconsistency and contradiction. These objections are usually based on particular theories about time, causality and

personal identity. I believe, however, that this way of arguing can be turned on its head. By using the conceivability thesis – that is, the thesis that if something is conceivable, then it is also possible – we can put forward a positive argument for the possibility of time travel, and then consider how this should inform our metaphysical views. I will attempt to do this by presuming the truth of the conceivability thesis and then presenting a simple piece of time travel fiction. I will argue for the conceivability of this story and, in doing so, show that this particular time travel story is also possible.

**Dr Mary Butler** (mary.butler@otago.ac.nz)

*Good Care*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 6

The work of the philosopher and ethnographer Sara Ruddick has never been surpassed as a record of what the work of care is like from the perspective of caring for children. She situated the discourse in what she termed ""maternal thinking." Maternal thinking, in Ruddick's terms, is the particular kind of thinking and reasoning that grows out of maternal practice. Ruddick follows Wittgenstein, Habermas and others in the practicalist school of philosophy here in claiming that ""distinctive ways of knowing and criteria of truth arise out of practices". Ruddick's thought is limited in scope however, in terms of care given to adults, by its emphasis on the provision of uncritical training to fit into society. The work of the (political) philosopher Hannah Arendt in "The Human Condition", although not aimed at carers, provides a tripartite division between the human activities of labour, work and action arranged in an ascending hierarchy of importance. In this paper the work of Arendt and Ruddick are analysed to provide a draft outline for the work of caring for an adult, where good care is defined by attention to all elements of the human condition.

## Campbell–Currie

**Dr Douglas Campbell** (douglas.campbell@canterbury.ac.nz)

*Analaticity, Apriority, and Necessity: On Why the Three Modal Distinctions Come Apart Every Which Way*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 6

Propositions are commonly classified as being either a priori or a posteriori; as being either analytic or synthetic; and as being either necessary or contingent. These three distinctions give rise to eight associated categories of propositions (one for each combination of properties). Hume held, in effect, that all but two of these eight categories are empty, and that all propositions are either a priori, necessary and analytic on the one hand, or a posteriori, synthetic, and contingent on the other. Kant sought to break Hume's link between apriority and analaticity by showing that a third category, of a priori, synthetic and necessary propositions, exists. Kripke has likewise attacked the link between apriority and necessity, by showing that both a priori contingencies and a posteriori necessities are possible. In this paper I will try to put together the lessons taught us by Hume, Kant, and Kripke, and also by Descartes, in order to show that none of the eight categories of propositions are empty. I will demonstrate examples of propositions belonging to each of the categories.

**Dr Colin Caret** (colin.caret@gmail.com)

*Against the 'No Solution' Solution to the Paradoxes*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 5

In recent years, a view I will call 'inconsistent language theory' (Azzouni, Eklund, Scharp) has gained some traction in the literature on truth and paradox. One tantalizing advertisement for inconsistent language theory is that it represents a fundamentally different perspective on the semantic paradoxes than is found in the orthodox literature on the subject. Insofar as they offer solutions to the paradoxes, orthodox theories of truth are accused of suffering from explanatory impotence and revenge problems. According to inconsistent language theory, the concept of truth is inconsistent, so there is no solution to the paradoxes. Recognizing this, the inconsistent language theorist arrives at a view which is both revenge-free and has greater explanatory power than any orthodox theory. This is first and foremost a dispute over methods: orthodox theories are said to have a wrong-headed tact in dealing with the paradoxes. I argue that this is an assault which at least some orthodox theories can withstand by discharging the explanatory burdens raised by inconsistent language theory. Along the way, I argue that some of the apparent failings of orthodox theories are really artifacts of uncharitable interpretation and classical bias. The 'no solution' solution to the paradoxes is not a viable alternative to extant truth theories.

**Dr Philip Catton & Joshua Black** (philip.catton@canterbury.ac.nz)

*C. S. Peirce on mathematical experiments: relations of logic, practice, insight*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 7

[This paper is jointly authored with Joshua Black] We consider here, in the context of a wider intellectual history of experimental measurement, some key tenets concerning mathematics of Charles Saunders Peirce. We thereby illuminate the precedence of practice to logic in mathematics and thus how it is that mathematics conditions logic not less than logic conditions mathematics.

**Ms Hannah Clark-Younger** (hannah.cy@gmail.com)

*Are Imperative Arguments Arguments?*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 3

Standard definitions of validity are designed to preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. However, it seems possible to construct arguments that contain sentences in the imperative mood, such as: If there's a stop sign, stop! There's a stop sign. So, stop! Together with a third claim, that sentences in the imperative mood (such as "Stop!") are not capable of being true or false (they are not 'truth-apt'), we have an inconsistent triad: (1) Imperative sentences can be premises or conclusions of valid arguments (2) Imperative sentences are not truth-apt (3) The premises and conclusions of valid arguments must be truth-apt. This, I claim, is the Problem of Imperative Inference. To solve the problem, we must reject one of (1) – (3). Two of the arguments for rejecting (1) rely on the claim that arguments with imperative parts are ungrammatical. I examine these arguments that move from a premise about the rules of grammar to a conclusion about the impossibility of imperative arguments, and conclude that they are unconvincing.

**Dr Steve Clarke** (stephen.clarke@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

*Are Philosophers' Intuitions Evidence?*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 4

Appeals to intuitions as evidence in philosophy are challenged both by critics who complain of the lack of a theoretical account explaining why we should believe that such appeals can count as evidence and by experimental philosophers who have shown up variability in folk philosophical intuitions. A common response to this latter problem has been to argue that it is only professional philosophers' intuitions that count as evidence in philosophy because it is only these intuitions that are sufficiently invariant. This response is inadequate for two reasons. First, recent surveys have shown up significant variability in professional philosophers' intuitions. Second, an examination of the academic literature on professional intuitions across disciplines gives us good reasons to doubt that philosophers can develop truth-apt intuitions. A less common response, which has been developed by Williamson, is to abandon the claim that intuitions are evidence but to seek to defend the use of thought experiments in philosophy nevertheless. However, it is not clear how far this response can go to defending current uses of thought experiments in philosophy. Clarity on this issue depends, inter alia, on clarity about the extent of our knowledge of counterfactual conditionals and possibility claims.

**Ms Stephanie Collins** (stephanie.collins@anu.edu.au)

*Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 3

I argue that if there is some morally demanded or desirable outcome that is likely to be achieved only through the coordinated actions of multiple individuals, then we can assign a duty over that outcome to the conjunction of those individuals only if the individuals together constitute a sufficiently structured collective agent. I recognize that this might be seen as too strict of a criterion for collective duties, since it appears to let disorganized individuals off the hook. I respond to this objection by putting forward an outcome-relative definition of "structured collective agent" and by specifying the duties that individuals have to form such a collective agent, conditional on what other individuals do.

**Mr Michael Couch** (michael.couch@canterbury.ac.nz)

*Hume's Philosophy of Education*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 1

Hume has rarely been considered a contributor to the philosophy of education, which is unsurprising as he did not write a dedicated treatise nor make large specific comment, and so educators and philosophers have focused their attention elsewhere. However, I argue that a more careful reading of his works reveals that education is a significant concern, specifically of enriching the minds of particular people. I argue that his educational ideas occupy an important, although not major, place in his writings, and also an important place in the history of ideas as Hume fills a gap after Locke, and provides the framework for the much more educationally influential Bentham and Mill.

**Dr Damian Cox** (dcox@bond.edu.au)

*The Paradox of Virtuous Judgment*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 7

Here are two problems for virtue theory: (1) how to reconcile virtuous judgment with judgment of virtue; (2) how to formally specify moral decency as opposed to moral heroism on the one hand and moral villainy on the other. I call the first of these problems the paradox of virtuous judgment. Virtuous judgment is judgment of others that attracts our admiration and approbation. Accurate judgment of virtue, on the other hand, involves a mercilessly precise and complete accounting of the weaknesses and failures of others. On the face of it, the two sorts of judgment are incompatible. I argue that this is a problem (and if one is committed to the very idea of a fully virtuous agent, the problem runs deep). A second problem for virtue theory is the problem of decency. For example, we need a way of distinguishing between heroic acting well and required acting well. The latter would typically be an object of reasonable criticism; the former would typically be the object of impertinent and bullying criticism. But how do we distinguish the decent from the heroic? In what terms do we draw the line? I propose to solve these two problems together.

**Prof Max Cresswell** (max.cresswell@msor.vuw.ac.nz)

*Mathematical Entities in the Divided Line*

Friday 8 July 10-50 Burns 4

The second highest level of the divided line in Republic 510b-511a appears to be about the entities of mathematics – specifically geometry. It differs from the highest level in two respects. 1. It involves reasoning from hypotheses, and 2. it uses visible images. I try to shew how these apparently different features are related, by focussing on Plato's need to give an account of how we can speak of many particulars of the same kind, without assuming that they are imperfect copies, in the way sensible things can be imperfect copies, of Forms.

**Ms Karen Crowther** (kcro8477@uni.sydney.edu.au)

*Effective field theory, emergence and fundamental physics*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 4

Quantum field theory (QFT) is the basis of fundamental physics, and provides the most accurate and successful physical theories to date. Problems with renormalisation, however, lead to the reconceptualisation of QFT as effective field theory (EFT) – our putative fundamental theories are valid only at some particular energy scale. Much of the philosophical literature on EFT has focused on debunking some controversial early claims made by Cao and Schweber, regarding antireductionism and the impossibility of a final theory. These claims, together with the strong responses they have elicited from other authors, result in a picture which, I believe, might be taken as a mischaracterisation of EFT. I argue that the framework of EFT should itself be understood as effective. Recognising this allows us to explore the relations of reductionism, approximation and emergence between our best theories of physics while remaining faithful to the spirit of EFT.

**Dr Gillian Crozier and William Harper** (g.crozier@gmail.com)

*“Feyerabend on Newton: A defense of Newton’s empiricist method”*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 2

In “Classical Empiricism,” Paul Feyerabend draws an analogy between Isaac Newton’s empiricist methodology and the Protestant faith’s primary tenet sola scriptura. He argues that the former – which dictates that ‘experience’ or the ‘book of nature’ is the sole justified basis for all knowledge of the external world – and the latter – which dictates that the sole justified basis for all religious understanding is Scripture – are equally vacuous. Feyerabend contends that Newton’s empiricism, which postures that experience is the sole legitimate foundation of scientific beliefs, serves to disguise supplementary background assumptions that are not observer-neutral but are steeped in tradition, dogma, and socio-cultural factors. He focuses on Newton’s treatment of perturbations in the Moon’s orbit, arguing that this typifies how Newton supports his theory by cherry-picking illustrations and pruning them of anomalies through the incorporation of ad hoc assumptions. We defend Newton’s notion of empirical success, arguing that Newton’s treatment of the variational inequality in the lunar orbit significantly adds to the empirical success a rival hypothesis would have to overcome.

**Dr Aneta Cubrinovska** (aneta.markoska-cubrinovska@canterbury.ac.nz)

*Time-branching account of tenses in counterfactuals*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 3

Counterfactuals do not have a standard syntactic characterisation in English, yet speakers’ intuition easily distinguishes them from those with fact-stating antecedents. This paper is an effort towards unpacking this intuition. I discuss the question of how the form of the antecedent conveys counter-to-fact meaning and what contributes towards the modal flavour of the consequent clause. If tenses are modeled using the notion of branching time in the style of Prior-Thomason, the verbal structures that make up the counterfactual sentences provide the entire conditional with a natural and intuitive interpretation that is modal and does not involve possible worlds.

**Prof Garrett Cullity** (garrett.cullity@adelaide.edu.au)

*Normative Derivation*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 5

Some normative judgements about action and feeling derive their justification from other, more fundamental ones. What are the forms that these derivations can take, what explains why they take these forms, and where should we expect them to terminate? I offer an answer to these questions, outlining a taxonomy of forms of normative derivation, and proposing an explanation of why these are the possible forms.

**Mr Adrian Currie** (adrian.currie@anu.edu.au)

*Sauropod Size & the Unity of Science*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 5

It is a common complaint that philosophical models of science have neglected the historical, social and biological sciences to their detriment. The traditional unity of science thesis, which claims that sciences become unified through a process of reduction, is a glaring example. In response some philosophers have denied reductionism to varying degrees of success. I take a different tack, showing that concerns about unity and reduction ought to be decoupled, and that reductive accounts of unity are dissatisfactory. For sufficiency, an account of unity must be illuminative of scientific structures. An examination of recent paleobiological explanations of gigantism in sauropods is revelatory of epistemic structure in historical sciences. Reductive accounts of unity ignore these structures, and so fail to be sufficient.

