

**Australasian Association of Philosophy
(New Zealand Division)**

Annual Conference, 2007

**University of Auckland Conference Centre (22 Symonds Street)
and School of Architecture Building (26 Symonds Street).**

December 2 – 6, 2007.

PROGRAM

Sunday, December 2nd.

**Conference Centre, University of Auckland
22 Symonds Street, Auckland**

2:00 – 7:15 p.m.: *Registration*

7:30 – 9:00 p.m.: *Presidential Address*

**Professor Rosalind Hursthouse
“Virtue Ethics and Human Nature”**

9:00 – 10:30 p.m.: *Drinks Reception*

About the Program:

Notes about the structure of the program, Monday - Thursday:

a) Careful!

For various reasons, including the need for sessions of different lengths (student sessions are shorter), and the need to squeeze in an Annual General Meeting, there is some variation of scheduling from day to day. Delegates are cautioned to check precise times.

To accommodate the AGM, Wednesday has the shortest breaks (including lunch); also the afternoon sessions on Wednesday are entirely given over to student presentations (which are shorter).

b) Morning and Afternoon Tea, etc.

Each day there are catered morning and afternoon tea breaks. The catered afternoon tea break is the *second* break in the afternoon: there is an earlier, ten minute afternoon break. Lunch will not be catered. (There will be tea bags, instant coffee, and hot water, available throughout the day. There are several coffee bars and cafes nearby on campus which will be open: see General Information Booklet.)

c) Session Timing.

Chairpersons are requested to start each session 5 minutes sharp after the start time shown on the program (allowing time for people to be seated, and for change of venue if numbers overflow). Student presenters should complete their presentation in 35 minutes, which will leave 25 minutes for discussion; others should complete their presentation in 45 minutes, leaving 30 minutes for discussion. Chairpersons are requested to ensure sessions do not go over time.

d) Sessions and Streams:

From Monday onwards, there are five sessions each day (not counting the AGM). All but three sessions have exactly four concurrent presentations; those three have five.

“Streams” range from very long to very short. Some of the shorter streams are subsets of the longer. Presentations in a single stream are almost always grouped contiguously on the program, and almost always in the same lecture room throughout. A proposed Mind and Language stream didn’t eventuate, due to the great heterogeneity of papers which it might have included, and the difficulty of achieving contiguity. Several Mind papers have been incorporated into the Ontology stream. Here are the streams ordered roughly by appearance on the program from left to right, and from earlier to later:

The **Ontology** stream may be found in the **first** column of the program; it runs the length of the conference and subsumes a **Philosophy of Mind** stream on

the Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of the Ontology stream are given over to the Philosophy of Time, Space, Modality, and Persistence, and more diverse topics in this stream may be found on Thursday. This stream overflows a little, e.g. on Thursday afternoon where there is a paper on Buddhist Ontology in the fourth column.

Ethics and Social Theory is the largest stream, mostly listed in the **second** column. Ethics and Social Theory presentations outnumber conference session-times, so inevitably some clash with one another (the stream overflows into the third column on Thursday). This stream also subsumes a **Bioethics** stream which occupies most of Wednesday.

The remaining streams are all shorter, and the **third** and **fourth** columns are accordingly diverse. A **History of Philosophy Stream** (third column) runs unbroken from Monday morning to Tuesday lunchtime, followed by island sessions on Wittgenstein (Tuesday afternoon) and (on Wednesday in Philosophy of the Arts) on Schopenhauer. The **Philosophy of the Arts** stream begins with the last session on Tuesday and continues until 2:25 on Wednesday. The **fourth** column includes a short **Conspiracy Theories** stream (Monday morning); a short **Teaching Critical Thinking** stream (a symposium and a presentation, on Wednesday), and a short not-quite-contiguous **Philosophy of Religion** stream (Thursday). It also includes diverse other papers including several on logic, language, and related topics. The **fifth** column, finally contains a stream on **Philosophy of Biology** (specially the social dimension of human evolution), and a paper floating somewhere between ontology, metaphilosophy, and ethics.

e) Lecture Rooms

Some sessions are in larger rooms than others. This primarily signifies the fact that we didn’t find a venue with enough equally large rooms. Ethics and Ontology have mostly been put in the larger rooms based on the weak argument that the large numbers of presenters in those areas equates to large audiences in those areas. We have an even larger lecture room (ALR1) in reserve in case a session’s audience can’t fit into the scheduled room – except where there are five concurrent sessions. Note that the student contributions to the Philosophy of Biology Stream have been placed in the fifth column but are scheduled for smaller rooms. Apart from this exception, program columns reliably indicate rooms.

f) Chairing sessions

Every student session has a pre-arranged official chair. You know who you are! We request, urge, and plead with others to sign up to chair sessions. A notice-board will be provided for this purpose.

Monday December 3rd.

	ALR5 Philosophy of Mind/Ontology	ALR3 Ethics/Social Theory	ALR2 History of Philosophy	ALR4
9:10 – 10:30 Papers	Graham Oddie <i>Boulder</i> What's So Bad About Pain Anyway?	Denise Gamble <i>Adelaide</i> Potentialism and Rights	Lee Churchman <i>Sungkyunkwan</i> Language and Falsehood in Plato's Sophist	Conspiracy Theories David Coady <i>Tasmania</i> Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?
10:30 – 11:00 MORNING TEA BREAK				
11:00 – 12:05 Student Papers	Jonathan Farrell <i>Auckland</i> Why We Shouldn't Be Soft-libertarians	Denise Vigani <i>Auckland</i> Virtue Ethics and Future Generations	Mark Johnstone <i>Princeton</i> Changing Rulers in the Soul: Psychological Transitions in Republic VIII – IX	Conspiracy Theories Matthew Dentith <i>Auckland</i> Have You Heard? Rumours and Conspiracy Theories
12:05 – 1:30 LUNCH				
1:30 – 2:50 Papers	Joe Corabi <i>St. Joseph's, Philadelphia</i> Evolutionary Arguments and the Mind-Body Problem	Simon Clarke <i>Canterbury</i> Paternalism, Endorsement and Aversion	Calvin Normore <i>UCLA</i> Ockham and Buridan on What There Are	Jonathan McKeown-Green <i>Auckland</i> How To Tell Languages Apart
2:50 – 3:00 BREAK				
3:00 – 4:05 Student Papers	Kelvin McQueen <i>Otago</i> Problems for Levine's Externalist Defence of Physicalism	Daniel Turton <i>Victoria</i> Reviving Hedonism about the Good Life: Rejecting the Objection from False Pleasures	History of Phil/Phil of Religion Imran Aijaz, Auckland The Proof of Islam's Aversion to Proof: A Critical Examination of Al- Ghazali's Religious Epistemology	Nir Fresco <i>UNSW</i> Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping It Simple
4:05 – 4:30 AFTERNOON TEA BREAK				
4:30 – 5:50 Papers	Mohan Matthen <i>Toronto</i> Auditory Objects	danielle davis, QUT What Are You? Black, White and In Between – Negotiating Race and Space: Lewis Gordon and the Problematics and Freedom of Mixed Race Identities	Philip Catton <i>Canterbury</i> Newton and Locke on experience and truth	Koji Tanaka <i>Auckland</i> Logic, Ontology and Semantics

Tuesday December 4th.

	ALR5 Ontology	ALR3 Ethics/Social Theory	ALR2	ALR4
9:10 – 10:30 Papers	Josh Parsons <i>Otago</i> The Shapes of Incongruent Counterparts	Liezl van Zyl <i>Waikato</i> Accidental Rightness	History of Philosophy Deborah Brown <i>Queensland</i> Descartes: Man of Distinctions	Catherine Legg <i>Waikato</i> The Essential Icon: A Logical Investigation
10:30 – 10:55 MORNING TEA BREAK				
10:55 – 12:15 Papers	Patrick Greenough <i>St. Andrews</i> The Open Future	Christine Swanton <i>Auckland</i> The Emotional Disclosure of Ethics	History of Philosophy Adriane Rini <i>Massey</i> No Animal is a Contingent Horse	Cei Maslen <i>Victoria</i> Causal Pluralism and Capricious Judgments of Pre-emption
12:15 – 1:30 LUNCH				
1:30 – 2:50 Papers	Jonathan Schaffer <i>ANU</i> Spacetime the One Substance	Cynthia Townley <i>Macquarie</i> What is Wrong with Betrayal?	Grant Gillett and Stuart McLennan <i>Otago</i> Broomean All Too Broomean	Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic <i>Western Australia</i> Forget About the “Coherence Theory of Truth”
2:50 – 3:00 BREAK				
3:00 – 4:05 Student Papers	Helga Kocurek <i>Massey</i> Actualism and Fatalism	James Coe <i>Auckland</i> Terrorism, Democracy and Innocence	History of Philosophy Silvia Lanzetta <i>Macquarie</i> Wittgenstein within the postmodern debate	Michael Gilchrist <i>Victoria</i> A Semiotic Solution to Semantic Paradox
4:05 – 4:30 AFTERNOON TEA BREAK				
4:30 – 5:50 Papers	Stephan Leuenberger <i>Leeds</i> Counterparts and Duplication	Ethics/History of Philosophy Charles Pigden <i>Otago</i> What Was Hume Really Up To With 'No-Ought-From-Is'?	Philosophy of the Arts Roman Meinhold: Lesotho Catharsis in Horror and Terror - A Culture-Philosophical Approach at the Intersection of Ritual, Film and Therapy	Rod Gire <i>Auckland</i> Asserting, Withdrawing and Reasoning

Wednesday December 5th.

	ALR5 Ontology	ALR3 Ethics/Bioethics	ALR2 Philosophy of the Arts (till 2:25)	ALR4	Philosophy of Biology
9:10 – 10:30 Papers	Max Cresswell <i>Auckland</i> The Folk Ontology of Time and Modality	Maurice Goldsmith <i>Victoria</i> Jim and the Indians Revisited	Stephen Davies <i>Auckland</i> Cross-cultural Sensitivity to Music's Expressiveness	Bill Ransome <i>Griffith</i> Sincerity and Self-Deception	ALR1: Mitch Parsell: Macquarie Non-Encapsulated Social Skills: Empirical Evidence from Eye-Gaze against Information Encapsulation
10:30 – 10:55 MORNING TEA BREAK					
10:55 – 12:15 Papers	Audre Brokes <i>St. Joseph's, Philadelphia</i> On Being Conscious, Other Impure Intrinsic Properties, and Bob Dole	John McMillan <i>Hull</i> John Harris, the Non-Identity Problem and Reproductive Technologies	Robert Wicks <i>Auckland</i> Natural Beauty and Optimism in Schopenhauer's Aesthetics	Teaching Critical Thinking A Roundtable Discussion Chairs: Justine Kingsbury, Waikato, & Jonathan McKeown-Green, Auckland	ALR1: Richard Paul Hamilton <i>Notre Dame, WA</i> Strange Bedfellows: Developmental Systems Theory and Interactionist Social Science
12:15 – 1:20 LUNCH					
1:20 – 2:25 Student Papers	Philosophy of Biology – See Column 5.	Alice Monro: Victoria Should We Genetically Enhance Our Intelligence? Responding to the Reversal Test Argument	Lesley Knight: Canterbury "When we speak of 'works of art' we gibber" – Essentialism and anti-essentialism about art	Teaching Critical Thinking Ilan Goldberg, Waikato Contributions to Critical Thinking Pedagogy from Religious Studies and Religious Education	ALR5: Matt Gers <i>Victoria</i> Real Culture
2:25 – 2:35 BREAK					
2:35 – 3:40 Student Papers	Ben Blumson <i>ANU</i> Pictures Perspective and Possibility	Stuart McLennan <i>Otago</i> Healer, Heal Thyself: Healthcare Workers and the Influenza Vaccination	Philosophy of Biology – See Column 5.	Conrad Asmus <i>Melbourne</i> Models and Consequence	ALR2: Kim Shaw-Williams <i>Victoria</i> Why We Are The Way We Are: The Triggering Track-ways Theory
3:40 – 4:00 AFTERNOON TEA BREAK					
4:00 – 5:05 Student Papers	Gerald Keaney, Queensland An Argument from the Theory of Flux to Indexicalism	Thomas Harvey, Auckland The Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion: A Qualified Defence	Alex Ferguson <i>Canterbury</i> Science as a Network	Frieder Lempp <i>Victoria</i> Conflict Modelling Logic	
5:05 – 5:15 BREAK					
5:15 – 6:15	ALR3: AAP(NZ): Annual General Meeting				

Thursday December 6th .

	ALR5 Ontology	ALR3 Ethics	ALR2 Social Theory (till 2:50)	ALR4	ALR1
9:10 – 10:30 Papers	Fred Kroon <i>Auckland</i> Reflections on the Gem	Steven Hales <i>Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania</i> Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology	David Wood <i>Melbourne (Law)</i> Retributive and Communicative Theories of Punishment	Tim Dare, Auckland, and Justine Kingsbury, Waikato The Philosophical Uses (and Misuses) of Science	
10:30 – 10:55 MORNING TEA BREAK					
10:55 – 12:15 Papers	Colin Cheyne <i>Otago</i> Narrative Fiction and Abstract Objects	Folke Tersman <i>Auckland</i> Are ethical non-cognitivists committed to non-cognitivism about (theoretical) rationality?	Gillian Brock <i>Auckland</i> Global Responsibilities and Duties to Compatriots: The Case of Health Care	Phil of Mind/Ontology Miri Albahari <i>Western Australia</i> Characterising No-self in Buddhism	
12:15 – 1:30 LUNCH					
1:30 – 2:50 Papers	Hinne Hettema <i>Auckland</i> Reduction, Supervenience and Explanation in Chemistry and Physics	Andrew Moore <i>Otago</i> What Makes For a Good Ethical Theory?	Vanessa Scholes <i>Open Polytechnic of NZ</i> Grounding policy in philosophy: the State's democratic responsibility with respect to providing education	Philosophy of Religion Greg Dawes <i>Otago</i> Divine Agency and the Writing of History	Denis Robinson: Auckland Neurath's Raft meets the Ship of Theseus - personal identity and conceptual analysis
2:50 – 3:00 BREAK					
3:00 – 4:05 Student Papers	Greg Kushnir <i>Waikato</i> Towards a Cognitivist Structuralist Philosophy of Mathematics	Carolyn Mason <i>Canterbury</i> Are Agent-Relational Reasons More Basic than Agent-Neutral Reasons?	Kelly Roe <i>ANU</i> Malfunction and Harm: Why the Distinction Doesn't Work to Ground Psychiatry	Brent Madison <i>University College London</i> Is Justification Knowledge?	
4:05 – 4:30 AFTERNOON TEA BREAK					
4:30 – 5:50 Papers	John Lamont <i>Catholic Institute of Sydney</i> A Defence of a Strong Version of the Eleatic Principle	Adrian Walsh <i>University of New England</i> Moral Inconceivability and the Methods of Ethical Inquiry	David Lumsden <i>Waikato</i> In Praise of Nonsense	Philosophy of Religion John Bishop, Auckland, and Ken Perszyk, Victoria The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil	
CONFERENCE DINNER – DYNASTY CHINESE RESTAURANT – 57-59 WAKEFIELD STREET – DRINKS 7:15 – FOOD 7:45					

**Australasian Association of Philosophy
(New Zealand Division)**

**Annual Conference, 2007
University of Auckland**

December 2 – 6, 2007.

ABSTRACTS

Abstracts Table of Contents (Presenter Index)

A

Aijaz, Imran (Auckland) Monday 3:00 pm – ALR2	4
Albahari, Miri (UWA) Thursday 10:55 – ALR4	4
Asmus, Conrad (Melbourne) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR4.....	4
Bishop, John and Ken Perszyk (Auckland and Victoria) Friday 4:30 – ALR4	5
Blumson, Ben (ANU) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR5.....	5
Brock, Gillian (Auckland) Thursday 10:55 – ALR2.....	5
Brokes, Audre (St. Joseph’s, Philadelphia) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR5..	5
Brown, Deborah (University of Queensland) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR2	6
Candlish, Stewart, and Nic Damnjanovic (UWA) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR4	7
Catton, Philip (Canterbury) Monday 4:30 – ALR2.....	7
Cheyne, Colin (Otago) Thursday 10:55 – ALR5.....	7
Churchman, Lee (Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul) Monday 9:10 – ALR2	8
Clarke, Simon (Canterbury) Monday 1:30 – ALR3	8
Coady, David (Tasmania) Monday 9:10 – ALR4.....	8
Coe, James (Auckland) Tuesday 3:30 – ALR3	9
Corabi, Joseph (Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia) Monday 1:30 – ALR5	9
Cresswell, Max (Auckland) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR5.....	10
Dare, Tim and Justine Kingsbury (Auckland and Waikato) Thursday 9:10 – ALR4	10
Davies, Stephen (Auckland) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR2	10
davis, danielle (Queensland University of Technology) Monday 4:30 – ALR3	11
Dawes, Greg (Otago) Thursday 1:30 – ALR4.....	11
Dentith, Matthew (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR4	11
Farrell, Jonathan (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR5	12
Ferguson, Alex (Canterbury) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR2.....	12
Fresco, Nir (UNSW) Monday 3:00 – ALR4.....	12
Gamble, Denise (Adelaide) Monday 9:10 – ALR3	13
Gers, Matt (Victoria) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR5.....	13
Gilchrist, Michael (Victoria) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR4.....	14
Gillett, Grant, and Stuart McLennan (Otago) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR2 ...	14
Gitler, Rod (Auckland) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR4.....	14
Goldberg, Ilan (Waikato) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR4.....	15
Goldsmith, Maurice (Victoria) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR2	15
Greenough, Patrick (Arché and St. Andrews) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR5	15
Hales, Steven (Bloomsburg) Thursday 9:10 – ALR3	16
Hamilton, Richard Paul (Notre Dame, WA) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR1	17
Harvey, Thomas (Auckland) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR3.....	17
Hursthouse, Rosalind (Auckland) Sunday 7:30 – Conference Centre.	18
Hettema, Hinne (Auckland) Thursday 1:30 – ALR5	18
Johnstone, Mark (Princeton) Monday 11:00 – ALR2.....	18
Keaney, Gerald (Queensland) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR5	19
Kingsbury, Justine and Tim Dare (Waikato and Auckland) Thursday 9:10 – ALR4.....	19
Kingsbury, Justine and Jonathan McKeown-Green (Conveners) (Waikato and Auckland) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR4	19
Knight, Lesley (Canterbury) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR4.....	20
Kocurek, Helga (Massey) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR5	20
Kroon, Fred (Auckland) Thursday 9:10 – ALR5	20
Kushnir, Greg (Waikato) Thursday 3:00 – ALR5	20

Lamont, John (Catholic Institute of Sydney) Thursday 4:30 – ALR5 ...	21	Robinson, Denis (Auckland) Thursday 1:30 – ALR1	32
Lanzetta, Silvia (Macquarie) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR2	22	Roe, Kelly (ANU) Thursday 3:00 – ALR2	33
Legg, Catherine (Waikato) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR4	22	Schaffer, Jonathan (ANU) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR5	33
Lempp, Frieder (Victoria) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR4	23	Scholes, Vanessa (Open Polytechnic of New Zealand) Thursday 1:30 – ALR3	33
Leuenberger, Stephan (Leeds) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR5	23	Shaw-Williams, Kim (Victoria) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR2	34
Lumsden, David (Waikato) Thursday 4:30 – ALR2	23	Swanton, Christine (Auckland) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR3	34
Madison, Brent (University College London) Thursday 3:00 – ALR4 ..	24	Tanaka, Koji (Auckland) Monday 4:30 – ALR4	35
Maslen, Cei (Victoria) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR4	24	Tersman, Folke (Auckland/Uppsala) Thursday 10:55 – ALR3	35
Mason, Carolyn (Canterbury) Thursday 3:00 – ALR3	25	Townley, Cynthia (Macquarie) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR3	35
Matthen, Mohan (Toronto) Monday 4:30 – ALR5	25	Turton, Daniel (Victoria) Monday 3:00 – ALR3	36
McKeown-Green, Jonathan (Auckland) Monday 1:30 – ALR4	25	Van Zyl, Liezl (Waikato) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR3	36
McKeown-Green, Jonathan and Justine Kingsbury (Conveners) (Auckland and Waikato) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR4	26	Vigani, Denise (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR3	37
McLennan, Stuart (Otago) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR3	26	Walsh, Adrian (UNE, Armidale) Thursday 4:30 – ALR3	37
McLennan, Stuart and Grant Gillett (Otago) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR2	27	Wicks, Robert (Auckland) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR2	37
McMillan, John (Hull) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR5	27	Wood, David (Melbourne (Law)) Thursday 9:10 – ALR2	38
McQueen, Kelvin (Otago) Monday 3:00 – ALR5	28		
Meinhold, Roman (National University of Lesotho) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR2	29		
Monro, Alice (Victoria) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR3	29		
Moore, Andrew (Otago) Thursday 1:30 – ALR3	30		
Normore, Calvin (UCLA) Monday 1:30 – ALR2	30		
Oddie, Graham (Colorado at Boulder) Monday 9:10 – ALR5	30		
Parsell, Mitch (Macquarie) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR1	31		
Parsons, Josh (Otago) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR5	31		
Perszyk, Ken, and John Bishop (Victoria and Auckland) Friday 4:30 – ALR4	31		
Pigden, Charles (Otago) Tuesday 4:05 ALR3	32		
Ransome, Bill (Griffith) Thursday 9:10 – ALR4	32		
Rini, Adriane (Massey) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR2	32		

Abstracts

Aijaz, Imran (Auckland) Monday 3:00 pm – ALR2

History of Philosophy/Philosophy of Religion

❖ **The Proof of Islam's Aversion to Proof: A Critical Examination of Al-Ghazali's Religious Epistemology**

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (c. 1051-1111), widely regarded as playing a significant role in the decline of Islamic philosophy, bore the title of *Hujjat al-Islam* ('Proof of Islam') for his defence of the Islamic religion against the trends of thought that existed during his time. This included a sustained critique and rejection of Peripatetic philosophy in his famous work *The Incoherence of The Philosophers*. And given al-Ghazali's disapproval of scholastic theology, one wonders what he thinks the epistemological foundation for belief in God is. Some answers are provided in his autobiographical work *The Deliverance from Error*, in which al-Ghazali states that his own deliverance from skepticism and error was due, "not to a concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the light which God caused to penetrate into [his] heart---the light which illuminates the threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God." In my paper, I shall critically assess al-Ghazali's non-discursive model of religious epistemology.

Albahari, Miri (UWA) Thursday 10:55 – ALR4

Philosophy of Religion

❖ **Characterising No-self in Buddhism**

Buddhists are famous for the claim that there is no self. But how do they characterize the self whose existence is being denied? Is it congruent with notions of the self that are discussed by Western philosophers? And do most of us identify as such a self? I address these questions with a view to arguing that not only is there congruence in notions of the self between Buddhism and the West, but that most of us buy into such a self, a self which probably does not exist.

Asmus, Conrad (Melbourne) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR4

❖ **Models and Consequence**

The argument with premises A_1, \dots, A_n and conclusion C is *valid* just in case in every model where each A_i is true so is C .

But why should we care about truth and truth preservation across models? In this talk I will examine two possibilities: each model is an interpretation of a language and each model represents the world in some counterfactual way. This gives rise to what Etchemendy calls, respectively, interpretational and representational semantics. Does it matter which of these we have in mind? Should we take into account what models are meant to be? I will demonstrate that paying attention to the purpose of models offers invaluable insight into consequence and validity.

**Bishop, John and Ken Perszyk (Auckland and Victoria)
Friday 4:30 – ALR4**

Philosophy of Religion

❖ **The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil**

There is a wide consensus that the 'Evidential' Argument from Evil poses the most serious threat to traditional 'omniGod' theism, and that the 'Logical' form of the Argument is bankrupt. There is also a growing consensus that the fate of the Evidential Argument from Evil rests on the Skeptical Theist reply - and we incline to the view that some version of this reply succeeds. In this paper we argue that this emerging consensus underestimates the force of the Argument from Evil, obscuring the fact that considerations about actual concrete evils in the world can provide decisive grounds for reasonable people to reject omniGod's existence. We argue that it is the Logical Argument from Evil that best expresses these grounds, at least relative to certain value commitments that reasonable people may hold.

Blumson, Ben (ANU) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR5

Ontology/Representation

❖ **Pictures, Perspective and Possibility**

I argue that the contents of perspective pictures are sets of centered possible worlds. I then draw conclusions for the debates over whether pictorial representation is mediated by resemblance and the nature of pictorial realism.

Brock, Gillian (Auckland) Thursday 10:55 – ALR2

Social Theory

❖ **Global Responsibilities and Duties to Compatriots: The Case of Health Care**

How should we weigh up the responsibilities we have to compatriots and non-compatriots? So far discussion of obligations to compatriots and non-compatriots has been conducted at a fairly abstract level, and lacks specificity with respect to what our obligations to compatriots and non-compatriots are in a particular domain. By examining particular issues we get a richer sense of what is possible and what might be involved. This kind of analysis can then in turn better inform our theoretical views. I discuss issues related to our responsibilities for health care, both at home and abroad. Using the ideas developed with respect to responsibilities concerning health care I go on in the final section to a more general discussion of what this implies about how we should weigh up responsibilities to compatriots and non-compatriots.