## Daniels–Frona

**Mr Paul Daniels** (paul.daniels@gmail.com)

*The Persistent Time Traveller: Insights about Persistence from Time Travel*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 2

Theories of persistence have recently been criticised using examples drawn from time travel. Here I use a range of more or less physically plausible time travel cases to raise a new worry. Through this discussion I draw attention to interesting characteristics of perdurantism and endurantism that many might find counter-intuitive. This discussion will also feature the first law of thermodynamics and issues from personal identity.

**Assoc Prof Greg Dawes** (gregory.dawes@otago.ac.nz)

*Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 6

Defences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that something is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best scientific theories since they are the theories that are most likely to lead to the goal of science, which is that of knowledge. In support of this claim I invoke Bill Lycan’s panglossian reflections regarding Mother Nature.

**Prof Sue Dodds & Dr Frederic Gilbert & Eliza Goddard** (Eliza.Goddard@utas.edu.au)

*Brain Intervention and Selfhood: Burden of Normality and Deep Brain Stimulation*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 4

Medical intervention using Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is regarded as an efficient and safe treatment for a number of neurological disorders. Some scientific studies, however, pose the possibility of a threat to personal identity following DBS. These studies report patients have difficulty seeing their life post treatment, as the same or continuous with their life pre treatment. Similar responses have been identified with other types of psychosurgeries. Clinical studies of epileptic populations, who have received an anterior temporal lobectomy, show patients experience difficulties adjusting to their new status as treated. This postoperative response adjustment has been described as a syndrome – “the burden of normality” (BoN). In this paper we explore what kind of threat could be posed to personal identity by DBS and the implications of this threat for clinical research and treatment. In the first section we investigate the BoN as an independent psychological response to DBS. In the second, we examine challenges raised by the BoN thesis to philosophical understandings of personal identity and argue that a narrative approach provides a more useful approach for philosophical analysis of BoN. The third section sketches the implications of our analysis of BoN for clinical research and treatment.

**Mr Andrew Donnelly** (adon1462@uni.sydney.edu.au)

*Conscience as Moral Identity*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 3

In this paper I explore two different conceptions of conscience. Within discussion of rights to freedom of conscience in the political philosophy and professional ethics contexts it has been standard to simply assume that the conscience is the same thing as the moral sense. Naturally enough, we can call this conception of conscience

**Dr Zoe Drayson** (zoe.drayson@anu.edu.au)

*Consciousness and Explanation*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 3

Can consciousness be reductively explained? Much discussion of this question relies on a traditional notion of reductive explanation associated with a priori metaphysics, and posits strong connections between reductive explanation, a priori entailment, and conceptual analysis. The contemporary ‘metaphysics of science’ trend, however, aims to understand issues such as reduction and explanation by reference to the methods and findings of the sciences. I defend a naturalistic notion of reductive explanation in the form of mechanistic explanation, and question its relation to a priori entailment and conceptual analysis. I show how the naturalistic approach can clarify explanatory projects in the science of consciousness, while suggesting that the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness seems to remain.

**Dr Simon Duffy** (simon.duffy@uni.sydney.edu.au)

*The ‘vindication’ of Leibniz’s account of the differential. A response to Somers-Hall.*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 2

In a recent article in *Continental Philosophy Review*, entitled ‘Hegel and Deleuze on the metaphysical interpretation of the calculus,’ Henry Somers-Hall claims that ‘the Leibnizian interpretation of the calculus, which relies on infinitely small quantities is rejected by Deleuze’ (Somers-Hall 2010, 567). It is important to clarify that this claim does not entail the rejection of Leibniz’s infinitesimal, which Leibniz considered to be a useful fiction, and which continues to play a part in Deleuze’s account of the metaphysics of the calculus. In order to further clarify the terms of this debate, I will take up two further issues with Somers-Hall’s presentation of Deleuze’s account of the calculus. The first is with the way that recent work on Deleuze’s account of the calculus is reduced to what Somers-Hall refers to as ‘modern interpretations of the calculus,’ by which he means set-theoretical accounts. The second is that this reduction by Somers-Hall of ‘modern interpretations of the calculus’ to set-theoretical accounts means that his presentation of Deleuze’s account of the calculus is only partial, and the partial character of his presentation leads him to make a number of unnecessary presumptions about the presentation of Deleuze’s account of the ‘metaphysics of the calculus’.

**Dr George Duke** (george.duke@deakin.edu.au)

*Thin Theories of Reference for Abstract Singular Terms*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 3

The prevailing approach to the problem of the ontological status of mathematical entities such as numbers and sets is to ask in what sense it is legitimate to ascribe a reference to abstract singular terms; those expressions of our language which, taken at face value, denote abstract objects. On the basis of this approach, neo-Fregean Platonists such as Wright and Hale have argued that abstract singular terms may be taken to effect genuine full-blooded reference towards objects, whereas nominalists such as Field have asserted that these apparent referential commitments should not be taken at face value. In this paper I argue for an intermediate position which upholds the legitimacy of ascribing a reference to abstract singular terms in an attenuated sense relative to the more robust ascription of reference applicable to names denoting concrete objects. In so doing I also seek to clear up some confusions regarding the ramifications of such a thin notion of reference for ontological claims about mathematical objects by appeal to the distinction between immanent and transcendent ontology.

**Assoc Prof Heather Dyke** (heather.dyke@otago.ac.nz)

*Playing by the Rules: Can a Doping Ban be Justified?*

Friday 8 July 10-50 Burns 2

I examine what I take to be the principal arguments employed to justify a ban on the use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sport: arguments from harm; arguments from cheating and unfair advantage, and arguments from damage to the essence of sport. I find all these arguments to be deficient. I suggest that one reason for the failure of these attempts to justify a blanket ban on the use of PEDs stems from the diversity and plurality of sports. I argue that we should take this pluralism within sport

and turn it to our advantage in the search for a principled justification for restrictions on the use of PEDs in sport. Each sport should have its own rules about the use of PEDs, and those rules are simply the rules of that sport. I illustrate a number of advantages of this approach. Finally, I acknowledge that my approach is in conflict with the current drive towards harmonisation in sport, and I argue that this is a good thing.

**Mr Edward Elliott** (edd.elliott@gmail.com)

*Tonk, Boche, Aqua & Flurg: Epistemic Analyticity and 'Defective Concepts'*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 4

One important objection to an account of epistemic analyticity based in the theory of Conceptual Role Semantics has been that of 'defective concepts'. These are concepts that appear to be counterexamples to the general claim that we are justified or entitled to infer according to any inferential patterns that are part of a concept's possession conditions (the 'Meaning-Entitlement Connection'). Four important examples of these 'defective concepts' are Prior's 'tonk' connective, Dummett's 'Boche', and Boghossian's 'Aqua' and 'Flurg'. Each of these presents a slightly different challenge to the Meaning-Entitlement Connection, and it has been suggested that there are no non-question begging answers to all of them for the defender of epistemic analyticity. I argue that there are plausible ways of filling in the details of the CRS framework in such a way that it effectively deals with each of these challenges, showing that these four purported counterexamples do not undermine the existence of epistemic analyticities.

**Prof Brian Ellis** (phibde@bigpond.com)

*Social Ideals and the new Metaphysics of Morals*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 4

The new metaphysics of morals is the theory of social idealism. There are two kinds of social ideals: ideals of society and ideals of social character. The two are not independent, and to employ one, while ignoring the other, in trying to construct a theory of morality would be a mistake. The ideals of good character are not independent of those of a good society, because good social institutions and structures need to be in place to develop and maintain good character, and, where there are few people of good moral character, a good society cannot be either developed or maintained. Therefore, if morals are social ideals, there must be two sorts of moral principles, individualistic moral principles concerned primarily with social character development, and social moral principles concerned with the development or maintenance of a good society. The individualistic moral principles are those that require us to be honest and fair in our dealings with others, and compassionate in our dealings with other sentient creatures. The social moral principles are concerned primarily with our moral rights and obligations, and our moral responsibilities to others and to the environment.

**Dr David Etlin** (david.etlin@gmail.com)

*Vague Desire: the Sorites and the Money Pump*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 5

This paper explains the sorites paradox about vague linguistic expressions in terms of the money pump puzzle about rational

choice. The connection is via a Gricean theory of meaning as determined by speaker intentions, where the latter are a preference about the interpretation of utterances. It is argued that an attractive but ultimately false principle relating preference to choice solves the money pump, and thereby the sorites.

**Dr Wan-Chuan Fang** (wcfang@sinica.edu.tw)

*Embodied Cognition and Searle's Intentions in Action*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 4

Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle have a long-standing dispute over the question of how skillful copings are to be better understood. In a way this is also a dispute over how much skillful copings are to be taken as a phenomenon of embodied cognition. Searle offers a logical analysis of skillful copings in terms of his notion of the intention in action. He further takes such an analysis as showing that, contrary to Dreyfus's contention, skillful copings should not be taken as cases of embodied cognition, at least not as Dreyfus understand it. Two things will be argued in this paper. First, some of Searle's reasons for appealing to intentions in action are not good reasons. Second, contrary to Searle's contention, an intention in action by itself cannot determine the definite physical shape of an action. Based on these two points, I shall further argue that there is indeed room left for Dreyfus's contention that skillful copings are embodied cognitions, Searle's logical analysis notwithstanding.

**Mr Jonathan Farrell** (jonathan.farrell@anu.edu.au)

*The meaning of 'what it is like' phrases as used to talk about phenomenal consciousness*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 3

Perhaps the most common way of introducing the notion of phenomenal consciousness, of characterising phenomenal consciousness, and of drawing our attention to phenomenal consciousness, is by using 'what it is like' phrases. These are phrases such as 'what it is like,' 'something it is like,' 'nothing it is like,' etc. Unfortunately, it is not so clear what these phrases mean. (Indeed, some have claimed that we are mistaken to think that we can make sense of them.) Thus it is not clear how they can be used to do the work (characterising, introducing, drawing attention to) that we put them to. (Indeed, some have claimed that we are mistaken to think that they can be so used.) I will give an analysis of 'what it is like' phrases that clarifies their meaning and shows how it is that we can use them in the ways that we do.

**Ms Alison Fernandes** (alisonsfernandes@gmail.com)

*Realism and Response-Dependence: What their Compatibility Suggests for the Realism Debate*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 2

In a series of papers beginning with 'Realism and Response-Dependence' (1991), Philip Pettit argues that a plausible account of response-dependence is compatible with realism. Acknowledging that many of our concepts are developed by way of our responses does not conflict with the core tenets of realism. I will argue that two strategies Pettit could be using to argue for this claim fail. Appealing to the metaphysical nature of the properties these concepts pick out, or to whether the

properties are causally responsible for the responses, both make the compatibility with realism too easy: even stipulative concepts that are not responsive to the world come out realist. I will argue that a third strategy succeeds, but that it interestingly involves recasting realism as an epistemic rather than metaphysical thesis. Concepts are realist when they are developed through appropriate methods, methods that allow participants to become coordinated in their responses. This result suggests a shift in realism debates away from metaphysics and into epistemic territory.

**Ms Sandra Field** (sfield@princeton.edu)

*Spinoza and Radical Democracy*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 3

Antonio Negri's radical democratic interpretation of Benedictus de Spinoza's political philosophy has received much attention in recent years. Its central contention is that Spinoza considers the democratic multitude to have an inherent ethical power capable of grounding a just politics. In this paper, I argue to the contrary that such an interpretation gets Spinoza back to front: the ethical power of the multitude is the result of a just and fair political institutional order, not its cause. The consequences of my argument extend beyond Spinoza studies. For Spinoza gives a compelling argument for his rejection of a politics relying on the virtue of a mass subject; for him, such a politics substitutes moral posturing for understanding, and fails to grasp the determinate causes of the pathologies of human social order. Radical democrats hoping to achieve effective change would do well to lay aside a romanticised notion of the multitude and pay attention to the more mundane question of institutional design.

**Ms Bronwyn Finnigan** (bronwyn.finnigan@gmail.com)

*Rationality in Action*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 1

There are several ways of explaining the nature of action as rational. In this presentation I shall assess the plausibility of a particular ontological version of this idea; namely, that there is an irreducible 'rational structure' in action. This is intended to oppose the standard idea that 'rationally structured' actions are non-basic actions that are reducible to basic actions in causal relations. I shall analyse the relevant sense of rationality involved in this dispute in terms of an action being relationally determined rather than an ontologically simple event and shall argue that actions not only should be defined as irreducibly rational in this sense but also that this claim can be reconciled with some version of the basic/non-basic action distinction.

**Dr Scott Forscherler** (scottforschler@gmail.com)

*The Formula of Universal Law is Heteronomous*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 4

Contrary to long-received tradition, Kant's first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is not the sole possible principle for the autonomous guidance of a rational will. The FUL essentially asks us to follow the will of a hypothetical agents who live in a very unusual world, one in which all other rational agents will adopt the same maxim, rather than work out what would be rational in the actual situation we find ourselves in—or more broadly, for

all possible situations, and hence for rational agents as such. It should be replaced by a truly autonomous principle, a Formula of Universal Willing (FUW), which instead checks if maxims are such that any rational agent can will, of any other rational agent in any world whatsoever, that the latter follow it. Kant's subtle mistake must be diagnosed by distinguishing between first- and second-order principles of will, and between two kinds of universalization and lawfulness. This correction promises to address the long-standing difficulty Kantian ethics has in offering ethical guidance when we must respond to evil or solve coordination problems.

**Assoc Prof Earl Stanley Fronda** (ebfronda@up.edu.ph)

*The statement 'God exists' is not substantively true, but it is not false either*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 5

It is commonly thought that the word 'God' (like the word 'ghost') designates an entity (which may or may not exist), and that the statement 'God exists' is a substantive statement and (like 'ghosts exist') can be true or false on the basis of certain facts in the world. The theist holds the statement at issue to be true because, aside from all the things or entities that make up the plenary world, there in fact exist an entity that the word 'God' designates. The atheist holds the same statement to be false because no such entity exist. But there is a discursive tradition in Christendom itself where the word 'God' does not designate an entity among or beside other entities that make up the plenary world, and the statement 'God exists' is not taken as a substantive statement: i.e. it is not about certain (possible) facts in the world. The statement 'God exists' is held true not because it corresponds with certain facts in the world but because it is a pleonasm (or, in Wittgensteinian parlance, it is a grammatical statement). And precisely because it is a pleonasm it cannot be false.

## Gavin–Hutchison

**Mr Samuel Gavin** (sgav008@aucklanduni.ac.nz)

*Types of Significance*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 6

Here is a collection of apparently disparate things of philosophical interest: the meaning of words, sentences and utterances, speaker meaning, natural meaning, practical significance, mental content, and representation. In this paper I will argue that the members of this collection do in fact have something interesting in common. I will suggest that most might be subsumed under a category I will call ""types of significance"" and the remainder viewed as parasitic on one or other of these types. Instances of significance exhibit the following abstract structure. Some item, such as an artifact, fact or proposition, is significant when it generates a normative requirement or permission for some agent, when the agent becomes related to it in some way, as specified by a set of norms. Different types of significance are distinguished by differences in the set of norms in play. Naturally, I cannot hope to conclusively establish here that each of the phenomena mentioned above is a type of significance in my sense. But I will show how in a number of important cases, such phenomena might plausibly be accounted for along these lines, and thus why

a project as ambitious as Peirce's 'Semeiotic' may yet be a going concern.

**Mr Michael Gilchrist** (michael.gilchrist@teu.ac.nz)

*Being something versus Being there*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 3

Quine, Carnap, Saussure and multilinear semantics Not all ontological commitment is ultimately metaphysical. The elements of an alternative conception may be found in a wide range of sources. In this paper I marshal some of these diverse elements in an attempt to give greater coherence to such an alternative. I begin with the difference between Carnap and Quine over what it means to be the value of a bound variable. Carnap's refusal of Quine's "existential generalisation" and his contrasting commitment to existential specificity has an almost exact counterpart in Saussure's semantic multilinearity. Indeed, despite the two theories having apparently quite different motivations, each provides invaluable illumination of the other. In particular, Saussure's conception of a language as an ontology whose objects are defined by opposition as well as association explicates Carnap's conception of a thing-language. Properly developed, an inherently differential ontology allows us to move beyond a framework in which language as a system of arbitrary names refers, via variables, to an extra-linguistic, purely associative, totality. I give an outline of such a development and an indication of how it would resolve some of the puzzles and paradoxes generated by the metaphysical framework.

**Assoc Prof Rod Girle** (r.girle@auckland.ac.nz)

*Invisibility and the Can't Do Principle*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 1

The Can Do Principle is set out by Gabbay and Woods (2005). It will be argued that the Principle does more than explain methods, it also gives a rationale for the high visibility of certain issues in Philosophy, especially Logic. It will also be argued that the contrary principle, the Can't Do Principle, gives an account of why certain issues are passed over as not important in Philosophy, especially Logic. It will be argued that at the extreme end of the importance-unimportance spectrum, unimportant issues tend to become invisible. But it does not follow that invisible issues are actually unimportant, it only follows that they are beyond the orthodox methodology delimited by the Can Do Principle. The emphasis in the paper will be on issues in Logic.

**Dr Clinton Golding** (clinton.golding@otago.ac.nz)

*An analysis of philosophical progress illustrated by papers from Rawls, David Lewis, Kripke & Singer*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 7

I start with four papers, generally agreed to be highly influential: Two Concepts of Rules by John Rawls; Elusive Knowledge by David Lewis; Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer; and Outline of a Theory of Truth by Saul Kripke. Then, I argue that they can also be understood as having made philosophical progress (rather than being influential merely for sociological reasons, or because of philosophical fashion). The papers did not make progress in the sense of presenting the 'true position'. Instead, I argue that they made philosophical progress in terms

of moving to better positions which resolve a current philosophical problem and which are in greater reflective equilibrium. I elaborate these two conceptions of philosophical progress, illustrate how they can apply to the four classic papers, and conclude that they are both consistent with philosophical practice, and enable us to make sense of philosophical progress despite the lack of reaching final, settled positions, because there is always room for further progress by discovering further or more refined problems and offering more sophisticated resolutions, and for moving to a position that is in greater reflective equilibrium.

**Mr Juan Manuel Gomez** (gomju504@student.otago.ac.nz)

*Hume's Four Dissertations: Revisiting the essay on taste*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 5

Sixteen years ago a number of papers and discussions considering Hume's essay on taste emerged in various journals. They deal with a number of issues that have been commonly thought to arise from the argument of the essay: some authors take Hume to be proposing two different standards of taste, other think that his argument is circular, and other focus on the role the standard and the critics play in Hume's theory. I believe that all the issues that have been identified arise from a reading of the essay that takes it out of its context of publication, and mistakes Hume's purpose in the essay. In this paper I want to propose an interpretation of the essay on taste that takes into account two key aspects: the unity of the dissertations that were published along with the essay on taste in 1757, under the title of Four Dissertations, and Hume's commitment to the Experimental Philosophy of the early modern period. I believe that these two contextual aspects of the essay provide a reading of the essay on taste that besides solving the identified issues, gives us a good idea of its aim and purposes.

**Dr Patrick Greenough** (pmg2@st-andrews.ac.uk)

*Externalism and Scepticism*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 5

Scepticism about knowledge comes in many different forms: Cartesian Scepticism, Dreaming Scepticism, Lottery Scepticism, Meta-Epistemic Scepticism, and so on. Externalism about knowledge, in its various forms, is well equipped to deal with the basic sceptic who claims that knowledge is impossible. However, it seems much less well equipped to deal with either Lottery Scepticism or Meta-Epistemic Scepticism - roughly, the form of scepticism which challenges us to show, from the philosophical armchair, that external conditions for knowing are good. In this talk, I argue that, suitably formulated, Externalism is in much better shape to address these further forms of scepticism than its detractors have alleged.

**Dr Jennifer Greenwood** (jennie.greenwood@gmail.com)

*Contingent Transcranialism and Deep Functional Cognitive Integration*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 3

Proponents of extended mind (contingent transcranialists) claim that the mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognisers' physical, socio-cultural and technological environments. They

further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources and internal neural resources. They have hitherto failed, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended cognitive systems. They claim, inter alia, that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains to world rather than from world to brains. Using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and biology and cognitive neuroscience, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world to brain transcranial achievement. In addition, I explicate the nature that three forms of deep functional integration can take and provide compelling examples of each.

**Prof Alan Hajek** (alan.hajek@anu.edu.au)

*Staying Regular?*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 1

‘Regularity’ conditions provide bridges between the various ‘box’/‘diamond’ modalities and various notions of probability. They have the form: If X is possible, then the probability of X is positive (or equivalents). Especially interesting are the conditions we get when we understand ‘possible’ doxastically, and ‘probability’ subjectively. I characterize these senses of ‘regularity’—one for each agent—in terms of a certain internal harmony of the agent’s probability space

**Dr Richard Paul Hamilton** (Richard.Hamilton@nd.edu.au)

*In Defence of Hirsute Naturalism in Ethics*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 7

Ethical naturalism, at its most basic, is an insistence upon the heteronymy of ethics, by which one understands that ethical theory should cohere with our best account of nature. This seems to suggest an affinity between ethical naturalism and naturalising projects in other areas of philosophical enquiry, such as epistemology and mind. Neo-Aristotelians, such as John McDowell, Michael Thompson and Rosalind Hursthouse, have been strongly resistant to such varieties of naturalism, rejecting ‘bald’ in favour of ‘relaxed’ naturalism. Such ‘relaxed’ naturalism gives pride of place to human being’s capacity for conceptual thought and the acquisition of a culturally formed ‘second nature’. The problem here, as Charles Pigden recently commented, is that neo-Aristotelians leave ourselves open to the charge of making our biology up as we go along. In this paper, I respond to Pigden and defend a hirsute ethical naturalism. I follow Alasdair MacIntyre in arguing that ethical naturalism requires a robust and plausible philosophy of nature. I explore what such a philosophy of nature might look like and ask whether it is supported by current biological science.

**Mr Matthew Hammerton** (gnothi-sauton@hotmail.com)

*Is moral error theory a contingent or necessary truth?*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 6

Suppose that Mackie’s moral error theory is true. Is it necessarily true or contingently true? In this paper I will argue

that, contrary to what several commentators have thought, Mackie regarded his error theory as a mere contingent truth. I will then examine several contemporary Mackie-style moral error theories and show that some are necessarily true (if they are true) and some are contingently true (if they are true). This discussion will obviously interest moral error theorists but is also relevant for critics of moral error theory, as the success or failure of certain objections against the error theory can sometimes depend on its modal status.

**Prof Carsten Hansen** (carsten.hansen@csmn.uio.no)

*Correctness and Naturalness: On David Lewis’ approach to Radical Interpretation*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 1

To what extent, and by what constraints, do the physical facts determine what a person believes, desires and means? Part of this question concerns the semantics of the constituents of sentences: in virtue of what does a term such as ‘Dunedin’ refer to something? In this talk, I take up David Lewis’s answer in terms of the eligibility of interpretations of a language that includes several terms. We will see that arriving at a notion of comparative eligibility that assimilates the termwise eligibility of interpretations is not at all trivial, because there is scope for an aggregation problem related to the one revealed by Arrow’s theorem of social choice. Keeping analogues of Arrow’s assumptions in mind will help us to avoid pitfalls when developing Lewis’s account more fully.

**Mr Jonathan Herington** (Jonathan.Herington@anu.edu.au)

*The Moral Foundations of Conceptions of Security*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 2

Theories of security impose conceptual constraints on what a referent requires in order to be secure. While it has long been recognised that the character of these constraints is informed by the political philosophy underpinning them, it is not often recognised that the way in which many of these constraints are articulated and justified can be seen as extensions of particular moral philosophies. In this paper I will investigate a commonly held, and relatively traditional, conception of security to identify its linkages with deontological and teleological approaches to value. I argue that this traditional conception limits the category of security to protection of a referent from harms that are intentionally caused by some other agent. Although the intentionality and agent-causation constraints underpin a widely held distinction between safety and security, and accord well with deontological considerations, I note that they appear arbitrary according to a teleological approach to value. I argue that the constraints on the content of security which result from this focus on causation and intentionality are by turns implausible, morally controversial and epistemically demanding.

**Dr Hinne Hettema** (h.hettema@auckland.ac.nz)

*The Reduction of Chemistry to Physics: Absolute Reaction Rate Theory*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 2

Henry Eyring’s absolute rate theory provides a good insight into what it might take to reduce a realistic theory of chemistry to a

collection of physical theories. The theory of absolute reaction rates is an example of how the unity of science works in practice. The theory explains the size of chemical reaction rate constants in terms of thermodynamics, statistical mechanics and quantum chemistry, but also uses a number of notions unique to chemistry, such as the 'transition state'. Moreover, the explanation relies in important measure on the comparison of reaction rate constant expressions derived from these individual theories. This example can be used to evaluate the philosophical notions of reduction deriving from Nagel, Spector, and Kemeny and Oppenheim, as well as Darden and Maull's notion of 'interfield theories'. These various theories of reduction are the key building blocks in the idea of unity of science. I argue that philosophical ideas about the unity of science need to consider theories of sufficient complexity to avoid the trap of oversimplification. On the other hand, we must also avoid a lazy conclusion of disunity, to which the theory of absolute reaction rates provides a robust counterexample.