**Brokes, Audre (St. Joseph's, Philadelphia) Wednesday
10:55 – ALR5**

Ontology

❖ **On *Being Conscious*, Other Impure Intrinsic Properties, and Bob Dole**

In an argument reminiscent of Merricks' (1998), Hawthorne in *Why Humeans are out of Their Minds* (2004) claims that if *being conscious* is an intrinsic property whose instantiation depends necessarily on the obtaining of certain causal facts, then "Humean Supervenience" – the view that *all* facts supervene on

the distributions of fundamental (inner-world) physical point-qualities – is false. I argue that Hawthorne’s argument is invalid. I argue further that *being conscious* shares all the characteristics of *impure* intrinsic properties and ought properly be assimilated to that class. I sketch the beginning of a functional/set-theoretic conception of impure intrinsic properties according to which they are a special sort of function from individuals in possible worlds to truth values, where T denotes instantiation and F denotes failure of instantiation. Finally, I show that this, rather than Sider’s maximal extrinsic construal of such properties, best preserves our unique-reference-fixing practices and best comports with a supervenience view of causation rather than undermining it.

Less Formally:

The basic intuition driving the paper is that *being conscious* in any interesting sense involves being a *subject of consciousness*, and that being a subject of consciousness requires being some specific subject or other and not none (or many); or, as a former US presidential candidate might have remarked, “Bob Dole is not out of Bob Dole’s mind”. I show that unless we interpret *being conscious* as an impure intrinsic property, we can’t square our basic intuitions concerning personal identity with our intuitions concerning duplication and numerical identity. If I’m right about this, then Hawthorne’s argument is invalid. I sketch the beginning of a theory of impure intrinsic properties, and I show that that theory does a better job than Sider’s at salvaging a Humean Supervenience view of causation while retaining the (qualified) intrinsicity of consciousness. Cartesian mentalism is not – even after all these centuries of debate – incompatible with Humean causation.

Brown, Deborah (University of Queensland) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR2

History of Philosophy

❖ Descartes: Man of Distinctions

Descartes’ official ontology recognises two items: substances and modes. There are other things, however, of which Descartes speaks freely — unions, both accidental and “substantial”, such as the union of mind and body, unions of ideas and their objects, and ordinary objects, like stoves, animals, machines and lumps of wax — none of which fit very naturally with the categories of Descartes’ official ontology. What is the status of these objects and what is their relationship to the substances and modes of Cartesian metaphysics? I propose to begin answering such questions by examining the theory of distinctions which Descartes introduces in the course of laying down the basic categories of his metaphysics. In particular, I will focus on the distinction *rationis ratiocinatae* (distinction of reasoned reason) which is the distinction introduced to explain our ability to distinguish in thought the attributes of a thing which are in no way separable from it, a distinction which nonetheless reflects a difference *in re* that Descartes is prepared to call, broadly speaking, “real”. I shall argue that this distinction offers us some way of understanding the relationship between Descartes’ official and unofficial ontologies.

Candlish, Stewart, and Nic Damnjanovic (UWA) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR4

❖ **Forget About the “Coherence Theory of Truth”**

The grand debate about truth traditionally had three main rivals: the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. From the late nineteenth century to the present day, and despite the emergence of other positions, the first two of these accounts of truth have generally been seen as two sides of a deep philosophical debate, each with distinguished adherents. Yet, we argue, on closer inspection it turns out that, although various people have held a coherence theory of justification, no one has actually maintained the coherence theory of truth. The reason for this historical curiosity is that the coherence theory is essentially unstable and, under pressure, turns into something different, and much stranger. At this point, philosophers with coherentist sympathies scatter in different directions.

Catton, Philip (Canterbury) Monday 4:30 – ALR2

History of Philosophy

❖ **Newton and Locke on Experience and Truth**

I start with a specific question. Can Locke's epistemology admit as 'true' in Newton's sense the quantity of duration? I answer no: Locke only impedes our coming to terms with Newton on the question of the status empirically of 'true' time. I explain and defend what Newton has to say about this: that there is a 'true quantity' of duration that differs from any possible sensible measure of that quantity, and that we would 'corrupt mathematics and philosophy' were we to confuse some such

sensible measure with the 'true quantity', yet that our basis for committing ourselves to 'true' time is nonetheless empirical, consisting as it does in due regard for the conceptual presuppositions concerning time of the empirically learned laws of motion. I also remark how Locke's epistemology orients us completely backwards for addressing our attention to Newton on this point. Newton is in effect able to recognise (as Locke can not) certain relatively exacting conditions upon public inquiry that are necessary in order for thought to be literal. The conditions are especially apparent in mathematical activity and are well brought to light by Plato. Those who are best positioned to see them totally front and centre as Newton does do mathematics and practical experimentation rather than merely advancing the word of letters. By simply taking for granted the possibility of the literalness of thought, Locke overlooks the way that meaning references an ideal. He treats as elementary and particular in thought what in fact references a synthetic public practical ideal. Locke's epistemology upsets Newton's physics fundamentally and, conversely, Locke fails to learn the epistemological lessons that Newton teaches.

Cheyne, Colin (Otago) Thursday 10:55 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **Narrative, Fiction and Abstract Objects**

Human beings are natural, perhaps compulsive, story tellers. I argue that our talk of abstract objects is best construed as story-telling about certain non-existent entities. This position is akin to Fictionalism, although that term is misleading, because the constraints on fiction are distinct from the constraints on abstract story-telling. I discuss those constraints, and also

discuss the semantics of such story-telling. I consider the possibility that our talk of abstract objects may be true simpliciter, even though its subject matter does not exist.

**Churchman, Lee (Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul)
Monday 9:10 – ALR2**

History of Philosophy

❖ **Language and Falsehood in Plato's *Sophist***

This paper examines the well-known passage at *Sophist* 261c-263d, where the Eleatic Stranger explains to Theaetetus how false statement is possible. Many modern critics take this passage to express the view that, while names (*onomata*) refer, but cannot bear truth values, statements (*logoi*) cannot refer, but are capable of being true or false. Plato is thus credited with the realization that a referential theory of statements makes falsehood impossible, and also with abandoning an earlier theory (from the *Cratylus*) which had seemed to accept the possibility of true and false names. This is understood as one aspect of a more general development in which Plato rejects earlier views expressed in the so-called “middle” dialogues.

In response, I argue that there is ample evidence that the explanation of falsehood in the *Sophist* is not substantially different from the Cratylan theory. Although Plato recognizes a difference between statements and names, that difference cannot be understood in terms of susceptibility to truth or falsehood. Rather, both dialogues offer up essentially the same theory of language, which subordinates the concepts of reference and truth to the general notion of more or less accurate imitation (*mimesis*) in linguistic images (*eidola*) of the being (*ousia*) of a thing or a state of affairs. In conclusion, I argue

that this mimetic theory of language gives us good reason to believe that the *Sophist* does not represent a rejection of ideas in the *Cratylus*, nor indeed those of the other “middle” dialogues.

Clarke, Simon (Canterbury) Monday 1:30 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Paternalism, Endorsement, and Aversion**

Abstract: According to the endorsement constraint, valuable activities cannot contribute to a person's well-being unless he or she endorses them. If true this would make much paternalism self-defeating. Forcing people into activities for their own good would be pointless because if they do not think those activities are valuable, the activities do not increase their well-being. I argue against this endorsement constraint on paternalism by suggesting an alternative view and showing that the arguments offered in favour of the endorsement constraint more plausibly support this alternative view. It is shown that this alternative rules out less paternalism than the endorsement constraint.

Coady, David (Tasmania) Monday 9:10 – ALR4

Conspiracy Theories

❖ **Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?**

It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be

occasions on which we should settle for an inferior account which entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end.

Coe, James (Auckland) Tuesday 3:30 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Terrorism, Democracy and Innocence**

A common position in the philosophical literature is that terrorism is always morally unjustified because it deliberately targets noncombatants, and non-combatants are "innocent". But are noncombatants necessarily innocent? Osama bin Laden, among others, claims that he uses terrorism (at least partly) in retaliation for injustices allegedly committed by Western governments. We also think that, in theory at least, citizens of democratic countries have some causal responsibility for the acts of their governments. I will investigate whether ideas of democratic responsibility can show us that noncombatants can be legitimate targets of terrorism. Using a hypothetical case study, I hope to show that, at least in theory, terrorism can pass the test of discrimination. This is easier to show for some members of society than others but I will show that it is possible to justifiably harm any member of a democracy, thanks in part to the doctrine of double effect. Although that doctrine remains controversial, I argue that philosophers who dismiss the justifiability of terrorism on the grounds of 'innocence' are in a bind - either accept the possibility of ethical terrorism or bring into question the possibility of a just modern war. My conclusions will give no encouragement to bin Laden, but they

also undermine an easy refutation of terrorism often found in politics, the media and academic philosophy.

**Corabi, Joseph (Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia)
Monday 1:30 – ALR5**

Philosophy of Mind/Ontology

❖ **Evolutionary Arguments and the Mind-Body Problem**

This paper examines and criticizes evolutionary arguments against epiphenomenalism, such as those offered by Herbert Spencer and William James, and more recently by figures like J.L. Mackie and Karl Popper. Essentially, these arguments use two broad pieces of evidence to make their case that epiphenomenalism about qualia is unlikely to be the case—(1) that evolution has occurred, largely by natural selection, and (2) that unpleasant qualia are typically associated with dangerous stimuli, and pleasant qualia with helpful ones.

After introducing and formulating a paradigmatic version of one of these evolutionary arguments, the paper then goes on to criticize it as wrongheaded on two separate grounds. First, even assuming the argument's key assumptions are warranted, it fails to apply the alleged insights consistently to all mind-body theories. When the alleged insights are applied consistently, epiphenomenalism is not the only view disconfirmed by the evidence. And second, the argument's key assumptions—specifically, those surrounding the way it thinks of the connection between qualia and behavior if physicalism is true—are incorrect.

Cresswell, Max (Auckland) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **The Folk Ontology of Time and Modality**

This talk considers the following argument:

- (1) Temporal operators are quantifiers.
- (2) 'times' are whatever temporal operators quantify over.
- (3) Some appropriate temporal sentences are true.
- (4) Modal operators are quantifiers.
- (5) 'worlds' are whatever modal operators quantify over.
- (6) Some appropriate modal sentences are true.

In order to appreciate the argument I try to say something about what I am tempted to call 'folk ontology' — the ontology of ordinary everyday things. I suggest that the entry into such ontology is the truth of ordinary non-philosophical sentences. But such sentences do not wear their ontology on their sleeve. You need to discern quantificational structure, and so I discuss the syntactic and semantic tests for discerning such structure. I then shew that tense and modal constructions pass these tests, and so, while there may be dispute about what times and worlds are, there can be no doubt that they are.

**Dare, Tim and Justine Kingsbury (Auckland and Waikato)
Thursday 9:10 – ALR4**

❖ **The Philosophical Uses (and Misuses) of Science**

It is common to appeal to scientific results and scientific theories in support of philosophical conclusions. And a good thing too – science remains our best way of finding out about the world,

and it is surely a good thing for philosophical theories to be informed by, or at the very least consistent with, our best science. However, there are pitfalls. Sometimes the science appealed to cannot, for various reasons, do the work it is being asked to do. For example, marginal or extremely new scientific theories may have a role in stimulating philosophical ideas, but they should not play an evidentiary or justificatory role. In this paper we discuss how philosophers should and shouldn't use science.

Davies, Stephen (Auckland) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR2

Philosophy of the Arts

❖ **Cross-cultural Sensitivity to Music's Expressiveness**

In this paper I note that instrumental music expresses emotions such as sadness and happiness and that the music of different cultures share important organizational and other features. If music's expressiveness is grounded in these musical universals, we might speculate that musical expressiveness, like displays of the basic affect programs discussed by psychologists, are appreciable across cultures. A critical review of psychologists' cross-cultural studies of recognition of music's expressive qualities is equivocal, however. The low number of such studies and their methodological weaknesses leave the issue in doubt.

davis, danielle (Queensland University of Technology)
Monday 4:30 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

- ❖ **What are you? Black, White and In Between-Negotiating Race and Space: Lewis Gordon and the problematics and freedom of mixed race identities**

In this paper I explore concepts of mixed race identity and the ontological implications of attempting (or perhaps more importantly not) to interpret this through social meaning. I draw on the work of Lewis R Gordon and Fanon to engage in dialogues to ask, what does this concept mean; how are we to interpret this through social meaning and critique the idea that we may understand any of this in a universalised context? I draw on Australian Indigenous ontology to problematise a hegemonic understanding of this concept and formulate a more contextualised understanding that perhaps is useful in understanding all of our beings.

Dawes, Greg (Otago) Thursday 1:30 – ALR4

Philosophy of Religion

- ❖ **Divine Agency and the Writing of History**

Christian theologians often criticize the secular discipline of history for its a priori exclusion of divine agency. They argue that this exclusion represents an implicit metaphysical commitment, which is no less an act of faith than the one made by the Christian. I respond to this argument in two ways. First of all, I show that its central claim is factually false. Many of the arguments that historians offer in support of this stance involve no controversial metaphysical commitments. I then argue that

the naturalism of history and the sciences is best thought of as a defeasible presumption. It would be defeated if there existed a successful research programme employing theistic explanations. But such explanations would have to be publicly testable, a condition that many theologians seem reluctant to meet. Until they do, we have good reason to exclude divine agency from the writing of history.

Dentith, Matthew (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR4

Conspiracy Theories

- ❖ **Have you heard? Rumours and Conspiracy Theories**

We've all heard the stories. Rumours about government sanctioned attacks on its own people. Hidden military bases in Nevada. Terrorist training camps in the Ureweras. Sometimes these rumours are borne out, sometimes they become conspiracy theories. Drawing on recent work by CAJ Coady and David Coady I will develop a theory which foregrounds the distinction between the activity of Rumourmongering and the propositions (or collections of them) which qualify as Rumours. Whilst Rumourmongering seems to present a pathology of the testimonial process Rumours themselves can be examples of reliable testimony. Yet Conspiracy Theories, which arguably share many characteristics with Rumours, are not usually treated as being reliable. I will argue that this is because Conspiracy Theories exist in contrast to Official Theories and that Official Theories are more reliable, thus justifying our suspicion of Conspiracy Theories but leaving the reliability of Rumours alone.

Farrell, Jonathan (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR5

Philosophy of Mind/Ontology

❖ **Why We Shouldn't Be Soft-Libertarians**

In his book 'The Significance of Free Will,' Robert Kane puts forward a libertarian theory of free will which does not appeal to 'extra factors' – things like noumenal selves or agent-causation. In other words, he thinks that we can have free will only if our universe is not deterministic, and he thinks that having this kind of free will does not require any metaphysical commitments (apart from indeterminism) which are not also needed for compatibilist theories of free will. Gary Watson has called this kind of view 'soft-libertarianism.'

Kane thinks that we should be libertarians because having free will requires that we originate – be the ultimate source of – our actions, and this is only possible under indeterminism. I will describe how Kane thinks that, even without appealing to 'extra factors,' we could originate our actions in an indeterministic universe. I will then offer two criticisms of Kane's position.

First, I will argue that we have reasons for thinking that Kane does not succeed in his attempt show how we could originate our actions. Secondly, I will argue that, even if my first argument is unsuccessful, what Kane can give us is not more significant than anything a compatibilist theory of free will could also provide. I conclude that there do not seem to be any good reasons why we should be soft libertarians, at least not of the Kanean kind.

Ferguson, Alex (Canterbury) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR2

❖ **Science as a Network**

There have been a number of varied explanations of the growth and organization of scientific knowledge. Typically, these explanations have been historical, psychological or social. Each explanation has approached a different aspect of science, and each has used markedly different methods for explanation. The proposed explanations are similar in that they assume a reductionist or "residue" stance, where the growth and organization of science can be entirely reduced to a purely (or nearly so) historical, psychological, or sociological explanation. I will briefly outline each of the three approaches and then show why none of them are adequate candidates for a proper explanation. I will then propose an explanation that incorporates aspects of each of the previous explanations, as well as drawing heavily on recent research in self-organizing systems and general systems theory. My proposal operates on the idea that the organization of scientific knowledge is a naturally formed network, in which theories act as nodes.

Fresco, Nir (UNSW) Monday 3:00 – ALR4

❖ **Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping it Simple**

This paper deals with the question how computation is best individuated.

1. The semantic view of computation: computation is best individuated by its semantic properties. On this view, there's no computation without representation, because computation is individuated in the same way that mental states are.

2. The causal view of computation: computation is best individuated by its causal properties. On this view, the relevant formal structure of computation is mirrored by the causal structure of its implementation without appealing to any semantic properties.

3. The functional view of computation: computation is best individuated by its functional properties. On this view, functional properties are insensitive to content and needn't presuppose semantics.

Some scientific theories explain the capacities of brains and computers by appealing to the computations they perform. The reason for that is usually that computation is individuated by its semantic properties. I criticize the reasons in support of this view and its presupposition of representation and semantics. Furthermore, I argue that any representational view of computation (e.g. the semantic view) can be no more than first order (i.e. characterization of all the subjective properties of experience in terms of the representational contents of experience).

Gamble, Denise (Adelaide) Monday 9:10 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Potentialism and Rights**

Should the intrinsic property of an embryo's or foetus's potential to become a person and moral agent ground for it a right to life? This question is one important strand in the moral debate concerning abortion and destructive embryo research. This paper looks at the rights question in relation to Feinberg's interest theory of rights, Warren's multi-dimensional view of

moral status applied to abortion, and Singer's anti-potentialism as supported by his "Prince Charles" example. A critical evaluation follows of a recent attempt to provide a 'Moral Relevance of Potential' principle in response to Singer type examples. This recent contribution builds on views of Feinberg and Jim Stone.

I will extract what I think are the important morals to be drawn from my review of influential and emerging positions, outlining possible alternatives and ways forward for those wishing to defend a version of potentialism.

Gers, Matt (Victoria) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR5

Philosophy of Biology

❖ **Real Culture**

In this paper I outline the problem faced by proponents of the theory that cultural units are discrete replicating entities, otherwise known as memetics. I then discuss the nature of patterns emphasizing their compositionality and hierarchy. I note the human predisposition to recognize patterns in the world. I then discuss the distinction between cultural artifacts and behaviours, and the very real patterns describing these artifacts and behaviours. I use this background as a foundation for a theory of the evolution of cultural objects. I defend the relevance of such a view of cultural evolution against the objection of replication and replicative fidelity, and the objection that such memetic theories are explanatorily impotent. I conclude that taken with human cognitive heuristics and biases, memetics is an important element of the study of cultural evolution and evolvability.

Gilchrist, Michael (Victoria) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR4

❖ **A Semiotic Solution to Semantic Paradox**

While, as Saussure remarked, everyone agrees that the signifier is arbitrary, his unique conception of this arbitrariness may be distinguished from the assumptions at work in the semantic paradoxes. Saussure's stipulation that an arbitrary signifier can only be such in relation to a specific signified can be contrasted with a signifier that may be arbitrary in relation to all signifieds. This stipulation precludes diagonalisation and so provides the basis for a solution to the Cantor-type paradoxes. Then, Saussure's view that a sentence is also a whole arbitrary sign, whatever the logical relation of its parts, allows this solution to be reproduced at the sentential level, with respect to the Liar and the Curry paradoxes. The comparison between a Saussurean semiotic solution and a Tarskian hierarchical solution is also briefly explored.

Gillett, Grant, and Stuart McLennan (Otago) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR2

❖ **Broomean all too Broomean**

John Broome argues that rationality and the giving of reasons are a matter of cognitive processes that obey canons of licensed transition between propositions but he does not clarify the status of propositions vis a vis our relation to the world. When we attempt to do so we find that something like a truth tracking relationship should be at the heart of practical reasoning rather than the kinds of operation Broome suggests. If that is so then it may be that a model according to which non-rational considerations ought to affect our reasoning is likely to be much more adequate such that autonomy is best seen as self rule in

accordance with techniques of linking oneself to the truth (about oneself and the world). The scope of arguments then widens beyond logic and its devices to something like moral sense and the apprehension of a gestalt demanded by the situation but not reducible to propositions or a calculus involving them.

Girle, Rod (Auckland) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR4

❖ **Asserting Withdrawing and Reasoning**

There are at least two quite different approaches to formal systems intended to model argumentative dialogue and interactive multi-agent reasoning.

One approach treats a dialogue system as yet another proof system for First-order Logic, classical or non-classical. [see Sahid Rahman, Laurent Keiff, "On How to Be a Dialogician" in: "Logic, Thought and Action", edited by Rahman and Symons, Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Vol. 2, Springer 2005]

A quite different approach treats dialogue systems as formal models of multi-agent reasoning without being tied to proving anything in a specific logic such as classical First-order Logic. The systems are somewhat like formal rules for the moderation of debate. The rules are formulated to prevent common fallacies such as *petitio principii* and loaded questions. This is the Hamblin-Mackenzie approach. [see Charles Hamblin, "Fallacies", Methuen 1970]

Nonetheless, most of those working in this genre of dialogue systems rely on a logic external to the dialogue system for the

evaluation of reason giving and belief consistency. This is 'externalism' in dialogue logic.

In this paper we discuss problems with externalism and set out the basis for a logic internal to dialogue systems. This 'internalist' approach is based on the ideas of asserting, withdrawing and reasoning already present in Hamblin-Mackenzie systems. The advantages and disadvantages of an internalist approach are discussed.

Goldberg, Ilan (Waikato) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR4

Teaching Critical Thinking

❖ **Contributions to Critical Thinking Pedagogy from Religious Studies and Religious Education**

My research concerns contributions from the academic study of religion and secular approaches to religious education to critical thinking pedagogy, and to problems associated with the effects of worldviews on reasoning in particular. The presentation introduces the area of my research and outlines some preliminary findings. A description of the standard critical thinking course provides the background for the problem of weak sense or sophistic critical thinking: Students typically use their newly acquired capabilities one-sidedly, to attack the views of others, while shielding their own beliefs from criticism. The implication of worldviews in reasoning, put forward as causal, is taken to justify interdisciplinary engagement of critical thinking pedagogy with the academic study of religion and secular approaches to religious education - two disciplines which are directly concerned with studying and teaching about worldviews. Literature on interreligious dialogue is presented

as one such area where the potential for contribution to critical thinking pedagogy exists.

Goldsmith, Maurice (Victoria) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR2

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Jim and the Indians Revisited**

In *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973), Bernard Williams accused Utilitarianism of ignoring some important moral considerations. He used the story of 'Jim and the Indians' to support his discussion. Jim arrives in a South American village and is offered the opportunity to kill one Indian rather than the militia captain executing twenty. Although Williams accepts that Jim should accept the offer, his discussion centres on some failings of Utilitarianism. This paper revisits the story to consider some aspects of the situation that Williams does not discuss.

Greenough, Patrick (Arché and St. Andrews) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **The Open Future**

The broad goal in this paper is to delineate and defend two closely related models of the open future. The first of these is a *truthmaker* gap model, the second is a *truthmaking* gap model. The notable highlights of these models are as follows: (1) They are both branching-time models of the open future. (2) They both assume that time has a B-ordering. (3) They both pose no threat to classical logic or classical semantics and they thus

stand in contrast to the many and various enduringly popular truth-value gap conceptions of the open future. (4) The models thus ratify both logical fatalism ('the law of excluded middle is valid for future contingents') and semantic fatalism ('future contingents have truth-values') but invalidate what may be termed *genuine* fatalism ('if an event will come to be then it is inevitable that it will come to be'). (5) They both deploy conceptions of indeterminacy which are able, in different ways, to capture the hitherto elusive (non-epistemic) distinction between indeterminate truth and determinate truth. As a result, they stand in opposition to what is perhaps the most common conception of worldly indeterminacy. (6) They both prove to be considerably less queer than a standard truth-value gap conception of indeterminacy since such a conception gives up not only on the equivalence schema for truth ('it is true that p if and only if p ') but also the truthmaking principle 'if p then there is something which makes it true that p '. (7) They both allow that determinate truth (for utterances) is absolute in the sense that whether or not an utterance is determinate in truth-value does not depend on the temporal perspective from which one is evaluating the utterance. (8) Despite the fact that time branches, the (indexical) singular term 'the future' denotes one and only one branch of the tree (at each context of use). (9) In consequence, the conceptions on offer do not threaten eternalism since the past, the present, and the future all exist. (10) Unlike all other extant branching conceptions of time, both models yield a perfectly natural specification of the truth-conditions for utterances of future contingent sentences in terms of what happens in *the future* with respect to the utterance in question.

Hales, Steven (Bloomsburg) Thursday 9:10 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology**

In this article I sketch out evolutionary psychological explanations of ethical norms, concurring with the widespread view that they offer the best hope of an adequate explanation of moral intuition. I then argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent-neutral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism.