**Mr Onni Hirvonen** (antti.hirvonen@students.mq.edu.au)

*Taylor and the Problem of Recognizing Cultural Groups*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 3

Recognition of cultural groups is an issue that puzzles those involved in the discussions around multiculturalism and Charles Taylor (1994) has done important groundwork in his 'The Politics of Recognition'. This paper proceeds as follows. At first, Taylor's view on recognition is shortly introduced. After that, two different conceptions of social ontology are brought into the picture. The first conception emphasizes the role of recognition in the constitution of individual persons. According to it, persons are ontologically dependent on recognition relationships. The second conception concentrates on the ontology of groups. The agency of cultural groups is not self-evident and in this paper it is argued that Taylor faces a social ontological problem when he grants agency to certain kinds of groups that are not really agents. After the problem is made clear, the attention is turned to the possibilities of misrecognition and disrespect that follow from recognizing groups that are not really agents. Finally, a way out is offered. The suggestion is that, despite of its vagueness, Taylor's position includes elements that enable incorporating a robust social ontological theory into it. If this is done, the problem on the theoretical level is solved.

**Dr Richard Wei Tzu Hou** (hou190506@ccu.edu.tw)

*Epistemic Possibilities Epistemologised*

Friday 8 July 10-50 Burns 3

Abstract. A widely accepted thesis in the literature concerning epistemic possibilities is the compatibility thesis that P is epistemically possible if and only if that P is compatible with the information state characterized by the epistemic states of relevant agents. The goal of this paper is to present some cases of epistemic possibilities to challenge the compatibility thesis, including various implementations of the thesis. Very roughly, the compatibility checking in the thesis captures only the epistemological coherence of an epistemic agent's entertaining an attitude toward epistemic possibility claims, rather than the truth conditions of epistemic possibilities claims.

**Dr John Howes** (learningguild@gmail.com)

*Plato's question: what is justice, and so what kind of good?*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 3

I first defend the rendering of 'dikaios' and its cognates by 'just' etc. rather than 'moral' etc. I argue that translators and commentators mislead when they have the brothers talking about the "effects" of justice and injustice (as one might talk about the effects of diets claimed to be beneficial or harmful). Adeimantus, consistently with Glaucon, uses words translatable by 'the condition into which each of them, in and of itself, puts its possessor'. The brothers present one challenge in remarkably similar ways but memorably different contexts. In three parts of the Republic (347e-54, 441c-5c, 571a-92b) Plato contributes to the answering of his main question. Though valuable, these contributions need to be improved upon. There is need of his own emphasis (in the Gorgias) on community and friendship and a Kantian one on respect, for justice and for persons, as issuing from an appreciation of reason and freedom in oneself and others. Plato is right, as against G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica secs 104-9), to hold that the virtue of justice is a good in itself, as well as for the consequences of being recognized or supposed to be just.

**Dr Kent Hurtig** (kent.hurtig@filosofi.uu.se)

*Rationality and Normativity*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 5

Contemporary philosophers are increasingly supportive of the idea that rationality consists in satisfying rational requirements, and these requirements are, in essence, consistency requirements. But now a problem arises: since there are at least two ways of satisfying consistency requirements – and since the requirements themselves say nothing about how you ought to satisfy it – it is unclear if, and how, the requirements of rationality really are genuinely normative. This is what John Broome has called 'The Normativity Problem'. In this paper I will set myself three tasks. First, I will explain what the normativity problem consists in. Secondly, I will canvass some of the proposed solutions to the problem and argue that they are all unsatisfactory. Finally, I will consider two potential solutions that to my knowledge have not yet figured in the literature. I shall call these 'The Holistic Solution' and 'The Indirect Solution' respectively.

**Dr Katrina Hutchison** (katrina.hutchison@anu.edu.au)

*Doing Philosophy and Making Progress*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 6

This is a paper on the relationship between accounts of the value of philosophy on one hand, and the nature and possibility of philosophical progress on the other. Assuming that progress is movement towards that which is valuable, it follows that conceptions of philosophical progress should be informed by accounts of the value of philosophy. With this in mind, I begin by looking at accounts of the value of philosophy. I draw these from a variety of sources including academic papers by philosophers, articles in the mainstream media and statements on philosophy department websites. A recurring theme in these writings is the idea that the practice of philosophy is itself valuable, both to the individual who practices philosophy, and to the world as a consequence of the individual's improved ability

to grapple with difficult and highly abstract questions, rigorously analyse concepts, think critically and offer effective arguments. Given this account of the value of philosophy, I consider whether there is an associated form of philosophical progress according to which philosophy progresses by stimulating the widespread practice of philosophy. I finish by speculating on the implications of this for academic philosophy.

## Ito–Lumsden

**Mr Ryo Ito** (822.110.ryo@gmail.com)

*Russell's Substitutional Theory and Two Paradoxes*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 3

Bertrand Russell, a founder of modern logic, developed a logical system called 'substitutional theory' as a prototype of type-theory in his course to archive the goal of 'logicism'. The theory, however, faces two kinds of paradoxes. I will argue that causes of them consist in the very idea on which the theory is based, by analysing them in terms of the 'domain' of the theory.

**Ms Conor Kiernan** (conor.kiernan@monash.edu)

*What Does a Prostitute Sell?*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 6

Those familiar with the debates over the moral status of prostitution will be acquainted with the dissatisfying lack of definition as to what a prostitute actually sells; various terms feature in the literature (often used interchangeably), such as 'sexuality', 'sexual services', 'sexual labour', and 'sexual property'. In this paper, I will propose an answer to the question, 'What does a prostitute sell?' I will compare some of the different interpretations of the prostitution contract found in the philosophical literature, and attempt to isolate in each the notion of what is sold. I will also draw out what I think are the shared beliefs in the debate, as well as what I think are false beliefs. Finally, I will propose my own foundation view, by considering a basic initial understanding of all prostitution contracts as consisting in the sale of some combination of the following three things: (false) intimacy, carnality and expertise. This conceptual analysis should lay the foundations for a more refined view in future writing, which might properly distinguish prostitution from other exchanges that also involve those three things and therein provide a basis for a moral assessment, though I shall not defend a moral position in this paper.

**Dr Justine Kingsbury & Dr Jonathan McKeown-Green** (justinek@waikato.ac.nz)

*Conceptual decluttering*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 2

When a concept turns out to be incoherent given our current best science (as is the case with Newtonian MASS), or to lump together a collection of things which are not genuinely of the same kind (as is the case with JADE), should we get rid of it? INNATENESS, FREE WILL, and OCTAROON are further examples of concepts for which the question of whether or not to eliminate may arise. Philosophers such as Frank Jackson are inclined to hold onto such concepts as FREE WILL, while admitting that strictly speaking nothing in the actual world

corresponds to them. They take their job to be finding the right successor concept, which will be close enough to what we normally mean by free will to still be worthy of the name. In this paper we discuss under what conditions a concept should be abandoned and under what conditions it should be retained.

**Prof Dan Korman** (dzkorman@gmail.com)

*Debunking Arguments Against Commonsense Realism*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 5

We are naturally inclined to "carve up" the world into a certain range of objects: dogs, trees, their trunks, and so forth. But we can easily imagine intelligent beings who divide up the world somewhat differently, as a result of differences in their interests, conventions, physiologies, or conceptual schemes. These sorts of imaginative exercises underwrite what look to be powerful arguments against commonsense ontology, by purporting to undermine the prima facie justification for our pretheoretical beliefs about which objects there are and aren't. After sketching a response to these arguments against commonsense realism, I show that the debunking arguments are a double-edged sword: the "permissivist" ontologists who advance these arguments are no less vulnerable to the arguments than commonsense realists themselves.

**Assoc Prof Fred Kroon** (f.kroon@auckland.ac.nz)

*Characterising Characterisation*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 1

Routley introduced the Characterisation Postulate (CP) — the postulate that, in general,  $A(\iota x A(x))$  (that is, the thing characterised as being A does indeed have the property A) — as one of the defining principles of Meinongianism. Unrestricted CP faces severe problems, however and Routley was left defending a heavily restricted version of CP (if A is a "nuclear" predicate, then  $A(\iota x A(x))$ ). In 'Towards Non-Being', Priest rejects the nuclear/extranuclear distinction, and advocates a version of CP (call it CP\*) that, he says, holds in full generality: no matter what A might be, A holds of  $\iota x A(x)$  — but only "at the worlds which realize the way the agent represents things to be in the case at hand". Even though CP\* has consequences that would have been anathema to Meinong and Routley, there is a way of reading Meinong, suggested by his 'On Assumptions', that suggests he might have been able to see the merits of CP\*. The central purpose of the present paper is to articulate this interpretation of Meinong, and to set it in a wider contemporary context.

**Dr Marguerite La Caze** (m.lacaze@uq.edu.au)

*An uneasy peace: facing the difficulty of forgiveness*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 6

This paper explores the relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation. I argue that reconciliation processes tend to be inappropriately interpreted as acts of personal forgiveness. The concept of forgiveness at work here is primarily a western religious form of conditional forgiveness, based on putting aside grievances in exchange for information and expressions of contrition. I will examine this question in relation to Rwanda's reconciliation efforts, such as the gacaca courts, which I contend should not be understood (in general) as forms of forgiveness

but as reconciliation and focused on peace and stability. I argue that forgiveness is not as central to reconciliation projects as is widely assumed.

**Dr John Lamont** (johnrlamont@hotmail.com)

*Molnar's Thomism*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 7

In Powers, George Molnar gave four generally accepted criteria for intentionality, argued that physical powers satisfy all these criteria, and argued that all properties of objects except for positional properties and the numerical identity of parts are powers. These positions have been accepted by a number of other philosophers. Debate on the intentional character of powers has focused on the question of whether or not such an intentional character would falsify Brentano's claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental. It has not addressed the fact that assigning intentionality to causal powers, together with claiming that the essential properties of things are given by their causal powers, is a revival of Aquinas's view that everything that exists has a final cause. Aquinas also holds that the essence of things is given by their causal powers, and the intentionality of the powers of a thing, as postulated by Molnar and others, is equivalent to the final cause postulated by Aquinas. The paper describes the resemblance between the views of Aquinas and Molnar and defends their shared position against some of the most obvious criticisms of it.

**Ms Joanne Lau** (joanne.c.lau@anu.edu.au)

*Voting in Bad Faith*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 7

Discussions of unfairness often focus on the free rider problem: if you benefit from a cooperative scheme but you don't contribute to it, then you are arrogating yourself over other members of your scheme. A similar unfairness exists at the decision-making stage, before the scheme is implemented at all. There, we think it unfair of someone to participate in the decision-making process, but not be bound to the decision made collectively. That we collectively decided how to act seems to be an additional reason, over and above any other reason I may have to act. But why is that? Perhaps people should not participate in democratic decision-making processes unless they are committed to accepting the outcome: the principles of fairness demand that you not arrogate yourself over the others in the collective decision. Voting when you will accept the outcome if and only if the decision goes your way is an act of bad faith. If I vote in bad faith, I am not really 'taking part in a process that I intend to decide what we will do'. Instead, I intend it to have that effect if and only if the vote turns out one particular way.

**Dr Holly Lawford-Smith** (holly.lawford-smith@anu.edu.au)

*Profiting from Poverty, and other stories*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 4

If one agent benefits from the fact that another agent suffers harm, does she for that reason have a duty to alleviate some of that harm? And if so, is that duty distinct from the duties that arise as a result of causing or contributing to harms ('contribution'-based duties), or as a result of having the capacity

to lessen harms ('assistance'-based duties)? I consider a range of cases with a view to deciding whether all, only some, or no instances of benefiting from harm give rise to duties in beneficiaries to end or lessen those harms. I argue that there are many cases in which agents benefit from harms and injustices to others, and yet have no duty toward those agents. Such duties arise only in a subset of cases, cases in which the beneficiary is responsible for, or has contributed to, the harms that befall the agent.

**Dr Wang-Yen Lee** (wylee@usm.my)

*Gruesome Hypotheses and the Swamping of Priors*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 3

Some subjective Bayesians argue that initial differences in opinions on the prior probabilities (known widely in the literature as 'priors') of various hypotheses do not matter in the long run, since the accumulation of evidence will lead to an ultimate convergence of opinions (Edwards, Lindman, and Savage 1963, 197). This is known in the literature as the 'washing out' or 'swamping' of priors (Salmon 1990, 106; Earman 1992, 141ff; Bird 1998, 207ff). I shall call it the swamping argument for the ultimate objectivity of subjective Bayesianism. I contend that the argument does not work by showing that taking gruesome hypotheses into account can prevent swamping because it allows a subjective Bayesian agent's taking the prior probability of a given stage of updating with a value that is lower than the posterior probability yielded by the preceding stage of updating.