Hamilton, Richard Paul (Notre Dame, WA) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR1

Philosophy of Biology

❖ **Strange Bedfellows: Developmental Systems Theory and Interactionist Social Science**

One of the most exciting recent developments in the biological sciences has been the move away from dichotomous accounts of development, as represented, for instance, by Richard Lewontin's Dialectical Biology and Developmental Systems Theory, defended by Susan Oyama et. al. These views offer the prospect of challenging crude biological essentialism without recourse to Social Constructionist pieties. Unfortunately, the subtlety and sophistication with which proponents of these approaches consider biological processes is sometimes undermined by crude conceptions of social phenomena. For instance, there is an a widespread tendency to construe cultural transmission in epidemiological terms. I suggest that this belies the complex ways in which social actors orientate towards and understand their own actions in terms of social norms. I propose that the profound insight that human culture is not *sui generis* requires a social ontology every bit as subtle as that which has been employed in understanding biological processes. I will argue that the outlines of such an ontology can be found within the interactionist tradition in Sociology and Anthropology. This tradition, epitomised by Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis and Symbolic Interactionism, has emphasised the ways in which social order is achieved in real-time settings by the active collaboration of social actors using typification and membership categorisation devices. Such an insight parallels some recent work on ecological niche construction and stabilisation and this paper will explore that parallel.

Harvey, Thomas (Auckland) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **The Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion: A Qualified Defence**

Don Marquis' so-called "future-like-ours" argument against abortion has received phenomenally wide attention both within and outside the confines of academic philosophy. The overwhelming majority of critical responses appearing in the literature, have been critical of the argument. In this paper I will offer a brief précis of Marquis' argument, and aim to undermine the three principal objections, of which most attempts to rebut it constitute a version. These objections are: 1) the objection that the premises Marquis relies on commit him to the view that we must maximise reproduction; and hence sexual abstinence and the use of contraceptive devices are gravely immoral; 2) Marquis is bound to embrace the unpalatable view that the wrongness of murder is proportional to the quality or quantity, or both, of the victim's future and 3) that Marquis needs, contrary to what he claims, to establish that the foetus is a person. I will finish by offering some tentative reservations of my own regarding Marquis' argument; although these do not, if valid, require us to dispose of his approach to the abortion issue entirely.

**Hursthouse, Rosalind (Auckland) Sunday 7:30 –
Conference Centre**

Presidential Address

❖ **Virtue Ethics and Human Nature**

It is being claimed that Aristotelian virtue ethics, being some form of ethical naturalism, can be refuted (undercut/shown to be unworkable) by evolutionary biology. With respect to a few versions of this claim I have come across, I argue that, as attempts to knock virtue ethics out, they all fail, though a couple have thrown up interesting points with respect to our ethical thought quite generally.

Hettema, Hinne (Auckland) Thursday 1:30 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **Reduction, Supervenience and Explanation in Chemistry and Physics**

In this paper I will argue that ontological supervenience, properly conceived, is one possible component of an epistemological reduction schema, alongside identification and causation.

My analysis is based on a detailed analysis of the reduction schema as presented in Nagel's "Structure of Science" (1961) alongside its early analysis in Causey's Unity of Science (1977) and the five step decomposition model of Kuipers' "Structures in Science" (2001). I will argue for a distinction between epistemological reduction, which is closely allied to explanation, and ontological reduction, which is closely allied to physicalism.

It will appear that ontological supervenience is a valid part of epistemological reduction, that is, the logical conditions

introduced by supervenience are sufficient to furnish explanation by reduction. With this in hand, we can re-evaluate some of the early criticisms on Nagel's reduction scheme.

Johnstone, Mark (Princeton) Monday 11:00 – ALR2

History of Philosophy

❖ **Changing Rulers in the Soul: Psychological Transitions in *Republic* VIII - IX**

At the beginning of Book 8 of the *Republic*, Socrates sets out to describe the four main kinds of flawed cities and the four kinds of men that correspond to them. His narrative charts a progressive decline, beginning from the good city and soul and concluding in tyranny and the tyrant. However, problems arise in the individual case, since Socrates sometimes appears to appeal to the person rather than to the three parts of his soul (reason, spirit and appetite) in order to explain the establishment of a new inner "regime". This threatens to make the tripartite psychology of the *Republic*, which Socrates leans on heavily in these passages, altogether superfluous, while it leaves the conception of the person that is in play unexplained. Terence Irwin has responded to this problem by arguing that Socrates is referring, not to some entity other than the three parts of the soul, but rather to the special role played by the rational part. According to his view, each of the four transitions to a new kind of rule in the individual soul should be understood as the direct result of a rational choice, attributable to the person in virtue of being attributable to the rational part of that person's soul. In this paper, I argue against Irwin's interpretation of the psychological transition passages and suggest an alternative to it. I also propose a different way of

understanding Socrates' references in these passages to the person as opposed to the parts of his soul.

Keaney, Gerald (Queensland) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **An Argument from the Theory of Flux to Indexicalism**

Given the Laws of thermodynamics and certain other basic commitments I purport to show that we should be indexicalists about persistence. That is we should consider properties as relations to times in order to avoid a contradiction that arises where the same object goes through change and yet has different properties to what it previously had.

The argument is of Heraclitean inspiration given a plausible story about what Heraclitus actually said, but I will not concentrate on the historical details. Rather I will use ancient Greek philosophy to set up an approach to persistence and suggest an account of the problem that arises out it.

I will run through the mainstream accounts already favoured in contemporary metaphysics, and indicate both why indexicalism is already attractive, but why it would be better if it had an argument to support its claim that intrinsic properties are relations to times.

Then, drawing inspiration from a more contemporary and plausible reading of the theory of flux, that believes it anticipated conclusions found in the study of thermodynamics, I will present two parallel arguments to indexicalism.

Kingsbury, Justine and Tim Dare (Waikato and Auckland) Thursday 9:10 – ALR4

❖ **The Philosophical Uses (and Misuses) of Science**

It is common to appeal to scientific results and scientific theories in support of philosophical conclusions. And a good thing too – science remains our best way of finding out about the world, and it is surely a good thing for philosophical theories to be informed by, or at the very least consistent with, our best science. However, there are pitfalls. Sometimes the science appealed to cannot, for various reasons, do the work it is being asked to do. For example, marginal or extremely new scientific theories may have a role in stimulating philosophical ideas, but they should not play an evidentiary or justificatory role. In this paper we discuss how philosophers should and shouldn't use science.

Kingsbury, Justine and Jonathan McKeown-Green (Conveners) (Waikato and Auckland) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR4

Teaching Critical Thinking

❖ **A Roundtable Discussion.**

Most philosophy departments, in New Zealand and elsewhere, offer critical thinking courses at first-year level. This is an opportunity for those involved in teaching these courses to discuss teaching strategies, learning objectives, curriculum design ideas and assessment methods. We will share ideas about what works and what doesn't. We may also explore the philosophical, logical, psychological and other considerations that inform our various approaches.

Knight, Lesley (Canterbury) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR4

Philosophy of the Arts

- ❖ “When we speak of ‘works of art’ we gibber”*:
Essentialism and Anti-essentialism About Art. (*Clive Bell, ‘The aesthetic hypothesis’ (1914))

Essentialism about art is the thesis that there is a property, or are properties, without which any given work could not be an artwork. At the present time it is widely held that there are no such necessary and sufficient properties for art. I will discuss the motivation for thinking about essentialism in the arts. Examples of essentialist and anti-essentialist theories of art will be presented. I conclude that essentialist and anti-essentialist theories all fail to capture ‘art’. Rather, I will argue, the term ‘art’ is grounded in conceptual confusion. In the interests of clarity, I argue that this term ‘art’ ought to be dispensed with.

Kocurek, Helga (Massey) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR5

Ontology

- ❖ **Actualism and Fatalism**

In the Dec 2006 AJP Michael C. Rea (‘Presentism and Fatalism’) puts forward an argument linking presentism with fatalism. Since presentism and actualism are very similar, as pointed out by Rea in the article, I will look at the analogous argument linking actualism with fatalism.

Kroon, Fred (Auckland) Thursday 9:10 – ALR5

Ontology

- ❖ **Reflections on the Gem**

In ‘Conceptual Idealism and Stove’s Gem’, Alan Musgrave excoriates a certain style of philosophical argument that he, following David Stove, calls ‘the Gem’: arguments of the form ‘One cannot stand in relation X to things unless C — a necessary condition for standing in relation X to things — is met. Therefore, one cannot stand in relation X to things-as-they-are-in-themselves.’ I agree that the argument-form is one we should deplore, but I also think that we should not rule out all instances of the form as equally hopeless – in particular, there is something quite compelling about instances that involve certain epistemic relations X (including, perhaps, the argument Kant gave for the claim that we cannot experience and know things-as-they-are-in-themselves). This paper describes an interpretation of “Gems” involving such epistemic relations X, and argues that, so interpreted, arguments of this type may well be defensible because of the way they give appropriate expression to a healthy epistemic humility rather than an unhealthy commitment to special “hyphenated” entities.

Kushnir, Greg (Waikato) Thursday 3:00 – ALR5

Ontology

- ❖ **Towards a Cognitive Structuralist Philosophy Of Mathematics**

In recent years Structuralism has become a predominant theory within philosophy of mathematics and a major arena for exploring central questions of ontology and epistemology of

mathematics. Structuralism is a theory according to which the subject matter of mathematics is structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of the associated objects. Mathematics is perceived as the exploration of structural possibilities, through concept formation, postulation and deduction.

In this paper I intend to point out to an Achilles heel in the Epistemology that underpins Mathematical Structuralism, namely, its failure to accord with our best scientific explanations. In the last 10-15 years rapid progress in cognitive science has shed light on some of the mysteries of mathematics as a human cognitive activity. New evidence as to the way humans acquire and practice mathematics threatens to undermine contemporary structuralist positions.

I will follow this by putting forward a hypothesis I dub 'Cognitive Structuralism' that seems to overcome the epistemological crisis within the structuralist framework. Utilizing cognitive science to provide naturalistic premises for a new structuralist epistemology, it promotes the notion of innate mathematics rather than abstractionism. Cognitive Structuralism bears promise of a more complete theory, accounting not only for the subject matter of mathematics but also explicating its origins and modus operandi as a human mental activity.

Lamont, John (Catholic Institute of Sydney) Thursday 4:30 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ A Defence of a Strong Version of the Eleatic Principle

The Eleatic Principle is defended, in different forms, by a number of contemporary philosophers. The paper formulates and defends a strong version of the principle, along the lines of Sydney Shoemaker, which asserts that all real properties of things just are causal features. The formulation offered attempts to avoid the pitfall of being self-refuting, and to capture the different kinds of causal features that things possess.

Shoemaker's epistemological argument for a strong Eleatic Principle is examined, and found to have some appeal – depending on who is being appealed to – but not to be conclusive. The best argument for such a principle is claimed to be an indirect one. If the principle is false, causal features of things must be one kind of real property among others. But hitherto all philosophical attempts to describe what particular kind of real property causation is have failed, and no future ones look like succeeding. A strong Eleatic Principle faces the 'always packing, never travelling' objection that is raised by Armstrong and others. It is argued that this objection is stronger than is usually admitted by defenders of the Eleatic Principle, and has not been satisfactorily answered to date. In order to answer it, the metaphysical picture assumed by these defenders, in which actualisations of causal power ultimately rest on bare powers, needs to be changed.

Lanzetta, Silvia (Macquarie) Tuesday 3:00 – ALR2

History of Philosophy

❖ Wittgenstein Within the Postmodern Debate

It is to Jean-François Lyotard that credit should be given for having placed Wittgenstein among those who initiated the “severe re-examination which postmodernity imposes on the thought of the Enlightenment, on the idea of a unitary end of history and of a subject”¹. However, Lyotard can also be discredited for having centred the postmodern elements of Wittgenstein’s thought far too generically “in his investigation of language games”², which, according to Lyotard, has “outlined . . . a kind of legitimation not based on performativity”³. This kind of legitimation is, in Lyotard’s account, precisely “what the postmodern world is all about”⁴. Lyotard has the *Philosophical Investigations*⁵ in mind. While Lyotard’s interpretation of the *Investigations* is disputable, parallels can definitely be traced between Lyotard’s *Postmodern condition*, which gives an account of scientific knowledge, first and foremost, as a kind of discourse, and Wittgenstein’s latest notes collected in *On Certainty*⁶.

In this paper, I will provide evidence that in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein is even more consistent and nihilist than Lyotard: the opportunity for the paralogic battle of local narrations against performativity is completely ruled out by language overpowering reality. Subsequently, the different formal systems can only cohabit, together with different ordinary languages.

Finally, I will show how Wittgenstein’s position fits within the most recent postmodern debate.

¹ Jean-François Lyotard: “Answering the question: what is postmodernism?”, Eng. tr. of “Réponse à la question: qu’est-ce que le postmoderne?”, translated by Régis Durand *Critique* 419 (April 1982), added as appendix in Jean-François Lyotard, *The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984, Eng. tr. of *La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir*, translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris 1979, p. 73

² Lyotard 1979, p. 41.

³ Lyotard 1979, p. 41.

⁴ Ibid..

⁵ Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Eng. tr. of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, edited and translated by E. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford 1953..

⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, Eng. tr. of *Über Gewissheit*, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford 1969.

Legg, Catherine (Waikato) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR4

❖ The Essential Icon: A Logical Investigation

Charles Peirce famously divided all signs into icons, indices and symbols. The past few decades have seen a broadening of mainstream philosophy from its traditional focus on symbolic signification to a recognition of the so-called “essential indexical”. Can the moral now be extended to icons? Is there an “essential icon”, and if so, what exactly would be essential about it? This talk is a beginning exploration of this question as it pertains to formal logic, taking into account Danielle Macbeth’s radical new ‘expressivist’ interpretation of Frege’s logic, and Charles Peirce’s existential graphs.

Lempp, Frieder (Victoria) Wednesday 4:00 – ALR4

❖ **Conflict Modelling Logic**

A conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent.[...] A conflict is resolved when some mutually compatible set of actions is worked out.“

As the above definition by political scientist Michael Nicholson shows, conflicts can be understood as inconsistent sets of actions, goals, beliefs, values, or the like. Conflict resolution, then, is the task to eliminate the inconsistencies of these sets. A logical representation helps to identify and, finally, eliminate the various inconsistencies that constitute a conflict.

In this paper I present the logical system CML (Conflict Modelling Logic) which can be used to model social conflicts, and sketch some ideas of CRL (Conflict Resolution Logic), a formal tool to generate solutions to conflicts previously modelled by CML.

I will introduce the syntax and semantics of CML and show how subsystems of it are related to established logics of time, necessity and action. After briefly addressing proof theoretic aspects of CML I will, finally, introduce some concepts of CRL and show how possible solutions to a conflict can be generated.

The formal framework, which I have developed as part of my PhD project, will be illustrated with examples of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Leuenberger, Stephan (Leeds) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ **Counterparts and Duplication**

Counterpart relations have been put forward as a solution to the problem of transworld identity of individuals. Some authors, e.g. Mark Heller, invoked counterpart relations for properties as well. Drawing on recent work by Tim Maudlin, I argue that even the answer to the question whether two individuals in a single worlds agree, or are duplicates, with respect to a determinable, is sometimes relative to a counterpart relation: there is a problem of “translocus identity” of properties within a single world. This can be motivated by considering the question whether two things on the surface of the earth have the same velocity. The answer depends on how we reidentify directions in different points, and there is no privileged way to do this on a curved surface. The problem arises even on a flat surface, as I bring out by discussing the asymmetric magnets problem, due to Brian Weatherston. Finally, I discuss an application of counterpart theory to the properties considered by Maudlin: properties postulated in gauge theories such as quantum chromodynamics, e.g. quark color.

Lumsden, David (Waikato) Thursday 4:30 – ALR2

❖ **In Praise of Nonsense**

Do philosophers talk nonsense? If this question, put to us by Ian Dearden, is taken to mean, “Do philosophers from time to time talk nonsense?” then it seems natural to answer, yes they do, along with many other people in various walks of life. Dearden by and large answers “no”, though his reasoning mainly

concerns the claims made by verificationists, Wittgensteinians and others (all labeled 'nonsensicalists') that some of their opponents are speaking nonsense. He understands speaking nonsense as being subject to the illusion that what one is saying is meaningful. Dearden is convincing when arguing there is a flaw in the kind of arguments nonsensicalists use against their opponents, but it does not follow that nonsense is not spoken by many of us from time to time. I shall investigate how there can be illusions of meaning and relate that to the task of constructing theories of meaning. I shall also point to ways in which illusions of meaning can be valuable.

Madison, Brent (University College London) Thursday 3:00 – ALR4

❖ **Is Justification Knowledge?**

There are many contemporary debates in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. For example, can beliefs be justified through coherence alone; is justified belief responsible belief; is justification 'internalist' or 'externalist' in nature -- to name but a few. One thing that is common ground, however, is that whatever else might be true of justification, epistemic justification is distinct from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this is deeply mistaken¹. Sutton argues for a surprising and unorthodox thesis, namely: justification *is* knowledge. He claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a consequence of Sutton's view is that there are no false justified beliefs, since only truths can be known.

Following Sutton, I will begin by outlining two types of beliefs that do not constitute knowledge but that seem to be justified. I will then survey the concepts of justification Sutton discusses and his identification of two of them with knowledge. I will then be in a position to critically evaluate Sutton's four arguments for his position that justification is knowledge, concluding that he fails to establish his bold thesis.

¹ See Jonathan Sutton (2005) "Stick To What You Know" in *Nous*. 39:3, as well as his full-length monograph, Sutton (2007) *Without Justification*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Maslen, Cei (Victoria) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR4

❖ **Causal Pluralism and Capricious Judgments of Pre-emption**

I'm about to be hit by a bus, so you push me in front of a truck. Either way, I die. But we say that it was your push rather than the presence of the bus that was a cause of my death. Sadly, we seem to be lacking a single theory that can account for all our intuitions in cases of this sort. This is the problem of pre-emption, a problem that has often been given centre stage in evaluating theories of causation. Why is this such a difficult problem and what are the prospects for finding a successful solution if the recently popular view of causal pluralism is correct?

Mason, Carolyn (Canterbury) Thursday 3:00 – ALR3

Ethics

❖ **Are Agent-Relational Reasons More Basic than Agent-Neutral Reasons?**

In recent articles and in his book, Mark Schroeder argues that there are agent-relational reasons of the form "Aaron has reason to help Katie" that cannot be explained in terms of any agent-neutral reason, "There is reason to help Katie". Schroeder suggests that this shows that arguments that agent-relational reasons are derived from agent-neutral reasons must be false, and thus that John Broome, certain rationalists, and consequentialists, are mistaken. Instead, Schroeder argues that "agent relational reasons are basic, and that agent-neutral reasons arise when something is an agent-relational reason for everyone". He concludes that this supports a broad Humean theory of reasons. Schroeder's approach to the debate about the Humean theory of reasons is unique, and the conclusions he draws are important for debates about reasons and ethics. However, Schroeder's conceptions of agent-neutral and agent-relational reasons and the claims that are made about the relationship between the two are not straightforward. I consider whether Schroeder's account of disagreements about the nature of reasons fairly represents the alternatives.

Matthen, Mohan (Toronto) Monday 4:30 – ALR5

Ontology/Philosophy of Mind

❖ **Auditory Objects**

What do we *directly* hear? In this paper, I examine the view that we hear sounds. My aim is to show that while everything we

directly hear *consists* of sounds, the latter have no priority from the perspective of audition. At any given time, a perceiver is conscious of a temporally extended auditory scene in which there are melodies, harmonies, sequences of phonemes, individual voices, meaning-carrying sounds, and so on. Each of these is composed of sounds, but, I shall argue, each is directly apprehended. Auditory ontology is more complicated than philosophers have hitherto recognized. The auditory system constructs a number of overlapping objects in any given auditory soundscape. The very same sounds may simultaneously belong to more than one of these objects: for instance, the sounds that constitute a sentence may also constitute a melody in parts, sung by two individual human voices. I conclude by attempting to indicate how aesthetic appreciation depends on this variety.

McKeown-Green, Jonathan (Auckland) Monday 1:30 – ALR4

❖ **How to Tell Languages Apart**

Chomsky has repeatedly argued that there are no public languages, or, at any rate, none that are of any interest to the empirical science of linguistics. One strand in his attack on public languages is the contention that socio-political, rather than linguistic, facts settle whether I speak Norwegian or Swedish and whether Madonna and I speak different languages or different dialects. Chomsky also notes that Dutch shares more linguistic similarities with certain dialects of (Low) German than those dialects share with other so-called dialects of German. He suspects that any taxonomy of public languages will be faulty in these sorts of ways.

I tease out several strands in Chomsky's dismissal of public language individuation and ask whether any scientifically respectable taxonomy of them could survive it. I use the term "Linguistic Project Relativism" to describe the kind of individuation policy which would apply to public languages if there were any. The idea is that what counts as a language depends on which phenomena interest you. If you are exploring the systematic differences in vowel-fronting tendencies between speakers of rural and urban English in New Zealand, then Rural New Zealand English and Urban New Zealand English count as distinct languages for you. If you are studying the underlying similarities between (folk) English and other West Germanic (folk) tongues, then the differences between rural and urban New Zealand English are intralinguistic, relative to your project. There are no public languages *simpliciter*, but language might still be an essentially social phenomenon in at least some respects.

McKeown-Green, Jonathan and Justine Kingsbury (Conveners) (Auckland and Waikato) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR4

Teaching Critical Thinking

❖ **A Roundtable Discussion.**

Most philosophy departments, in New Zealand and elsewhere, offer critical thinking courses at first-year level. This is an opportunity for those involved in teaching these courses to discuss teaching strategies, learning objectives, curriculum design ideas and assessment methods. We will share ideas about what works and what doesn't. We may also explore the

philosophical, logical, psychological and other considerations that inform our various approaches.

McLennan, Stuart (Otago) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR3

Bioethics

❖ **Healer, Heal Thyself: Healthcare Workers and the Influenza Vaccination**

Despite studies demonstrating that the annual influenza vaccination of healthcare workers is associated with a reduction in morbidity and mortality among the patients they care for, and New Zealand District Health Boards (DHBs) having voluntary programmes to provide the influenza vaccine to healthcare workers free of charge, vaccination rates among healthcare workers are dismal, with only about 20%-40% coverage rates being achieved. With these low rates posing a serious health threat to the vulnerable patient populations that are entrusted into healthcare workers' care, this has been a controversial issue for some time now. There has not been, however, an adequate ethical analysis of the duty of care in relation to this issue. I seek to remedy that situation, and will argue that there is an ethical basis in the duties attached to healthcare work for healthcare workers to be vaccinated against influenza. I will also explore the legal dimensions of this issue, arguing that DHBs are currently failing to meet the legal duties imposed on them under New Zealand law. Taking into account both ethical and legal factors, I will recommend a way to rectify this situation.

McLennan, Stuart and Grant Gillett (Otago) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR2

❖ **Broomean all too Broomean**

John Broome argues that rationality and the giving of reasons are a matter of cognitive processes that obey canons of licensed transition between propositions but he does not clarify the status of propositions vis a vis our relation to the world. When we attempt to do so we find that something like a truth tracking relationship should be at the heart of practical reasoning rather than the kinds of operation Broome suggests. If that is so then it may be that a model according to which non-rational considerations ought to affect our reasoning is likely to be much more adequate such that autonomy is best seen as self rule in accordance with techniques of linking oneself to the truth (about oneself and the world). The scope of arguments then widens beyond logic and its devices to something like moral sense and the apprehension of a gestalt demanded by the situation but not reducible to propositions or a calculus involving them.

McMillan, John (Hull) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR5

Bioethics

❖ **John Harris, the non-identity problem and reproductive technologies**

The non-identity problem is the moral puzzle that can result when we contemplate taking measures to avoid harm to a future person that alter the identity of this person. John Harris and other philosophers respond to the non-identity problem in

a way that appears to have a number of important implications for public policy and reproductive technologies.

Harris¹ criticises the conservative position on surrogacy in the Brazier Report² suggesting it does not realize the implications of the non-identity problem for public policy. In an article about sex selection for social reasons³ Harris criticises the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority for not acknowledging the implications of the non-identity problem for sex selection.⁴ In an article co-authored with Justine Burley he argues that the non-identity problem implies a permissive position on human cloning⁵.

This paper will discuss five objections to the way that Harris and others use the non-identity problem.

1. Harris teases out one implication of the non-identity problem, while failing to acknowledge the implications that Parfit derives from this problem. In *Reasons and Persons*⁶ Parfit argues that altering identity does not matter: a claim which appears to contradict the implications that Harris seeks to draw. In fact, Harris's use of the non-identity problem is better described as an instance of 'wrongful life' than the non-identity problem.
2. At some points, Harris suggests that it is possible for a welfare relation to hold between a child and a non-existent child. I will suggest a way out of this worry.
3. Harris, along with Julian Savulescu and others, who cite the non-identity problem, assume that small genetic changes will necessitate a change in the identity of the person caused to exist. This 'origin essentialism', or the view that any change to the actual origins of a person will

necessitate a change in the identity of that person, is controversial.

4. There is no acknowledgement in Harris's articles of rival solutions to the non-identity problem. I will argue that the 'rights based' accounts developed by Woodward, O'Neill and Archard have more than a degree of plausibility.
5. Harris misquotes the central provision of the relevant legislation, the *Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990*, in a way that makes his argument less implausible. A correct reading of the Act sits more comfortably with a 'rights based' solution to the non-identity problem.

¹ John Harris "The Welfare of the Child" in *Health Care Analysis* (Vol 8. No.1. 2000. 27-34.)

² Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell, Susan Golombok. *Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers*

³ John Harris "Sex Selection and Regulated Hatred" *Journal of Medical Ethics* (online version December 2003)

⁴ Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority *Sex Selection: Options for Regulation* (<http://www.hfea.gov.uk> last accessed 5/03/05)

⁵ Justine Burley and John Harris "Human cloning and Child Welfare" in the *Journal of Medical Ethics* (Vol.25.No.2. April 1999 108-114.)