**Dr Catherine Legg** (clegg@waikato.ac.nz)

*Epistemic Particularism*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 6

In the last few decades virtue ethicists have profoundly reassessed the goals and theories of mainstream ethics. The traditional focus on whether individual acts are right or wrong has been at least supplemented by discussion of a series of irreducible moral virtues (e.g. patience, courage, honesty...) The even newer discipline of virtue epistemology seeks to extend analogous insights to epistemology – supplementing the traditional focus on whether individual beliefs are known or not known by discussion of irreducible truth-seeking virtues (e.g. e.g. patience, courage, honesty...) Another recent debate of interest in ethics is moral particularism, sometimes described as the view that moral evaluation is not fully capturable by any set of general principles but requires the ability to respond sensitively to the unique exigencies of particular situations. I inquire whether this view also might be 'exported' to epistemology. I suggest that it can and should be, and that this is in fact embodied in the 'maxim' of classical American pragmatism that if one wishes to truly understand an idea, one needs to be able to apply it in specific contexts.

**Ms Lisa Leininger** (leininge@umd.edu)

*Ersatzer Presentism and the Passage of Time*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 5

Presentism is considered a deficient theory by its opponents partly due to its supposed inability to provide truthmakers for past (and future)-tensed claims – this problem is known in the

literature as the grounding objection. Craig Bourne, in *A Future for Presentism*, defends a version of presentism which he claims avoids the grounding objection. This version, which Bourne labels ersatz presentism, is somewhat analogous to modal ersatzism. The ersatz presentist holds that all times are abstract objects – sets of propositions – and only one time is concretely realized – the present moment. Bourne gives an account of the passage of time as the successive concrete instantiation of these times. I argue that Bourne’s analysis of the passage of time faces a trilemma: the passage of time, according to Bourne’s account (1) renders the passage of time a fiction or (2) gives up presentism or (3) faces an infinite regress. On this basis, I conclude that Bourne’s analysis of the passage of time should be rejected, and along with it, Bourne’s ersatz presentism.

**Dr Peter Lewis** (plewis@miami.edu)

*Wavefunction Possibilism*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 4

Wavefunction realism is the position that the quantum wavefunction can be taken literally as a representation of the physical world. The most pressing problem with it is that the wavefunction contains representations of every possible result of a measurement, so wavefunction realism apparently entails that every such result actually occurs. This “many-worlds” position can be resisted by supplementing the wavefunction with hidden variables or a collapse mechanism, but such modifications are ad hoc and empirically problematic. Is there a way to understand the wavefunction that does not have the objectionable many-worlds consequence? I argue that we can understand the branching structure of the wavefunction as a structure of physical possibilities rather than as the structure of actuality. The challenge is to overcome the immediate objection that wavefunction branches cannot be *possibilia* since they causally interact with each other. But it is not so obvious that the correlations between branches should be attributed to causal interaction. Instead, I argue (1) that the correlations are the result of a global constraint rather than local causation, and (2) that the lesson of the many-worlds approach is that our physical theory doesn’t need to pick out the actual world from among the *possibilia*.

**Ms Steffi Lewis** (slewis@municapllc.com)

*David Lewis' Teachers and Students*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 1

David Lewis lived at a time when the relationship between teachers and students in philosophy underwent great change. When David was an undergraduate (1958 - 1962) and a graduate student (1963 – 1966), the Doctorvater could still be found on the landscape (here and there anyway), even in philosophy and even in the USA. David as a student was very much his own man: he respected many of his teachers but was neither dominated nor forced into areas of study by any of them. David never thrust his own ideas on his students, and never pushed them into areas or onto topics where they did not want to go. The talk is more history and anecdote than substance; it has lots of pictures.

**Mr ChiYen Liu** (liuchiyen@gmail.com)

*Conditionals as 3-valued sentences*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 7

I argue that conditionals are 3-valued sentences. I first propose two crucial claims for simple conditionals, that is, non-nested conditionals: (i) the probability of  $A \rightarrow B$  being true is  $P(A \& B)$ , and (ii) the assertibility of  $A \rightarrow B$  is  $P(A \& B) / P(A)$ . I will explain the rationale behind these two claims, and then give a more general account for nested conditionals such that we can define the probability and the assertibility of more complicated conditionals.

**Mr Bruce Long** (bruce.long@arts.usyd.edu.au)

*An Informational Defence of Melia's Mathematical Nominalism*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 4

The Quine-Putnam indispensability thesis is that mathematics is indispensable to our best science and thus we should be committed to the existence of mathematical abstracta over which scientific theories quantify. Joseph Melia has suggested two strategies for the nominalist to retain commitment to the indispensability of mathematics but reject the need to be committed to the existence of Platonic mathematical abstracta. The first strategy involves referring to Platonic entities for the purposes of theory building, then discarding any ontological commitment to those entities as fictions. The second strategy conceives of mathematical structures as information-encoding indexes. The paper defends the second strategy. I proceed by engaging with a strong argument from mathematical Platonists Mark Colyvan and Aiden Lyon to the effect that phase spaces have explanatory power because they provide information about non-existent possible states of dynamical systems. Colyvan and Lyon are right that phase spaces and other mathematical structures and abstracta have information-based explanatory power. However, I reject the idea that this informational explanatory power comes from real Platonic entities. An alternative and corrective conception of the nature of mathematical abstracta is developed: that they are neither Platonic entities or fictions but information encoding indexes or indexing structures.

**Dr David Lumsden** (d.lumsden@waikato.ac.nz)

*Concepts and Pragmatics*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 2

Many approaches to pragmatics involve considering the contents of the minds of the interlocutors in one way or another. In particular, Relevance Theory takes an explicitly cognitive turn by treating the process of relevance assessment as a cognitive process. Relevance Theory is typically seen as assuming some form of Language of Thought thesis and it develops on the basis of either a classical notion of concept, or a modification of such a notion. I wish to argue that the purposes of Relevance Theory may be better served by a non-classical notion of concept such as a prototype notion.

## MacIntosh–Munn

**Prof Jack MacIntosh** (macintos@ucalgary.ca)

*Models and Method in the Early Modern Period: 4 case studies*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 2

In this paper I consider the various roles of models in early modern natural philosophy by looking at four central cases: Marten on the germ theory of disease. Descartes, Boyle and Hobbes on the spring of the air; The calorific atomists, Digby, Galileo, et al. versus the kinetic theorists such as Boyle on heat and cold; and Descartes, Boyle and Hooke on perception. Did models in the early modern period have explanatory power? Were they taken literally? Did they have a heuristic function? Unsurprisingly, perhaps, consideration of these four cases (along with a brief look at some others) leads to the conclusion that the answer to each of these questions is yes, no, or sometimes, depending on the model, and the modeller, in question. I consider briefly the relations among these different uses of models, and the role that such models played in the methodology of the 'new philosophy.' Alan Gabbey has suggested an interesting threefold distinction among explanatory types in the early modern period, and I consider, briefly, the way in which his classification scheme interacts with the one these cases suggest.

**Dr Brent Madison** (b.j.c.madison@warwick.ac.uk)

*Epistemic Justification and Its Value*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 4

This paper investigates two interrelated questions: first, can the value of epistemic justification be used to motivate and illuminate the nature of justification? Secondly, which theory of justification adequately explains why epistemic justification is something that we value in the way that we do? Standardly, epistemic internalism is motivated and defended on the basis of intuitive judgments about cases, which is an accepted methodology in much of contemporary analytic philosophy. While I agree that such intuitive judgments do have a central role to play in philosophical theorizing as data that need not be justified, the motivation for a philosophical position, and epistemic internalism, in particular, can be bolstered if the intuitions can be explained. Therefore, I will engage in motivating epistemic internalism on theoretical grounds, rather than purely from judgments about cases. The theoretical grounds I will focus on concern the value of epistemic justification. In this way, my approach falls within the "value turn" in recent epistemology. My central claim is that only epistemic internalism can make sense of the fact that justification is something that we do, and ought to, care about in the way that we do.

**Dr John Maier** (john.maier@anu.edu.au)

*The Argument from Moral Responsibility*

Friday 8 July 10-50 Burns 7

Consider: (1) Agents are morally responsible, (2) If agents are morally responsible then determinism is false, so (C) Determinism is false. This deceptively simple argument has attracted much attention. A number of philosophers, disturbed

by the prospect of reaching such a conclusion on such grounds, have argued against one or the other of the premises. I take a different approach. I argue that even if the argument is sound, it suffers from a distinctively epistemic flaw, which is that (given certain facts about our actual epistemic situation) its premises cannot be jointly known. This is because, if its second premise is known (and so true), its first premise is unknowable. I will also discuss certain symmetries and asymmetries between this argument and so-called "Moorean" arguments for the existence of the external world.

**Mr Raamy Majeed** (Raamy@yahoo.com)

*A Priori Conditionals and the Conceivability of Zombies*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 2

According to a conditional analysis of qualia, it is a priori true that (C1); if we hold fixed the actual world as a world in which there are spooky states, the A-intension of our concept 'qualia' would assign the extension of this concept as these spooky states. And (C2); if we hold fixed the actual world as a world in which there are no spooky states, the A-intension of our concept 'qualia' would assign the extension of this concept as whatever plays the functional roles in this world. In this paper, I will explain how this analysis enables us to both explain the zombie intuition and undermine the conceivability argument. I will then explain how the analysis gives us a novel response to the hard problem of consciousness because it puts us in a unique position to explain how we could give a reductive analysis of consciousness whilst simultaneously taking consciousness seriously. Finally, I will defend the analysis from recent objections.

**Ms Alejandra Mancilla** (alejandra.mancilla@anu.edu.au)

*An enforceable duty of humanity?*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 6

One of the main differences between duties of justice and duties of humanity has traditionally been taken to be that the first are enforceable, while the second are not. In the context of the current global justice debate, some philosophers have argued against this distinction, claiming that an enforceable duty of humanity is no oxymoron, but rather a necessary moral category when addressing the duties that the global wealthy owe toward the global poor. In this paper, my purpose is to examine what is meant by this claim and in what sense humanity can be said to be 'enforceable'. I distinguish three different senses of enforceability –legal, social and 'moral'– and go on to defend the third option over the other two.

**Mr Dan Marshall** (danm@hku.hk)

*Intrinsicity and Necessarily Co-extensive Properties*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 7

A leading analysis of intrinsicity is the analysis put forward by David Lewis in *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Lewis's analysis, however, has a serious defect. According to his analysis, if p is necessarily co-extensive with a property q, then p and q cannot differ in their intrinsicity: either they are both intrinsic, or they are both extrinsic. This consequence, however, is plausibly false. For example, given numbers necessarily exist, the property of being made of tin is necessarily co-extensive with the property

of being made of tin and co-existent with the number 1. The former property, however, is plausibly intrinsic, while the latter property is plausibly extrinsic. This paper provides an alternative analysis of intrinsicity, which, while similar in spirit to Lewis's analysis, allows necessarily co-extensive properties to differ in their intrinsicity.

**Mr John Matthewson** (john.matthewson@gmail.com)

$\alpha$

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 7

Even if a group of organisms exhibit phenotypic variation, fitness differences and heritability, those organisms will not undergo natural selection unless they are interconnected in the right ways. In his book *Darwinian Populations*, Peter Godfrey-Smith introduces the variable " $\alpha$ " as a way to understand this interconnectedness.  $\alpha$  reflects the level of reproductive competition that holds between a population's members - the extent to which more offspring for one member means fewer offspring for the others. I present an expanded analysis of this variable, and argue that high  $\alpha$  is a core requirement for a group of organisms to form a population that can undergo paradigmatic natural selection.

**Ms Hatha McDivitt** (hatha.mcdivitt@anu.edu.au)

*"Which Bunk Can Evolutionary Arguments Debunk?"*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 5

There has been a recent trend of giving so-called "evolutionary explanations" for morality, with such explanations being deployed in the service of arguing for a wide range of positions, both in normative ethics and in metaethics. Perhaps the most common form of argument which attempts to connect a hypothesis about morality being an evolved trait with an ethical or metaethical conclusion, is the Evolutionary Debunking Argument (or EDA). In a paper that came out earlier this year Guy Kahane claims that Sharon Street and Richard Joyce both deploy what he calls "Global Evolutionary Debunking Arguments" which are intended to debunk "morality" tout court. In this paper I will examine Joyce's use of an EDA, which he uses to establish a form of radical moral skepticism, and will use this example to ask the question "Which bunk can evolutionary arguments successfully debunk?"

**Mr Thomas McGuire** (tmcg019@aucklanduni.ac.nz)

*Why children have the right to a spiritual education*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 4

The aim of my paper is to argue that children have the right to a spiritual education, if they have the right to education at all. I argue that education should ideally be concerned with the development of maximum human potential. I will explain why, in my view, spirituality is the awareness and positive transformation of one's inner life. Spirituality should be a primary focus of education because of its important role in activating human potential. Spiritual education should aim to provide the knowledge, skills and inspiration for spirituality to blossom in a child's life to the greatest extent possible. Failure to provide spiritual education to children is a violation of their right to education.

**Mr Kelvin McQueen** (kelvin.mcqueen@anu.edu.au)

*Reduction, A priori Entailment and the Additivity of Mass*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 1

The Apriori Entailment Thesis (AET) states that ordinary macroscopic truths follow apriori from microphysical truths. AET has been used to defend an account of reduction: if some macroscopic truth doesn't follow apriori from microphysical truths then reductive explanation of that truth is impossible. Why believe AET? It's usually defended via a model of concepts 'the conditional abilities model'. But as Diaz-Leon (forthcoming) forcefully argues, this model doesn't tell us how to infer large-scale properties from the instantiation of microphysical properties. AET-advocates have suggested that there are apriori principles of scale-additivity for scale-neutral properties (properties that apply at all scales) e.g. that the mass of a whole is the sum of the mass of its parts. Diaz-Leon admits that these principles might be apriori, but worries that this is still not enough to infer the instantiation of scale-specific properties. Against both parties, I argue that the mass-additivity principle is aposteriori. Nonetheless, I argue that this does not affect AET, and will develop AET in an alternative way. I will show how the principle of mass-additivity itself follows apriori from a Newtonian microphysical description. I will then argue that the apriori entailment of scale-specific properties can be demonstrated in a similar way.

**Dr Angela Mendelovici** (amendel5@uwo.ca)

*A Simple Intentionalist View of Emotions*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 3

Emotions have a felt aspect and an intentional aspect. I argue that, unlike other views of emotion, intentionalism about emotion can neatly account for both aspects. I further argue for my favoured version of intentionalism about emotion on which (1) emotion-representations represent uninstantiated simple properties, and (2) like concepts, but unlike most perceptual representations, emotion-representations can occur without binding to any object-representations, yielding undirected emotions, such as sudden pangs of anxiety or pervasive feelings of sadness.

**Mr David Merry** (david.merry@gmail.com)

*Why I don't tend to respond well to dispositional analyses of character traits*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 5

Moral character traits, which include the virtues and vices (but may include other things) have often been given an analysis in terms of being a disposition to some kind of response. In this paper I examine three versions of this strategy: analysing character traits as dispositions to carry out some kind of action (held by Gilbert Harman), analysing character traits as dispositions to desire certain things (held by Brandt and Rawls), and analysing character traits as dispositions to respond in a good or bad way to some specified class of reasons (held by Goldie and Russell). I will argue that none of these theories can do everything that it is reasonable to expect from a theory of character traits. In particular, neither of the first two kinds of theory can adequately capture our intuitions about what make people worthy of moral approval and disapproval. The last sort of theory fails because it cannot be used informatively in

working out which actions might be virtuous and which might be vicious. I will describe a key sense of virtuous and vicious action which ought to be informed by a theory of character traits.

**Dr Kristie Miller** (kristie\_miller@yahoo.com)

*Persons sans objects*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 7

This paper defends strong conventionalism about personal identity — the view that persons are partly constituted by certain sorts of conventions — against a number of recent prominent objections. It then goes on to argue that despite being able to meet these objections, there are further objections that neither strong conventionalism nor traditional psychological continuity theorists are well placed to face. Instead, I suggest that those who are attracted to either of these views instead do better to reject the idea that persons are objects and that there are, in some good sense, any persons, even though much of our talk about persons and their persistence turns out to be true.

**Dr Francesca Minerva**

*Conscientious objection in the medical context: how can we solve conflicts of values between patients and doctors?*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 4

**Dr Joseph Mintoff** (Joseph.Mintoff@newcastle.edu.au)

*On the Quantitative Doctrine of the Mean*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 3

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is expressed in quantitative terms, but this has been hard for some people to take literally. While a literal interpretation has had its brave defenders, others such as Rosalind Hursthouse have been more dismissive, some describing it as an unhelpful analytical model which is better forgotten, and others describing its more elaborate versions as ""extremely silly"". Roughly two books of the Nicomachean Ethics are permeated with talk of character traits which are either deficient or excessive, however, and the aim of this paper is to examine how the doctrine might meet the objections of its critics.

**Mr Kengo Miyazono** (kengomiyazono@yahoo.co.jp)

*Imaginative Resistance and Higher-Lower Inconsistency*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 6

What is the crucial feature of the stories evoking so-called imaginative resistance? In this article, I examine "Higher-Lower Inconsistency View (HLI)" according to which the crucial feature is the inconsistency between higher-level propositions and lower-level propositions in the stories. I compare two possible interpretations of HLI; HLI (1) says that the higher-lower inconsistency in explicitly written story-texts is what matters for imaginative resistance, while HLI (2) takes the higher-lower inconsistency in what I call "extended stories" as crucial. I argue for HLI (2), against HLI (1), by showing that there are serious difficulties that can only be solved by accepting HLI (2). The problems are about "context sensitivity", "genre effect" and "moral-conventional asymmetry". And I argue,

against the skeptics of HLI who take these problems as fundamental difficulties of HLI, that the basic idea of HLI can be defended when we look at the right kind of higher-lower inconsistency, namely, the higher-lower inconsistency in extended stories.

**Prof Michael Morreau** (mimo@umd.edu)

*Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 5

Thomas Kuhn has argued that scientists can reasonably disagree about which of several rival theories to choose. But one of his main arguments, if successful, scores an own goal. It makes such disagreement just as reasonable in normal science as it is in revolutionary science. Borrowing from the theory of social choice, I set out a more controlled version of Kuhns argument. It shows how choice can be more tightly constrained in normal science than it is in revolutionary science.

**Dr Nicholas Munn** (Nicholas.Munn@monash.edu)

*Normative Ethical Pluralism*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 3

I defend a normative ethical pluralism in which best available versions of consequentialism (C), deontology (D) and virtue ethics (V) are all components of our pluralist moral theory. I argue a) That such a pluralist theory confers advantages over any of C, D or V individually, b) That we need not be overly concerned with the conflicts that arise from the co-existence of these competing systems, and c) That a pluralism of this kind will not be subject to an endless proliferation of moral theories. That is, that the number of acceptable theories can be consistently capped at 3 (or if not exactly 3, thereabouts). To do this I take inspiration from HLA Hart's famous analysis of the content of rules, and from JC Beall & Greg Restall's not yet quite so famous argument for Logical Pluralism.

## Nath–Russell

**Dr Rekha Nath & Holly Lawford-Smith** (rnath@ua.edu)

*Doxastic Obligations for Members of Collectives*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 5

If a collective has an obligation to  $\phi$ , then the members of the collective have distributed obligations to contribute to  $\phi$ -ing, conditional upon beliefs about the efficacy of their contribution. What if a member finds herself in a situation in which she has a reasonable belief that the others won't contribute? Given that a collective will only do what it is obliged to do if the members believe of each other that they will contribute to the collective action, when faced with a lack of evidence it /would be better if /members believed that others would contribute. That belief will trigger cooperation, while erring on the side of caution will not. So individuals in situations where there is potential collective action have an obligation to /promote /these beliefs in others. These are doxastic obligations—obligations to have (and promote in others) certain kinds of beliefs. Sometimes these beliefs will be truth-tracking, because other members really will intend to contribute to the collective action given that other members do so too. But other times the beliefs will be false: a

member will be deceiving herself into believing that others are conditional cooperators when they are not. That raises problems to do with the irrationality of having false beliefs and the objectionable nature of disseminating them. We consider the extent to which these prima facie doxastic obligations are threatened by the irrationality of false beliefs.

**Mr Tim Oakley** (T.Oakley@latrobe.edu.au)

*Scepticism (almost) without tears*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 3

Contextualists and others have long argued that there are distinctions amongst types, or levels, or standards, of justifiedness of beliefs. One type, level or standard of justification is to be found in our everyday ascriptions (including those made carefully in the course of rigorous investigations in science and elsewhere). On the other hand, sceptical arguments establish the absence of a quite different type, level or standard. If this contention is true, it makes scepticism very easy to accept, for a number of reasons, but makes it seem trivial, since it leaves intact all our normal justificatory practice. The contention is indeed correct, but the consequential triviality charge is not, and is my target here. What the sceptic needs to point out is that the sort of justification we normally ascribe, the sort untouched by sceptical argument, is in fact a worryingly second-rate sort of justification, the ascription of which involves disregarding epistemic norms that we consider it important to follow in other contexts, where scepticism is not at stake. The practical consequences of accepting such a view are briefly considered. Note: this paper rehearses, but expands and hopefully improves upon, some of the ideas and arguments presented in my paper "In Defence of the Sceptic", presented at the 2010 AAP conference. The present paper of course does not presuppose acquaintance with the previous one.

**Mr Dean Ogden** (dean.ogden@monash.edu)

*Rethinking the Mind: Solving the problem of split brains*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 2

Experiments conducted on split-brain subjects have given philosophers cause to question the nature of our concept of mind. In this paper, I will: examine the questions raised by the problem of split brains; present the problem as one of accounting for the various behaviours split-brain subjects display; and evaluate various solutions that have been put forward so far. These solutions fall into four general categories: two minds solutions, one mind solutions, 'split' solutions, and solutions that hold the thesis of partial unity. Analysing each in terms of the variously unified, disunified and partially unified behavioural results of the split-brain experiments, I will show their explanatory benefits and deficiencies. I will then give a new solution to the problem, arguing that we ought to rethink our concept of mind in terms of constitution.

**Ms Elizabeth Olsen** (elizabeth.olen@gmx.com)

*Is Logic Normative?*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 4

It is a straightforward philosophy of logic that says that logic is descriptive of the reasoning process. However, there is evidence

to suggest that classical logic is not descriptive of the reasoning process. One could maintain this philosophy of logic and take the evidence as a critique of classical logic, but the more common response is to say, "logic does not tell us how we think, rather it tells us how we ought to think." One way this could be unpacked is that logic is descriptive of the ideal reasoning process. A conclusion that follows from this philosophy of logic is that there is a bridge principle that allows one to arrive at conclusions about what one is obliged to believe based on what one already believes. The existence of such a principle introduces the possibility of a bridging of the Is/Ought gap.

**Prof Paul Patton** (prp@unsw.edu.au)

*Political Liberalism and the basis of rights*

Thursday 7 July 10-50 Burns 2

Rawls's political liberalism draws a sharp distinction between moral, political and legal rights. It insists that political normativity ultimately rests on the considered judgments of a people and the kinds of consensus among them that might reasonably be reached. This approach is typically interpreted in terms of a concept of what is reasonable that is irreducible to what people actually thought and wrote. Within the realm of the reasonable, there will be a variety of acceptable conceptions of justice. Within actual historical societies, the possibility of consensus will be a function of the comprehensive moral and other views available to the potential citizens of a political community. Once the consensus is understood in these terms there is reason to suppose that conceptions of justice, public reason and the rights and duties of citizens may be different in different historical circumstances. This paper proposes to explore the consequences of actual as opposed to possible consensus for our understanding of political and legal rights.

**Dr Neil Pickering** (neil.pickering@otago.ac.nz)

*Prototype resemblance alternatives to classical concepts of illness and disease*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 5

Increasingly, philosophers interested in the concept of disease (or illness or disorder) are questioning the received classical approach. The classical approach involves providing a set of necessary and sufficient criteria for membership of the category or class 'disease'. The leading philosophers in this area (Christopher Boorse, Jerome Wakefield, Bill Fulford) use the classical approach. The emerging alternative in the philosophy of medicine is the prototype resemblance approach (Lilienfeld & Marino, Sadegh-Zadeh). This takes its inspiration from the work of psychologists such as Eleanor Rosch. Rosch says that, contrary to the classical approach, there are no necessary criteria for membership of many classes or categories. Rather classes of things are structured around prototypes. Some members of a class may be much less similar to the prototype than others, and may share different things with the prototype. This paper aims to introduce the prototype approach, with particular reference to the concept of disease, and consider its prospects for replacing the classical approach.

**Assoc Prof Charles Pigden** (charles.pigden@otago.ac.nz)

*No-Ought-From-Is: Searle, Godwin and the Duke of Wellington.*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 2

In 1964 John Searle famously claimed that it is possible to derive an 'Ought' from an 'Is'. Since this cannot be done by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises with conclusions about obligations. I shall argue that we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the fact that a promise has been made than we can derive a moral duty to fight a duel from the fact that a challenge has been issued. We can indeed derive conclusions about duties from institutional premises but these are conclusions about what we ought to do according to the rules of the institution not conclusions about what we ought to do period (which means that for one mad moment I find myself in agreement with R.M.Hare). My argument features an obstreperous earl, an anarchist philosopher and dueling Prime Minister.