⁶ Derek Parfit *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)

McQueen, Kelvin (Otago) Monday 3:00 – ALR5

Ontology/Philosophy of Mind

❖ Problems for Levine's Externalist Defence of Materialism

In his "two-dimensional argument against materialism", David Chalmers invokes a conception of the explanatory gap that is steeped within a rich conception of apriority, one that assumes that the class of a priori truths is very extensive. So much so, in fact, that he believes that one can in principle infer, with apriori reasoning alone, all our macrophysical truths (excluding truths about consciousness) from a sufficient microphysical description of the world. The explanatory gap, for Chalmers, lies in the fact that our concept of consciousness is not constituted by any apriori functional role specification, unlike ordinary macrophysical concepts, necessary for the apriori inference from microphysics. To defend materialism, Joseph Levine, in his book "Purple Haze", restricts the set of apriori truths almost entirely to the truths of formal logic, bringing macrophysical concepts in line with our concept of consciousness, at least as it pertains to apriority. He does this with a critical discussion of apriority and an appeal to a causal theory of reference, the implication being that no interesting truths can be derived apriori from microphysics, thus deflating Chalmers' explanatory gap conception. I shall respond to Levine in two ways. Firstly, I shall argue that causal theories of reference suffer from the so-called "qua-problem" so badly that the only solution is to embrace Chalmer's conception of the apriori. Secondly, I shall argue that Levine's conception of apriority makes the apriori/aposteriori distinction seem arbitrary – while Chalmers' doesn't.

Meinhold, Roman (National University of Lesotho) Tuesday 4:30 – ALR2

Philosophy of the Arts

❖ **Catharsis in Horror and Terror: A Culture-Philosophical Approach at the Intersection of Ritual, Film and Therapy**

Certain forms of catharsis involve horrifying and/or terrifying experiences (in a Basotho healing ritual for example a limb of finger will be cut for all sorts of therapeutic purposes); or – to put it the other way round – one of the results of horrifying and terrifying experiences can be a catharsis (despite the fact that in many cases the result of such experiences will be traumatic).

The paper aims to compare catharsis in 1) film involving violence, 2) Southern African rituals and 3) psychotherapy. The main purpose of this paper is to find out under which circumstances and in which contexts the result of horror and terror can be a catharsis. The paper is divided into six sections. The first section defines the notions of catharsis, horror and terror in this particular context. The second, third and fourth part deal with manifestations of catharsis due to fear, horror, terror and violence in film, Southern African rituals and psychotherapy. The fifth part highlights and compares commonalities of catharsis induced by horror and terror in these three spheres and the last part traces those commonalities back to concepts of human nature to explain the attributes and the essence of catharsis between the poles of human nature and culture.

Monro, Alice (Victoria) Wednesday 1:20 – ALR3

Bioethics

❖ **Should We Genetically Enhance Our Intelligence? – Responding to the Reversal Test Argument**

In a paper published in the journal *Ethics*, Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord apply the “Reversal Test” in order to argue for the use of genetic technologies to enhance human cognitive capacity. The Reversal Test begins with the assumption that practically no-one would endorse genetically lowering human intelligence. This then presents a challenge to opponents of cognitive enhancement: to maintain that we should neither decrease *nor* increase our cognitive capabilities is to imply that our current level of intelligence is at its local optimum, and this is a claim that needs sound justification. Bostrom and Ord contend that there are in fact no *good* reasons for supposing that our current level of intelligence (the status quo) is optimal, and that opposition to enhancing intelligence is attributable to a psychological “status quo bias”, i.e. “an inappropriate (irrational) preference for an option because it preserves the status quo.” These facts, they argue, lend more weight to the view that we should, after all, genetically enhance our cognitive capacities.

My aim is to meet the Reversal Test challenge. I intend to deny that opposition to enhancing human intelligence can be solely explained by a status quo bias and argue that there are in fact good reasons for opposing cognitive enhancement.

Moore, Andrew (Otago) Thursday 1:30 – ALR3***Ethics/Social Theory*****❖ What Makes for a Good Ethical Theory?**

Many arguments on behalf of rival ethical theories appeal to claims about what makes for a good or plausible theory of this sort. But there are relatively few systematic discussions of the nature and number of these desirable features themselves and of the grounds for taking them to be desirable. This paper explores that relatively neglected terrain. It argues, *inter alia*, that we need an account of desirable features for ethical *theories* and also for *ethical* theories; that there are some methodological considerations that should inform development of any such account; that there are several different variants of such an account; and that there is a modest plurality of different features, each of which adds non-decisively to the merits of any ethical theory that has that feature. The paper engages with recent work of, amongst others, Brad Hooker and Mark Timmons.

Normore, Calvin (UCLA) Monday 1:30 – ALR2***History of Philosophy*****❖ Ockham and Buridan on What There Are**

Ockham insisted that there were only particular substances and particular qualities. John Buridan was willing to countenance some particular quantities as well but there he drew the line. Nonetheless both Ockham and Buridan were willing to count as true such sentences as “There is a striking similarity between Peter and Paula”. Their proposal was that such nouns as ‘similarity’ pick out the very objects which are similar but,

whereas such nouns as ‘human’ might pick out Peter and Paula singularly, ‘similarity’ would pick them out pairwise. They extended this strategy to a vast array of cases their contemporaries (and ours) treat by introducing new entities. The strategy Ockham and Buridan adopt has similarities to plural quantification of the sort studied by George Boolos and his followers but there are differences induced in part by differences in the underlying logic employed. This paper explores the strategy Ockham and Buridan develop, discusses its relation to that suggested by Boolos et al. and considers the advantages of the medieval approach.

Oddie, Graham (Colorado at Boulder) Monday 9:10 – ALR5**❖ What’s So Bad About Pain Anyway?**

A standard thesis about pain is that it is necessarily a bad thing that may also be contingently good. It is necessarily bad because the experiences of pain are bad in themselves. However it may be, in addition, contingently good, because those experiences may in fact alert us to actual and possible bodily damage that we need to respond to quickly. Pain and pleasure have, of course, played a central role in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of value. Typically those interested in the one are not so interested in the other, so theorizing about the nature of pain and pleasure, on the one hand, tends not to overlap much with theorizing about the value of pain and pleasure on the other. But this is a bit schizophrenic. The different demands placed on pleasure and pain in these different branches of philosophy should surely mesh together in a single unified account. I examine three different accounts of pain and of pleasure. Each has something to say in its favor but none of

them is completely adequate. Finally I consider whether we can amalgamate the best features of all of these in a fourth account. I think we can, but the resulting account comes tantalizingly close to turning the standard thesis on its head.

Parsell, Mitch (Macquarie) Wednesday 9:10 – ALR1

Philosophy of Biology

❖ **Non-Encapsulated Social Skills: Empirical Evidence from Eye-Gaze against Information Encapsulation**

Since social skills are highly significant to the success of humans, we should expect these skills to be efficient and reliable. For many Evolutionary Psychologists efficiency entails encapsulation: the only way to get an efficient system is via information encapsulation. But encapsulation reduces reliability in opaque epistemic domains. And, as Sterelny has shown, the social domain is darkly opaque: people lie and cheat, and deliberately hide their intentions and deceptions. Modest modularity (Currie and Sterelny, 2000) attempts to combine efficiency and reliability. Reliability is obtained by placing social skills in un-encapsulated central cognition; efficiency by having the system sensitive to upward encapsulated socially tagged cues. In this paper, I argue that this approach fails because the most plausible examples of such upward encapsulated cues—a range of data from the eye-gaze literature—are subject to downward influences from central cognition.

Parsons, Josh (Otago) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR5

❖ **The Shapes of Incongruent counterparts**

In this paper, I suggest a way of thinking about shape which preserves three principles often held to be conflict. First, that shapes are intrinsic; second, that shapes that differ only in their handedness (such as a left-handed glove and a right-handed glove) differ in shape; third, that it's conceptually and metaphysically possible that space is non-orientable, so that a glove that fits on my left hand could travel rigidly through space and fit on my right hand when it returns.

Perszyk, Ken, and John Bishop (Victoria and Auckland) Friday 4:30 – ALR4

Philosophy of Religion

❖ **The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil**

There is a wide consensus that the 'Evidential' Argument from Evil poses the most serious threat to traditional 'omniGod' theism, and that the 'Logical' form of the Argument is bankrupt. There is also a growing consensus that the fate of the Evidential Argument from Evil rests on the Skeptical Theist reply - and we incline to the view that some version of this reply succeeds. In this paper we argue that this emerging consensus underestimates the force of the Argument from Evil, obscuring the fact that considerations about actual concrete evils in the world can provide decisive grounds for reasonable people to reject omniGod's existence. We argue that it is the Logical Argument from Evil that best expresses these grounds, at least relative to certain value commitments that reasonable people may hold.

Pigden, Charles (Otago) Tuesday 4:05 ALR3

Ethics/History of Philosophy

❖ **What Was Hume Really Up To With 'No-Ought-From-Is'?**

According to Hume, a 'small attention' to this point - that it 'seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation [ought] can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it' - would 'subvert all the vulgar systems of morality'. But what exactly are these 'vulgar systems' and how is 'No-Ought-From-Is' supposed to subvert them? A common view is that the vulgar systems are cognitive, and that No-Ought-From-Is is supposed to subvert them by vindicating non-cognitivism. This, as I have previously argued, is a mistake. But if it is a mistake, we still have a puzzle. I shall endeavour to solve this puzzle by explaining the part that 'No-Ought-From-Is' plays in Hume's over-arching argument and why this principle, trumpeted in the *Treatise*, is quietly dropped in the *Enquiry*.

Ransome, Bill (Griffith) Thursday 9:10 – ALR4

❖ **Sincerity and Self-Deception**

This paper offers a review and clarification of the concepts of sincerity and self-deception, and challenges two traditional views, one about the limitations of sincerity with respect to self-deception, and the other concerning the status of sincerity as a virtue. On one traditional view, a necessary condition of sincerity is congruence between avowal and actual states – sincere agents must actually be in or possess the admirable states or motives they avow. This view appears to rule out self-deceived sincerity. However, being self-deceived does not rule out sincerity, since it is a sufficient condition of sincerity that

avowals match self-understanding, not underlying states. The spectre of self-deceived sincerity subsequently raises doubts about the status of sincerity as a virtue. Sincerity *qua* ethical virtue appears to derive much of its status from the fact that we assume or trust that sincere agents actually possess the laudable motives to which their avowals refer. However, since ethical sincerity often occurs in the absence of these admirable states, it seems reasonable to question the extent to which sincerity has earned its status. I conclude by suggesting that although ethical sincerity can be considered valuable, it is capable too of disguising significant ethical failure.

Rini, Adriane (Massey) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR2

History of Philosophy

❖ **No Animal is a Contingent Horse**

Since in Aristotle's metaphysics anything that is a horse is a horse by an essential nature – i.e. by necessity – it would seem that Aristotle should count

(1) No animal is a contingent horse

as *true*. This talk looks at how Aristotle's treatment of negatives puts curious limits on just what he is able to say in his logic, and shows why (1) may cause him problems.

Robinson, Denis (Auckland) Thursday 1:30 – ALR1

❖ **Neurath's Raft Meets the Ship of Theseus - Reflections on Personal Identity and Conceptual Analysis**

Prima facie, the central question in the philosophy of personal identity - what are the constitutive criteria for personal

continuity and persistence over time? - might be thought a straightforwardly factual question to which one might expect, give or take a little vagueness, a reasonably straight answer. But some strands of thought in the recent philosophy of personal identity run counter to such expectations, seeing the criteria for personal persistence as relative to the practices, feelings, and moral and prudential values of communities or individuals, perhaps even to those of the very individuals whose persistence-criteria are in question.

My remarks will be intended to shed some light on the question "How could this happen?", and will take the form of general ruminations on what the problem of personal identity, and the practice of conceptual analysis, can tell us about each other. I won't so much talk about relativist positions, but about the obstacles in the way of giving a straight answer. Toward the end I'll comment on some connections with issues in ethics.

Roe, Kelly (ANU) Thursday 3:00 – ALR2

❖ Malfunction and Harm: Why the Distinction Doesn't Work to Ground Psychiatry

In response to anti-psychiatrists who maintain that there is little more to mental disorder than social and / or moral norm violation, theorists have attempted to appeal to different objective notions of malfunction that are to be discovered by the natural sciences quite independently of our values. In this talk I hope to show that the main ways of cashing out malfunction are dependent on the notion of harm to the extent that the distinction fails to successfully ground psychiatry in the natural sciences in a way that is independent of our social and / or moral values. As such, we should expect the issue of what

conditions are appropriately regarded as mental disorders (e.g., addiction? sociopathy?) to be determined more by our getting clearer on the relevant evaluative notion of harm than by advances in the natural sciences.