**Mr Andrew Pinchin** (Andrew.Pinchin@monash.edu)

*Searching for External Reason Statements*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 7

In his 1979 paper Bernard Williams considers two propositions to be true: (1) that in ordinary conversation people sometimes make statements of the form 'A has a reason to  $\Phi$ ' and 'There is a reason for A to  $\Phi$ ' while not believing that a certain necessary relation obtains between A having that reason and A being motivated to  $\Phi$  for that reason; and (2) that the relevant necessary relation does obtain. His conclusion is that all statements about reasons that deny that this necessary relation obtains are either false or intended to mean something else. The literature in this area is largely, if not entirely, concerned with affirming and disputing the second proposition. With a similar concern to that driving Stephen Finlay's criticism of error theory about morality, in this paper I take issue with the first proposition contending that in ordinary conversation people do not make what Williams' calls external reason statements and if they do, the rarity of such statements nevertheless tells against the existence of external reasons.

**Mr Gabriel Rabin** (grabin@humnet.ucla.edu)

*Grounding Grounding*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 1

Some facts and entities ground others. Grounding is a metaphysical "in virtue of" relation. The groundees are the way they are in virtue of the way the grounders are. For example, microphysicalists claim that our entire world is the way it is in virtue of the way the microphysical world is – all facts are, ultimately, grounded in the microphysical. A complete story of the grounding structure of the world says, for every fact or entity, what (if anything) grounds that fact or entity. This story must say what grounds the facts about grounding. Are they themselves grounded in further facts, or are they ungrounded? Many (Cameron[2008], Schaffer[2010]) have worried that, if grounding facts are themselves grounded, an infinite regress of grounding looms. "Being would be infinitely deferred, never achieved" writes Schaffer (62). In this paper, we investigate the prospects for the thesis that all grounding facts are grounded.

We investigate a variety of different types of infinite regress that might result. We conclude that the bare claim that all grounding facts are grounded is perfectly defensible. Without the addition of further substantive metaphysical principles, it does not lead to metaphysically problematic regress. The way is cleared for grounding grounding.

**Ms Kari Refsdal** (kari.refsdal@ifikk.uio.no)

*Kant on Rational Agency as Free Agency*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 6

Kant argued for a close relationship between rational, moral, and free agency. Moral agency is explained in terms of rational and free agency. Many critics have objected that Kant's view makes it inconceivable how we could freely act against the moral law – i.e., how we could freely act immorally. But of course we can! Henry Allison interprets Kant so as to make his view compatible with our freedom to violate the moral law. In this talk, I shall argue that Allison's interpretation is anachronistic. Allison's distinction between freedom as spontaneity and freedom as autonomy superimposes on Kant a contemporary conception of the person. Thus, Allison does not succeed in explaining how an agent can freely act against the moral law within a Kantian framework.

**Dr Adriane Rini** (A.Rini@massey.ac.nz)

*Three Kinds of Proofs about Possibility*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 7

Aristotle uses three different kinds of proofs when studying reasoning about possibility. This talk explains what these different methods reveal about Aristotle's understanding of the structure of modal reasoning.

**Dr David Ripley** (davewripley@gmail.com)

*Bilateralism and paradox*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 1

Bilateralism takes meaning to consist in both assertion and denial conditions, or both acceptance and rejection conditions. In this paper, I consider the response that a bilateralist ought to have to paradoxes of truth, showing that bilateralism naturally gives rise to a nontransitive extension of classical logic when truth comes on the scene.

**Dr Ali Rizvi** (alimirzvi@gmail.com)

*The Independence/Dependence Paradox within John Rawls's Political Liberalism*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 7

Rawls in his later philosophy claims that it is sufficient to accept political conception as true or right, depending on what one's worldview allows, on the basis of whatever reasons one can muster, given one's worldview (doctrine). What political liberalism is interested in is a practical agreement on the political conception and not in our reasons for accepting it. There are deep issues (regarding deep values, purpose of life, metaphysics etc.) which cannot be resolved through invoking common reasons (this is the fact of free reason itself), and trying

to resolve them would involve us in interminable debates and would hamper the practical task of agreement on the political conception. Given the absolute necessity of a political society which is stable and enduring, it is thus wise to avoid these issues in founding a political society and choosing its basic principles - this is the pragmatic part of Rawls's position. In this paper I argue that this strategy leads Rawls into a paradox: (i) although the intention is to stay independent of comprehensive doctrines, the political conception is in fact totally (and precariously) dependent on comprehensive doctrines (not just on one doctrine but on each and every major doctrine in society). It is dependent on them: for its conceptualisation as an independent idea, for its justification, for the check of its reasonability in relation to the external world, for the formation of identities and value inculcation and hence for the formation of its model citizen; (ii) the very search for independence makes the political conception more dependent on comprehensive doctrines, and by extension makes it potentially more prone to intervention in and tampering with comprehensive doctrines (it is enough to show that it is a strong conceptual possibility to cast doubt on the whole strategy). Thus, for example, the political conception relies on the hope that "firmly held convictions gradually change" and that it would "in fact . . . have the capacity to shape those doctrines toward itself". The purpose of the Rawlsian conjecture is to give these "hopes" a concrete, practical form by giving advice to proponents of the comprehensive doctrine on how they can do all this and "try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception". I further argue that this paradox can be overcome by making the core of political liberalism more flexible.

**Mr Steven Robertson** (steven.robertson@sydney.edu.au)

*Normative theory choice*

Tuesday 5 July 11-50 Burns 6

It is a common problem that two normative theories will disagree about how an agent should act or what an agent should believe in various situations. Different logics disagree about whether certain deductions are valid; different decision theories disagree about whether certain decisions are rational; and different ethical theories disagree about whether certain actions are morally right. Presented with such disagreements, it is difficult to determine in a principled way which of two competing theories should be adopted. In this paper, I offer a framework for theory choice between normative theories, drawing on and extending the use of theoretical virtues for theory choice between competing empirical theories. Competing decision theories that disagree in the case of the Allais paradox are used as a case study.

**Dr Denis Robinson** (dj.robinson@auckland.ac.nz)

*Contemplating Animalism's Claim to be the Favourite of Common Sense*

Friday 8 July 17-00 Burns 2

I discuss certain general features of the personal identity sub-debate between Animalism and Psychological or "neo-Lockean" views. I start by noting a sense in which Animalism has a natural advantage and might be argued to be the "default" view in this debate. I note the ease with which many people have nevertheless apparently accepted Psychological views, meaning that they have not been put off by the added ontological or epistemological burdens imposed by this choice. I discuss a

couple of central reasons which have been offered for thinking Psychological views offend against "common sense", and discuss a "minimal" version of the much-debated constitution relation, arguing against Animalists who reject the very possibility of such a relation.

**Dr Matheson Russell** (m.russell@auckland.ac.nz)

*The pragmatics of political dissent: Rancière after Habermas and Arendt*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 3

Jacques Rancière's account of democratic politics attempts to capture the logic of dissent: that is, the way in which a political dispute can be staged by people who are normally disqualified from the circle of those able to participate in rational deliberation and the exercise of rule. In this paper I consider Rancière's account of political action with special attention to his critique of Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt. I attempt to provide a partial harmonization of these three accounts though highlighting the 'communicative presuppositions' of Rancière's democratic politics.

## Schouten–Terlazzo

**Ms Vanessa Schouten** (schouten@princeton.edu)

*Problems with Post-Mortem Harm*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 3

Many people think that we can harm the dead – for example, by failing to respect a dead person's wishes about whether to be buried or cremated, or by failing to dispose of their wealth in accordance with their will. It is a virtue of desire-fulfillment theories of welfare that they manage to explain these kinds of harms. However, if we take seriously the notion that harms such as these generate obligations to avoid causing such harm, then views such as virtue desire-fulfillment theories of welfare face a problem: how do we weigh up our duties to the dead against our duties to the living? I argue that treating duties to the dead and duties to the living as though they carry equal weight generates counter-intuitive obligations, and so a view such as a desire-fulfillment theory of welfare needs an account of how and why we accord the interests of the living greater weight than those of the dead.

**Dr Neil Sinhababu** (neiladri@gmail.com)

*Ethical Reductionism*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 1

I defend a reductionist view on which moral properties are identical with properties posited by the natural sciences. I criticize the nonreductionist view of the Cornell realists, on which moral properties are constituted by the properties of the other sciences without being identical to them. Supposing (for illustration) that hedonic utilitarianism is the true moral theory, reductionists take the goodness-pleasure relation to be the same as the water-H<sub>2</sub>O relation. Nonreductionists take the goodness-pleasure relation to be the same as the one between belief and a particular brain state, on Jerry Fodor's influential view. I argue first that nonreductionism is unmotivated. Its main advantage is that it helps us deal with multiple realizability, which is unlikely

to be a problem in ethics. While moral properties may be multiply realizable at the fundamental physical level, most ethical theories can be seen as moral-psychological identity statements, which is all reductionism requires. Then I argue that reductionism is ontologically simpler, avoids problems about causation, and doesn't endanger realism by requiring the implausibly robust evidence needed to support ethics as something like an independent science.

**Ms Olwyn Stewart** (olwyn@orcon.net.nz)

*Meaning, Living Faith and Theistic Metaphysics*

Friday 8 July 11-50 Burns 5

In this paper I defend D Z Phillips's religious philosophy against charges directed at Wittgensteinians in general by John Haldane and Brian Clack. To this end I isolate two areas of conceptual confusion that apply to the philosophy of religion (1) assessing one type of meaning by using epistemic practices whose methodology and criteria are tailored to another, and (2) allowing one type of meaning to become occluded by the predominance of another. From here I argue that the "neutral ground" in which philosophical claims about the existence of God are discussed fails to respect the relevant criteria for assessing such claims. Hence the "God" whose existence is proved or disproved is a quasi-empirical God with little or no relation to the world of religious meaning that gave rise to the "God" question.

**Mr Macintosh Stewart** (toshrs@gmail.com)

*Contractualism, Animals, and Intrinsic Value*

Friday 8 July 16-00 Burns 4

Social contract theories are often criticised for their weakness in dealing with non-human animals. An especially familiar variety of this complaint is that animals are accorded only indirect moral importance under contract views, and that we really need a moral theory to recognise the direct or intrinsic moral value of these creatures. I will argue that there is in fact no problem here in principle for social contract views. The notion of intrinsic value is not necessary for moral theories of this type, and once we dispense with attempting to distribute this mysterious property, contract theories can deal with animals in the same way they deal with humans.

**Ms Inja Stracenski** (injast@inet.com.au)

*What is Jewish Philosophy?*

Tuesday 5 July 14-10 Burns 4

What makes the unity of Chokmah (hebr. wisdom) and Sophia (gr. wisdom)? The notion of Jewish Philosophy harbors two names for wisdom, and entitles the unity of two primordial metaphysical foundations of knowledge and cognition. What is the content of this coexistence and what the aim of its confirmation? Is it not rather a contradiction in terms, like many objected, just a particular way to denominate the universal? In philosophical readers and literature about Jewish Philosophy we usually find the chronology of Jewish thinkers from Late Antiquity to the Present, learning that Maimonides was an Aristotelian, Hermann Cohen a Kantian or Franz Rosenzweig a Hegelian. Also that Moses Mendelssohn was the father of the Jewish Enlightenment in Germany, or that he influenced Kant as

Maimonides influenced Aquinas, and that Cohen was the founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. But we rarely find them scheduled on our philosophy departments program, although their works were written for the philosophical reader. Jewish Philosophy is not simply philosophy written by Jewish authors nor it is religious philosophy commonly conceived. I will present essential terms and ideas enabling us to read works of Jewish Philosophy in a philosophical genuine way.

**Dr Christine Swanton** (c.swanton@auckland.ac.nz)

*Right action: two levels of vagueness*

Monday 4 July 14-10 Burns 4

One source of moral disagreement that cannot be attributed to cognitive shortcomings, whether emotional or more narrowly cognitive, could lie with the vagueness of the idea of moral rightness itself. This claim is contentious, for vagueness is commonly regarded as a source of uncertainty in the application of terms; not of disagreement. How are we to understand vagueness in relation to the notion of morally right action, and what is the appropriate response to such vagueness? I provide a framework for answering these questions by distinguishing two levels of vagueness: vagueness in the concept of moral rightness itself (Level 1 vagueness) and vagueness in a substantive conception of moral rightness which is a "thickening" or precisification of what I shall describe as competing and contested 'thin' concepts of morally right action (Level 2 vagueness). This substantive conception is a virtue ethical one, which I call the target-centred conception of right action.

**Dr Sor-hoon Tan** (phitansh@nus.edu.sg)

*Does Xunzi's Ethics of Ritual Need a Metaphysics?*

Wednesday 6 July 11-50 Burns 6

Ritual (li) is central to Confucian ethics and political philosophy. Robert Neville believes that Chinese Philosophy has an important role to play in our times by bringing ritual theory to the analysis of global moral and political issues. In a recent work, Neville maintains that ritual "needs a contemporary metaphysical expression if its importance is to be seen." This paper examines Neville's claim through a detailed study of the "ethics of ritual" in one of the early Confucian texts, the Xunzi. This text has sometimes been read as offering a form of naturalism in its discussions of "heaven (tian)" as analogous to Western, even modern, concept of "nature," while other interpreters insist that tian is a normative notion. Does this concept of tian offer a metaphysical ground for ethics of ritual advocated in the text? If so, what kind of metaphysics is it? Do those Confucian ethical views need any metaphysical grounding?

**Dr Koji Tanaka** (k.tanaka@auckland.ac.nz)

*On Self-Awareness and Self*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 2

Some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, phenomenologists as well as Buddhist philosophers have claimed that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also involves self-awareness. It is sometimes argued that being aware of an object without being aware of

oneself is pathological. As anyone who has been involved in sports requiring quick responses such as cricket, tennis and some forms of martial arts can testify, however, awareness of the self at the time of acting becomes problematic: you would not be able to respond to the spin of the cricket ball, for example, if you were aware of yourself responding to it. This suggests that it must be possible for us to be aware without being self-aware. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of self-awareness and its relation to the self by investigating the phenomenology of the player who is 'in the act'. I shall argue that we can make sense of self-awareness without invoking awareness of oneself.

**Dr Weng Hong Tang** (wenghong@gmail.com)

*Success Semantics and Partial Beliefs*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 6

Suppose that one's belief and desire cause one to perform a certain action. According to success semantics, the content of one's belief is that which guarantees that the action performed satisfies the desire. On the face of it, success semantics—which is sometimes referred to as Ramsey's Principle, since the idea can be traced to F.P. Ramsey—seems to fare poorly in accounting for the contents of partial beliefs. For example, if Ida's degree of belief in  $p$  is 0.5, she might act in a way that best satisfies her desires if  $p$  were in fact false. But defenders of the view are unfazed by this worry. In response to it, J.T. Whyte has suggested that a partial belief's content is that which suffices for the success of the actions it would cause if it were a full belief. In my talk, I shall argue that such a reply is unsatisfactory. I then sketch and explore a unified account of the contents of both partial and full beliefs that stays true to the spirit of success semantics—and furthermore, is in line with the work of Ramsey.

**Ms Kate Tappenden**

*Embodied representations*

Thursday 7 July 11-50 Burns 7

This paper provides an examination of theories of representation within the embodied cognition literature. These theories are discussed in relation to their applicability to non-human animals. Using domestic dogs as a case study, I argue that much can be benefited from applying the framework of embodied cognition to the study of non-human animals' cognitive processes. In particular, embodied cognition can provide us with a strong framework in which representations can be examined. In conclusion, this paper argues for the application of 'weak' representations to non-human animals such as the dog.

**Ms Rosa Terlazzo**

*Autonomy: Its Promotion and Recognition*

Thursday 7 July 14-10 Burns 5

There is strong disagreement between substantive and content-neutral theories of autonomy over what the conditions for autonomy should be, but the two camps nevertheless seem to tacitly agree that the conditions for autonomy should indeed be the locus of the debate. In this paper, I argue that to adjudicate between conceptions of autonomy, we should begin by asking not what the conditions for autonomy should be, but rather what it is that we want a conception of autonomy to do. I suggest that substantive theories want a conception of autonomy that will

allow us to promote autonomy, while content-neutral theorists want an account that will not exclude marginalized and vulnerable persons from the realm of the autonomous. I argue that both of these purposes can be met if we shift the locus of autonomy from person to preference, and propose an indicative substantive account of autonomy that works in the service of both of these goals. This theory neither makes the conditions for autonomy so narrow that they can be met only by those with a particular set of values (as substantive accounts of autonomy tend to do), nor excludes much of the information that we might need in order to explore whether or not a preference is autonomous (as content-neutral theories often do). Instead, it employs a substantive conception of value at two levels, but does not, at either level, make these substantive criteria a requirement for an eventual attribution of autonomy. This makes our account of autonomy thick enough that it can be of use, but not so thick that it reserves autonomy for those of one social station or cultural milieu.

**Ujewe–Yamada**

**Mr Samuel Ujewe** (sujewe@yahoo.com)

*The African Concept of Person: Ubuntu and its implications for Human Free Will*

Tuesday 5 July 17-00 Burns 7

The idea of free will permeates and is over-emphasised in the concept of person that is widely held by Western scholars in current philosophical debates. There is however a question as to whether this widely accepted notion of person ought to be what ultimately defines the human person. For that a particular view of a concept prevails in a certain intellectual era does not necessarily mean that it can claim to be the absolute definition of that concept. The concept of person has inherent cultural and social undertones. Hence, its definition and application in one socio-cultural context or worldview may not be generalizable given the wide range of cultural and social variances in the world. This paper shall explore the African concept of person, which is summed up in the notion of ubuntu. Ubuntu is a notion that refers to the collective notion of the African people; it specifies that "a person is a person through other persons" in the words of the Zulu people. The paper shall review various understandings and appreciations of personhood among African communities, noting that a common ground for understanding the general notion of person in Africa has already been established. Since the African concept of person differs significantly from the generally held view, it is a strong indication that it may encounter problems with free will which is a prevailing feature in the latter view. Thus, the paper shall address the seeming conflicts that may arise regarding the compatibility of ubuntu and free will. This will be done in the context of practical experiences in daily life of African people.

**Dr Alberto Vanzo** (alberto.vanzo@otago.ac.nz)

*Rationalism and Empiricism in the Historiography of Early Modern Philosophy*

Tuesday 5 July 10-50 Burns 5

According to standard histories of philosophy, the early modern period was dominated by the struggle between Descartes', Spinoza's, and Leibniz's Continental Rationalism and Locke's, Berkeley's, and Hume's British Empiricism. The paper traces the

origins of this account of early modern philosophy and questions the assumptions underlying it.

**Miss Kirsten Walsh** (walki303@student.otago.ac.nz)

*Structural Realism, the Law-Constitutive Approach and Newton's Epistemic Asymmetry*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 2

In his famous pronouncement, *Hypotheses non fingo*, Newton reveals a distinctive feature of his methodology: namely, he has asymmetrical epistemic commitments. He prioritises theories over hypotheses, physical properties over the nature of phenomena, and laws over matter. What do Newton's epistemic commitments tell us about his ontological commitments? I examine two possible interpretations of Newton's epistemic asymmetry: Worrall's Structural Realism and Brading's Law-Constitutive Approach. I argue that, while both interpretations provide useful insights into Newton's ontological commitment to theories, physical properties and laws, only Brading's interpretation sheds light on Newton's ontological commitment to hypotheses, nature and matter.

**Dr Adrian Walsh** (awalsh@une.edu.au)

*Economic Hurts and Millian Harms*

Friday 8 July 14-10 Burns 6

In this paper I explore the relationship between laissez-faire economic theory and Millian conceptions of non-intervention as embodied in the Harm Principle. Free market theorists typically assume any government intervention that is not a response to a genuine harm but involves a desire to promote is morally objectionable. In so arguing such theorists assume that a clear distinction can be drawn between mere hurts and morally considerable harms. Herein I raise two problems for such a picture, the first concerning whether the Harm Principle rules out positive assistance when the recipients request such assistance? The second concerns what counts as a harm in the economic context. In the competitive environment that is a part of modern economic activity, is it possible to distinguish easily between hurts and harms? I suggest that if we consider these questions closely we see ways in which Millian liberalism differs significantly from laissez-faire.

**Mr Clas Weber** (Clas.Weber@anu.edu.au)

*Centered Communication*

Monday 4 July 10-50 Burns 7

According to an attractive account of belief, our beliefs have centered (i.e. de se) content. According to an attractive account of communication, we utter sentences to express our beliefs and share them with our audience. However, the two accounts are in conflict: if our utterances really do express the centered content of our beliefs, the content of the belief expressed by the speaker cannot be identical to the content the hearer acquires. I am going to sketch an alternative account of communication that accepts this consequence and explains how the two levels of content, the one expressed by the speaker and the one acquired by the hearer, are related.

**Dr Zach Weber** (zweber@unimelb.edu.au)

*Bad Lines*

Thursday 7 July 15-30 Burns 1

The shortest path between two points is a straight line. What is a straight line? The answer depends on logic. In this paper, I sketch geometric lines using a paraconsistent logic, and indicate how such an understanding of one-dimensionality impacts on a number of important philosophical topics -- including definite descriptions, mereological boundaries, time, and, yes, freedom.

**Mr Dan Weijers** (dan.weijers@vuw.ac.nz)

*The Experience Machine is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine!*

Monday 4 July 16-00 Burns 6

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment is widely thought to provide a knockdown argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Indeed, it is frequently introduced to undergraduate philosophy students as a sufficient reason to reject this whole category of theories and as a clear demonstration of the progress of philosophical thought. However, some have argued that Nozick's thought experiment cannot perform this function because it elicits judgements marred by status quo bias. This paper investigates this argument and the question of whether the experience machine should be used at all when teaching undergraduates about well-being. Several empirical studies on Nozick's and new experience machine scenarios are described and their results are discussed. Unlike those elicited by Nozick's scenarios, the responses to these new experience machine thought experiments do not provide any basis for refuting hedonism. It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment should no longer be used as a knockdown objection to hedonism and that all the experience machine thought experiments discussed here should be used together to educate philosophy students in how to assess thought experiments.

**Dr Simon Wigley** (wigley@bilkent.edu.tr)

*The Right, the Good and the Problem of Distinct Identities*

Tuesday 5 July 16-00 Burns 7

A standard criticism of utilitarianism is that it is only indirectly concerned with the distribution of welfare between individuals and, therefore, does not take adequate account of the separateness between individuals. This has led some to conclude that the utilitarian must either downplay the moral significance of distinct identities (e.g. Parfit) or concede that justice represents a prior and independent constraint on the pursuit of the good (e.g. Rawls). An intriguing alternative presents itself if we accept that intrinsic value for the world is independently generated by the receipt of welfare and the degree to which receipt accords with the demands of justice. Fred Feldman, for example, argues that an action is right if and only if it maximizes the sum of both these sources of intrinsic value. The proposal retains the aggregative structure of utilitarianism and takes into account the morally relevant differences between individuals. In response I argue that justice-adjusted utilitarianism collapses into a deontological theory because (i) the axiology assigns lexical priority to justice and (ii) the alleged intrinsic value of justice is entirely derivative.

**Dr Alastair Wilson** (alastair.wilson@monash.edu)

*Meta-ethics for (Quantum) Modal Realists*

Wednesday 6 July 14-10 Burns 7

Both Lewisian modal realism and my own preferred quantum-mechanical modal realism are subject to a meta-ethical objection, originally formulated by Robert M. Adams and recently endorsed by Mark Heller. In this talk I discuss how a modal realist ought to respond to the meta-ethical objection, and draw some methodological conclusions.

**Dr Peter Wong** (peter.wong@unimelb.edu.au)

*A Musical Vocabulary for Human Cultivation*

Wednesday 6 July 10-50 Burns 6

Robert Neville in his *Ritual and Deference* notes that there is a dance-like quality to ritual; and, citing Xunzi, he states that music is an apt analogy for ritual practice. The paper intends to go further by suggesting that, it is not only music in general that functions as a useful analogy, but that the Confucians have identified a number of musical terms in describing and assessing ritual practice. Furthermore, given that Confucians take ritual (li) to be co-extensive with the entire range of human conduct, then those musical terms are equally applicable in describing the qualities of noble human conduct. In other words, to be human (ren) is to be imbued with musical qualities.

**Mr Takahiro Yamada** (g.yamadatakahiro@gmail.com)

*The Relationship between Metaphysical (Anti-) Realism and Semantic (Anti-) Realism*

Monday 4 July 11-50 Burns 1

Usually, Realism about X is introduced as the view that X exists independently of our cognitive activity, and the anti-realism about X as opposed to it. In contrast to this common "metaphysical" characterization, Michael Dummett regarded these as entirely "semantic" positions, and proposed the semantic characterizations and a new framework to dispute about them. But, in the result, it seemed (anti-) realism lost the notion of existence, and some philosophers suspected that the debate became irrelevant to the original one. I will argue that it is not the case, with the help of the arguments by Alexander Miller (2003; 2006). He thinks that it would be better to see realism as a realistic "worldview", which includes a triple of a realistic metaphysics, an epistemology, and a semantics. And according to him, semantic realism is the consequence of the realistic metaphysics and the semantics adopted. So two realisms are related. I want to agree with him, but there is an insufficiency. I will refine and develop his idea.