Schaffer, Jonathan (ANU) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR5

Ontology

❖ Spacetime the One Substance

What is the relation between material objects and spatiotemporal regions? Suppose that spacetime is substantialist. There remains the question of whether (i) objects and regions are two distinct sorts of substances, linked by a fundamental relation of occupation; or (ii) objects just are regions by another name. This is the question of dualistic versus monistic substantialism.

I will defend the monistic view. On the monistic picture I will defend, there is the spatiotemporal manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned directly to it.

Scholes, Vanessa (Open Polytechnic of New Zealand) Thursday 1:30 – ALR3

Social Theory

❖ Grounding Policy in Philosophy: the State's Democratic Responsibility With Respect to Providing Education

In this paper I will use an applied philosophy approach to comment on the provision of education in society. I will work through a consideration of the State's responsibilities for the provision of education to children and adolescents, before

turning to focus on tertiary education; that is, the education of adult learners. A central question I want to answer is whether New Zealand has a responsibility to provide some free tertiary education for adults. I will offer a very brief sketch of key responsibilities a democratic State (such as New Zealand) has, and draw on these in discussing the State's responsibilities to provide an education system for children. I will then address the provision of tertiary education, arguing that the responsibility to facilitate *representative democracy* in society grounds an obligation for the State to offer some lower-level tertiary education for free in New Zealand.

Shaw-Williams, Kim (Victoria) Wednesday 2:35 – ALR2

Philosophy of Biology

❖ **Why We Are The Way We Are: The Triggering Track-ways Theory**

The Laetoli fossilized hominin track-ways, dated at 3.5 myrs ago, do not just prove that our ancestors were fully bipedal by then. They also prove incontrovertibly that we were intelligent enough to be aware of conspecific footprints. I am suggesting that entering the unique cognitive niche of learning to 'read' each other's footprints, via decoupled mental representations, led to being able to narratively imagine absent fellow agents acting towards goals, and the cognitive capacity to understand thematic grammar. This raised the crucible of social complexity to a level not seen in any fellow primate, and a cognitive arms-race centred round being able to know what fellow troupe members were up to anywhere else in time or space, not just associatively in the here and now, began. When we began to also use this unique cognitive skill for hunting and gathering,

an enormous fuel for success was introduced to the social/group selection for increase in human brain size or capacity for memory. This selection pressure is what led to the capacity to think recursively using fully arbitrary or symbolic signals, and finally we invented the cognitive tool of linguistic communication. In other words, entering the unique cognitive niche of reading track-ways at the very beginning of our evolutionary trajectory could constitute what Kim Sterelny has called our 'evolutionary vindication': why we are the way we are.

Swanton, Christine (Auckland) Tuesday 10:55 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **The Emotional Disclosure of Ethics**

Moral Theories giving prominence to the role of emotion in ethics, such as virtue ethics, have been insufficiently radical in placing emotion at the metaphysical heart of ethics. In this paper I explicate Heidegger's conception of truth as disclosure or aleithia to show how emotion can play this role. Central is the idea of a Grundstimmung or fundamental emotional attunement which "discloses" the ethical aspect of the world. I illustrate this notion with the help of Heidegger's long discussion of boredom, and, of central ethical relevance, the idea of 'lovingness' as a background 'totalizing' emotional attunement. I show how the emotional disclosure of ethics can avoid relativistic and non-realist positions in ethics.

Tanaka, Koji (Auckland) Monday 4:30 – ALR4

❖ **Logic, Ontology and Semantics**

Kant held that (pure general) logic is a maximally general science. He took this to mean that logic is concerned with understanding (and thought) as such. Moreover, he inferred from this that logic deals with abstractions from the objects. Frege rejected this inference of Kant's and argued that logic does tell us something, in fact a lot, about objects (i.e., numbers). Now, Russell's paradox is sometimes thought to have refuted Frege's view of logic and vindicated Kant's view of logic. In this paper, I examine Frege's view of logic and show that Russell's paradox does not, in fact, refute Frege's view. In so doing, I try to reinvigorate Frege's view of logic which has given way to Tarski's metamathematical approach to logic.

Tersman, Folke (Auckland/Uppsala) Thursday 10:55 – ALR3

Ethics

❖ **Are Ethical Non-Cognitivists Committed to Non-Cognitivism About (Theoretical) Rationality?**

Frank Jackson has argued (in "Non-Cognitivism, Normativity, Belief") that non-cognitivism about theoretical rationality (discourse about when beliefs are justified, rationally held, etc) leads to the implausible conclusion that there are no beliefs and no believers. This is not only taken to refute non-cognitivism about that particular discourse, however. It also, Jackson suggests, casts doubt over ethical non-cognitivism, as he assumes that being an ethical non-cognitivist commits one to being a non-cognitivist about theoretical rationality. My aim in this paper is twofold: First, to show that Jackson's *reductio ad*

absurdum of non-cognitivism about theoretical rationality fails, and, second, to question the background assumption that ethics and theoretical rationality must be given a unified treatment. I argue that there are significant differences between these discourses that may justify the adoption of a "mixed verdict": non-cognitivism about ethics and some form of cognitivism or realism about theoretical rationality.

Townley, Cynthia (Macquarie) Tuesday 1:30 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **What is Wrong with Betrayal?**

Cheshire Calhoun (1995) and Annette Baier (2004) have developed analyses of integrity and virtue that incorporate individual and social aspects of morality. Baier has characterised virtues as "essentially regulated attitudes to our mutual power and vulnerability, where the regulation serves to improve a climate of trust" ('Demoralization, Trust and the Virtues' in *Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers* ed. Cheshire Calhoun, p. 184). It might seem that preserving or improving a climate of trust precludes betrayal, which involves renegeing on commitments and/or deception. Calhoun has pointed out that integrity need not preclude ambivalence, specifically when an agent belongs to different communities with different normative demands. In some cases, loyalty, fidelity, promises and other commitments will have been misguided – decisions to promise or to sign up can be made in error, haste or ignorance, or under pernicious conditions of manipulation or brainwashing. Hence some circumstances might require revision or recalibration of commitments. This inconstancy, like the ambivalence Calhoun

identifies, might be construed as betrayal by one or another group. In this paper I deploy Baier's and Calhoun's analyses to distinguish real and perceived betrayal, and to connect the wrongness of betrayal with arrogance rather than deceit.

Turton, Daniel (Victoria) Monday 3:00 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Reviving Hedonism about the Good Life: Rejecting the Objection from False Pleasures**

In this seminar I will argue that a particular hedonistic theory can revive hedonism, at least to the level of plausibility, about the prudentially good life (subjective well-being).

First, I will provide an account of pleasure, the Simple Scientific Account, which is informed by recent neuroscience and the folk conception of pleasure. This will be followed by a brief explanation of hedonistic views about 'the prudentially good life.' Then, I will discuss the most important objection to hedonism; false pleasures. Many philosophers view the objection from false pleasures as knock-down against hedonism – which is why it is in need of revival! The false pleasures objection is often thought to show that truth is also valuable (when evaluating how good a life is for the one living it) because pleasures based on truth are more valuable than those based on deception. I will explain how the thought experiments used to convince us of true pleasures' higher value are misleading, which reveals that the false pleasures objection has much less force than its proponents suppose.

Combined with the assumption that the other objections can also be refuted, this will allow me to conclude the following: Since there is no good reason to disbelieve that pleasure is the

only relevant consideration when evaluating how good a life is for the one living it, then hedonism is a plausible view about 'the good life'.

Van Zyl, Liezl (Waikato) Tuesday 9:10 – ALR3

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Accidental Rightness**

I discuss a case where an agent performs a right act by accident: The agent, concerned only with furthering his own interests, and not for a moment considering his obligations to others, nevertheless performs an act that turns out to be exactly what is morally required. I argue that if we do not take "right" to imply moral praise but simply to mean "obligatory", then the phenomenon of "accidental rightness" does not present us with a contradiction. However, it does provide us with a reason to focus our attention on good (or virtuous) action as the locus of morality, rather than on right (or obligatory) action. While I believe that this shift in focus is appropriate, the question still remains as to what a virtue ethicist can say about moral obligation, as well as related "deontic" concepts such as permissibility, duty and rights. Can virtue ethics give an account of moral obligation, or should it get rid of obligation-talk altogether?

Vigani, Denise (Auckland) Monday 11:00 – ALR3

Ethics and Social Theory

❖ **Virtue Ethics and Future Generations: Responding to Parfit**

Responding to the issues that Derek Parfit raises in Part Four of *Reasons and Persons*, I explore what virtue ethics has to say about decisions that affect future generations. I argue that, for the virtue ethicist, decisions affecting future generations do not require any alteration of the decision-making process, although future generations can be and are taken into moral consideration when the situation calls for it. While I maintain that the virtue ethicist cannot, but has no need to, directly respond to Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion, I do offer an indirect response for the sake of the debate, concluding that the virtue ethicist is not bound to any repugnant conclusions. I also argue that adherence to virtue ethics would not lead to any dire consequences regarding the world population. Finally, I conclude that Parfit's problems seem to be self-created as a result of his utilitarian inclinations.

Walsh, Adrian (UNE, Armidale) Thursday 4:30 – ALR3

Ethics and Social Theory

❖ **Moral Inconceivability and the Methods of Ethical Inquiry**

It is sometimes claimed that there are thoughts which are so morally repugnant that no virtuous agent could entertain them, for to do so would necessarily lead to or involve moral corruption. Let us call these thoughts the 'morally inconceivable'. They are inconceivable in the sense that one cannot conceive of them without doing significant damage to

one's moral character. In this paper I explore whether the category of the morally inconceivable could be extended to regulate the conduct of ethical inquiry. Some philosophers have argued that certain bizarre and gruesome thought experiments involve morally inconceivable thinking. Equally, following Bernard Williams' idea of the one-thought-too-many, it might well be argued that at least in some circumstances the use of general moral principles involves the morally inconceivable. In this paper I argue that although there are indeed questions to which one should not respond and imaginary scenarios that one should not in earnest entertain, the arguments discussed do not provide justificatory grounds for placing constraints on the use either of thought experiments or of general moral principles.

Wicks, Robert (Auckland) Wednesday 10:55 – ALR2

Philosophy of the Arts/History of Philosophy

❖ **Natural Beauty and Optimism in Schopenhauer's Aesthetics**

Schopenhauer regards aesthetic experience as a means to salvation, but some of his remarks about natural beauty ascribe to it a negative value. Specifically, he describes natural beauty as a false glitter that misleads us into believing optimistically that the world is intrinsically benevolent. This raises the question of how Schopenhauer allows himself to be positively inspired by natural phenomena such as rainbows and sunbeams, when he realizes that natural beauty is so deceiving. It is also a well-known scriptural matter that Buddha became enlightened upon observing the morning star, and held up a single flower to transmit his state of enlightenment to others. Among the subjects of this essay is how, within a

Schopenhauerian perspective, such instances of natural beauty can consistently stimulate an enlightened state of mind, when Schopenhauer claims that from a metaphysical standpoint, their inspiring charm should not be taken seriously. This problem is addressed within the broader context of describing how Schopenhauer's negative valuation of natural beauty reveals an inner teleology within his aesthetics that ultimately displays three different types of wisdom in an ascending order. These are aesthetically-acquired wisdom, morally-acquired wisdom and ascetically-acquired wisdom, the latter two of which are tempered by the suffering that natural beauty leads us to ignore.

Wood, David (Melbourne (Law)) Thursday 9:10 – ALR2

Ethics/Social Theory

❖ **Retributive and Communicative Theories of Punishment**

The paper is concerned with the relation between retributive and communicative theories of punishment, and attempts to develop joint retributive-communicative theories. The central issue for such a theorist is to show why condemnation or censure need taken the form of hard treatment. The paper concentrates on the dispute between two leading protagonists, Anthony Duff and Andrew von Hirsch, and considers whether a third such theorist, John Tasioulas, offers a way forward.

SOME REFERENCES

R.A.Duff, *Punishment, Communication and Community* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001).

-----, 'In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara', (2000) 24 *Melbourne University Law Review* 411

-----, 'Punishment, Communication and Community', in Matt Matravers, ed., *Punishment and Political Theory* 48 (Hart, Oxford, 1999)

John Tasioulas, 'Punishment and Repentance', (2006) 81 *Philosophy* 279

A. von Hirsch, *Censure and Sanctions* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1993)

A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, *Proportionate Sentencing* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005)

David Wood, 'Retribution, Harm Reduction, and the Justification of Punishment', (2002) 22 *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 301

-----, 'Retributive and Corrective Justice, Criminal and Private Law', (2005) 48 *Scandinavian Studies in Law (Perspectives on Jurisprudence: Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup, ed. Peter Wahlgren)* 541